Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.61/5–448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Moscow, May 4, 1948—7 p. m.

836. Eyes only. Reference mytel 835 May 4. Following exact text of statement to Molotov, informal transcript of which has been given to Troyanovski:

Two years ago during my initial conversation with Generalissimo Stalin and yourself, I stated as clearly as possible my estimate of the inevitable reaction of the American people to the continuance of a policy by the Soviet Government which would appear to have as its purpose the progressive extension of the area of Soviet power. At that time I pointed out that it would be a grave misinterpretation of the fundamentally pacific character of the American people to believe that they would not react strongly and vigorously to the progressive domination by one country of its neighbors and the clear threat to the world community which such actions would imply.

I emphasized at that time that the United States had no desire whatever to see the world divided into two major groupings, nor to divert a large part of its income to the maintenance of a military establishment which such a world situation would necessitate in elementary self-defense. It seemed apparent then that such a line of policy as that described would lead inevitably to a crystallization of the non-Soviet areas of the world, whose people would quite understandably feel themselves progressively threatened by such developments. It seemed also inevitable in such a case that the United States, as the strongest nation in this community, would be forced to take a leading part in this movement and to divert a large portion of its energy, which by preference our people would prefer to utilize for assistance in the reconstruction of the ravages of the war, to the maintenance of a military establishment adequate to meet the developing world situation.

Unhappily the apprehensions I felt at that time have been realized.

Since that date, Soviet policies in eastern Europe have produced the reaction which was predicted. The situation which has resulted is obviously one of great seriousness.

The European community and the United States have become alarmed at the implications of Soviet policy, and are drawing closer together in mutual self-protection, but only in self-protection.

It is for this reason that my government desires me to outline to you with complete clarity and frankness the position of the United States Government.

There should be no mistake about the determination of the United States to play its part in these cooperative movements for recovery and self-defense. The concern and the determination of the people of the United States have been intensified by the inexplicable hostility of the Soviet Government to the European Recovery Program—a measure which in its inception and subsequent development is so obviously only a measure of American assistance for reconstruction on a cooperative basis without menace or threat to anyone.

The situation which has been produced by the actions of the Soviet Government or by political groups obviously under its control, and the natural and inevitable reaction on the part of other countries, including the United States, to these actions is obviously one of great seriousness.

My government has no idea what conclusions the Soviet Government has reached concerning the present attitude of the United States. It has noted that the picture of this attitude given by the Soviet press is dangerously distorted and erroneous. Whether, or in what degree, the members of the Soviet Government themselves believe this distorted version my government has no means of estimating. For this reason I wish to make plain certain points on which my government considers it extremely important that there be no misunderstanding at this time.

1. The policies of the United States Government in international questions have been made amply clear in recent months and weeks. They have the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people. They will continue to be vigorously and firmly prosecuted.

It would be a grave error if others were to assume that domestic considerations, such as the forthcoming elections, would in any way weaken the determination of the United States to support what it believes to be right. The American people have always known how to separate domestic and foreign policy at the proper moment.

Similarly, my government is aware that Communist organizations here and there have been disseminating propaganda to the effect that a forthcoming economic crisis in the United States will soon produce a radical change in American policies. It is hoped that no one will be so foolish as to forfeit the chances of progress toward world stability for the sake of an economic prognostication which has been proven wrong time and time again. Even those who persist in believing such a prognostication must, at the very least, realize that an economic crisis would not affect in any way our basic productive capacity nor our concept of the basic factors underlying our foreign policy.

It must be emphasized that the present state of world affairs involves issues which the people of the United States consider to be vital to United States national security and to world peace. No one should deceive himself as to the seriousness of United States policy with respect to these issues.

2. On the other hand, my Government wishes to make it unmistakably clear that the United States has no hostile or aggressive designs whatever with respect to the Soviet Union. Assertions to the contrary are falsehoods which can result only from complete misunderstanding or malicious motives. United States policies have been so devised that they cannot possibly affect adversely the interests of a Soviet Union which seeks to live at peace with its neighbors and to refrain from attempts to exercise undue influence, directly or indirectly, in their affairs.

In fact, many of the elements of United States foreign policy to which the Soviet press takes such strong exception today would never have come into existence if it had not been necessary for the United States to aid other countries to defend their own political integrity from attempts, on the part of Communist minorities, to seize power and to establish regimes subservient to foreign interests. Should these attempts cease, the necessity for some of the manifestations of United States foreign policy, which are apparently unwelcome in Moscow, would cease with them.

The present state of United States-Soviet relations is a source of grievous disappointment to the American people and to the United States Government. As far as we are concerned, it represents a painful and undesired alternative toward which we have been driven, step by step, by the pressure of Soviet and world Communist policy. We still do not despair by any means of a turn of events which will permit us to find the road to a decent and reasonable relationship between our two countries, with a fundamental relaxation of those tensions which today exercise so unhappy an influence on international society everywhere. As far as the United States is concerned, the door is always wide open for full discussion and the composing of our differences.

My government earnestly hopes that the members of the Soviet Government will not take lightly the position of the United States Government, as here expressed. They have it in their power to alleviate many of the situations which today weigh so heavily on all international life. It is our earnest hope that they will take advantage of these possibilities. If they do, they will not find us lacking in readiness and eagerness to make our own contribution to a stabilization of world conditions entirely compatible with the security of the Soviet peoples,¹

Smith

1. Telegrams 835 and 836 were read to the Cabinet at its meeting on May 7. The members “were cautioned very emphatically and specifically against mentioning this to any other person.” Secretary Marshall had cabled to the Ambassador in telegram 501 on May 5 that his interview with Molotov had “accomplished excellently the purpose we had in mind, and I appreciate the calm and able manner in which the matter was handled.” He further stated that comment would soon come “on the position you should take in the counter-approach which will presumably be made.” (711.61/5–1048)