711.61/5–448: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
835. Eyes only. I saw Molotov today at 2:30.1 He was serious, attentive and courteous. He showed no sign of hostility or antagonism and might even have been described as conciliatory. My oral statement followed almost exactly outline given by Department but exact text being transmitted in immediately following telegram as Molotov suggested in interest of accuracy transcript be furnished Troyanovski2 who acted as interpreter.
At conclusion Molotov replied that surely after two years in the Soviet Union I must realize that the Soviet Government does not pursue any aggressive aims in its foreign policy but that its first and foremost desire is to rehabilitate and reconstruct its own internal economy. He had no doubt that the Soviet Government would pay the closest attention to the statement of United States position, that it reciprocated the desires of the US to alleviate the present situation, and that he considered there were not a few possibilities of enabling US to go along this path toward improved relations. He felt obliged to say that the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union had been widely misrepresented in the American press and in the public utterances of some American statesmen. He wished to point out that the Finnish treaty recently signed was a convincing example of the lack of aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy and that the other treaties which had been concluded with neighboring states would serve equally well as examples. Politicians in western Europe and elsewhere were inclined to attribute to Soviet agitators the inception of all unpleasant happenings abroad. It seemed that no strike could occur in France or elsewhere but that Soviet agents were deemed responsible in spite of the fact that in many instances the Soviet Union had no representatives or agents anywhere in the vicinity.
The same is true whenever some democratic movement is started or becomes successful outside the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government continues to be surprised at these allegations and can only advise others to believe these fables less implicitly. He assumed that in my statements regarding the defensive attitude of western Europe I alluded to the agreements made or in progress between France, Britain and the [Page 846] Benelux countries but he wished to point out that these agreements which the United States was supporting were pointedly directed toward the Soviet Union whereas all the agreements which the Soviet Union has made with neighboring states have been solely for the purpose of guarding against future German aggression. The Soviet Government cannot forget that twice they have been attacked by Germany and these purely defensive arrangements should themselves furnish proof that the Soviet Union has no aggressive policy. On the other hand the Soviet Government is completing its system of economic agreements with neighboring states and it favors general resumption and expansion of trade and economic recovery without danger. It is obliged to feel that US economic plans are fraught with certain danger to European countries since these plans are made on different principles to those of the Soviet Union.
Soviet trade agreements exist with England, Belgium, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and many others and could also be made with the US and it is not the will of the Soviet Union that constitutes an obstacle to such an arrangement. He realized the above did not answer all of the points in my statement but hoped that his observation on Soviet policy would clarify the erroneous picture now being given in America both by the press and by public officials. Certainly the hopes and objectives of the Soviet Union are by no means connected with an economic crisis in the US or elsewhere but are centered only in the peaceful development of own country.
To this I replied that I would be dishonest if I left him with the impression that I did not personally have grave apprehensions with regard to Soviet foreign policy. Insofar as Finnish treaty was concerned it did not contain particularly objectionable points nor as matter of fact did the published texts of the treaties with other countries. Regrettably there were rumors that to these and other existing treaties secret protocols had been appended covering military and economic matters but that I was of course not in position to assess the accuracy of these rumors.
Reverting again to conversation with Stalin would remind him that on that occasion I had stated that burning question in minds of American people was how much farther is the Soviet Union going to go, to which Generalissimo Stalin replied “we are not going much further”. Nevertheless since that date events in Hungary and more important still in Czechoslovakia had increased apprehensions in my country and to even greater extent in western Europe. It was quite impossible for American Government or public to believe that Communist seizure of power by a coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia could possibly have been accomplished without the direct or implied support of the Soviet Union. The United States was aware of the recent exchange of notes [Page 847] between the Soviet and Iranian Governments and had been startled at the increasingly threatening tone of the communications.
Molotov answered that there were no secret protocols of any kind attached either to the Finnish treaties or others now existing with neighboring states (Department is able to evaluate truth of this statement even better than I am), that these treaties were designed solely to facilitate the economic recovery and development of eastern and central Europe, that with regard to Czechoslovakia, he had this to say: It is ridiculous simply because his assistant Mr. Zorin3 was in Prague on purely routine matter at the time democratic elements of Czechoslovakia took decisive action to assume or to suppose that the Soviet Union had engineered the affair. The fact was that in Czechoslovakia as in other countries the democratic forces at work were the product of events of the second world war and of the suffering and struggle of the peoples against fascism. Those seeking an explanation can find true one in the increased dynamism of these democratic forces which, threatened by undemocratic forces, were vigilant, alert and aggressive to protect their liberty. With regard to my other observations and to my original presentation he would present them to his government from which they would receive the closest attention.
Meeting ended with usual expressions of courtesy.
- Some description of the meetings with Molotov in early May is in the book by Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, Moscow Mission, 1946–1949 (London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1950), pp. 146–155.↩
- Oleg Alexandrovich Troyanovsky. (He was the son of Alexander Antonovich Troyanovsky, former ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, 1934–1939.)↩
- Valery (Valerian) Alexandrovich Zorin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩