Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

867.00/5–1148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 11, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Huseyin Ragip Baydur, Turkish Ambassador Secretary Marshall
	Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs

I received the Turkish Ambassador this afternoon at his request. He told me that under instructions from his Government, he had come to bring to my attention the concern of his Government lest the United States should grant what he termed certain guarantees to the countries of Western Europe² against aggression without simultaneously granting similar guarantees to Turkey.

In elaborating on this statement, the Ambassador made the following two points:

1. The extension by the United States of security guarantees to Western Europe of a character which it does not extend simultaneously to Turkey may give the Russians, with the mentality of whom the Ambassador is well acquainted as a result of having served seven years as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the impression that although they might risk a conflict with the United States by engaging in acts of aggression against Western Europe, they might be able with comparative safety to commit aggression against Turkey. If the Russians should obtain such an impression, they would undoubtedly increase their activities aimed at undermining the independence and integrity of Turkey.

2. Most of the Turkish people at the present time are united in backing the policy of the Turkish Government to resist Russian pressure. Nevertheless, a small Turkish minority follows the line that it is hopeless for a small country like Turkey over a long period to stand up under the pressures of a great country like the Soviet Union. This minority group, therefore, advocates the submission by Turkey to Soviet demands and the voluntary entry of Turkey into the Soviet sphere of influence. The new Soviet Ambassador has been probing in Turkey for a soft spot through which he can attack Turkish unity. Any action on the part of the United States displaying greater interest in the security of Western Europe than in that of Turkey would undermine the morale of the Turkish people and strengthen the minority group which insists upon the hopelessness of Turkish resistance. The hand of the Soviet Ambassador would also be strengthened. If the United States should adopt a policy which might be interpreted as meaning that it gives a higher priority to the security of Western Europe than to that of Turkey, the Turkish Government would continue, of course, to resist Soviet pressure. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this resistance would be weakened.

I told the Ambassador that we had been receiving requests from many countries either to guarantee their security or to promise to come to their aid if attacked. We had as yet made no decisions with regard to these various requests and had, therefore, given no guarantees or promises. I was not in a position at this time to add to this statement other than to say that the whole matter was under consideration.

I pointed out that the Turkish Government should not overlook the fact that for the last year we had been carrying out a policy of giving Turkey and Greece certain military equipment, a policy which we had not thus far adopted with regard to any Western European country. It seemed to me that by selecting Turkey and Greece as the first countries of Europe to receive grants for strengthening their military establishments, the United States had already manifested an interest in their security which the Turkish Government and people, as well as other governments, could not ignore.

The Ambassador replied that he hoped that I had not misunderstood him. The Turkish Government and people were deeply appreciative of the aid which the United States was already extending to Turkey. His present approach to the American Government was motivated by the conviction of his own Government that the preservation of peace based on the Charter of the United Nations was the common objective of both the Turkish and American Governments. It was the belief of the Turkish Government that the most effective, and at the same time cheapest, from the point of view of a conservation of resources, measure for preventing the outbreak of war would be for the United States Government to make it clear to the Soviet Union that Soviet aggression against Turkey would involve the Soviet Union at once in a war with the United States and other powers interested in the maintenance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

I told the Ambassador that I was glad to have the views of his Government in this respect. I would like to repeat that in my opinion the United States was still manifesting by acts its interest in the maintenance of Turkish integrity and independence. The question of formal commitments on the part of the United States to take certain actions under certain conditions was not an easy one. The Ambassador had been long enough in the United States to understand the problems which a democratic Government like the United States must face in assuming new international obligations. We had to take into consideration our Congress and our press. We could not, therefore, always do what seemed to be the logical thing to do.³

I remarked that I had thought that perhaps one of the purposes of the visit of the Ambassador might be to discuss the problem of assistance to Turkey under the European Recovery Plan.

The Ambassador said that he did not wish to take up my time during his present visit to discuss so complicated a matter. He would like to say, however, that both the Turkish Government and the Turkish people were keenly disappointed at the place which had been tentatively allotted to Turkey in the European Recovery Program.⁴ It was the feeling in Turkey that in assigning to Turkey so minor a role, the responsible American officials had failed to take into consideration certain factors of great importance to the preservation of world peace.

I told the Ambassador that aid under the European Recovery Program was now being administered by the ECA outside of the Department of State. The Department of State continued to maintain interest in the matter and would continue to do what it properly could do to be of assistance to Turkey.

The Ambassador and I then discussed briefly the exchange of views which had recently taken place between Ambassador Smith and Mr. Molotov.⁵ I outlined to the Ambassador the reasons which prompted the Ambassador to make his statement to Mr. Molotov and emphasized the fact that this exchange did not indicate any weakening in the determination of the United States to oppose aggression in the Near East or elsewhere.

1. Drafted by Mr. Henderson.
2. For documentation on the support given by the United States to the concept of a Western European Union pact, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
3. For a further exchange of views on this subject by Department officers and the Turkish Ambassador, see Mr. Lovett’s memorandum, May 25, printed in volume iii , under Western European Union.
4. For documentation on this subject, see ibid. , under the European Recovery Program.
5. For documentation on the conversations between Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailo-vich Molotov, which took place earlier in May at Moscow, see pp. 845–854, passim.