Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.61/4–3048

The British Embassy to the Department of State ¹

Aide-Mémoire

top secret

Mr. Bevin² wishes to express his thanks for Mr. Marshall’s friendly reply to the message sent to him from Paris by Mr. Bidault³ and Mr. Bevin. Whilst Mr. Marshall has been away in Bogotá, Mr. Bevin has been giving careful thought to Anglo-American problems. It is four months since Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin agreed in London that the time had come to call a halt to Russian aggression and the present seems a suitable moment to take stock of the position.

2. This is how Mr. Bevin sees the general situation. Quite impressive progress has been made in consolidating the free countries of Western Europe. The ark of the European Recovery Programme has been launched and the five power treaty has not only been concluded but is already in process of becoming an efficient instrument.⁴ The Finance Ministers are meeting in Brussels and the defence ministers and staffs in London this week. Mr. Bevin hopes to be able shortly to let the United States have the preliminary picture, which they require, of our general military situation and our general approach. There have also been helpful talks on the official level between the United States, Canadians and ourselves on the defence of the West.

3. In a word, under the threat of Russian aggression, on which the Czechoslovak coup put a searchlight, the last three months have seen the Western European countries drawing closer together politically and economically. This development has put fresh heart into our friends and unless Mr. Bevin is mistaken it has given cause for reflection to Russia. Another ground for satisfaction is the result of the Italian Elections, in which our Trieste declaration, our handling of the Italian Fleet question, the support given by the British Labour Party to the independent socialists, the European Recovery Programme and the conception of comprehensive Western Union all played a part. The defeat of the communists in Italy must be regarded as a serious set back to Russia. It has had an excellent effect notably in Western Germany, where our prestige requires boosting and where the anti-communists have been anxiously waiting for some sign that Russians plans can be thwarted.

4. All this is very satisfactory, but it must be recognised that there are two places in Europe where we are face to face with Russian aggression and where we may expect them to be up to every devilment—Berlin and Vienna. We are also under indirect pressure from them in Trieste and Greece and there is always the possibility that at any time Russian attention may once more be directed to Turkey and the Middle East. In all these places, and particularly in Germany and Austria, Russian policy constitutes a permanent danger to peace, since we may at any moment of the day or night be suddenly faced by a serious incident. Mr. Bevin is sure, therefore, that British and American Representatives on the spot must exercise the greatest care in handling the situation. What is needed is moderation and patience, combined with firmness and a determination not to be provoked into any ill-considered action which might result in an impossible position from which it would be difficult to retreat. On the other hand, there can, of course, be no question of being forced out of Berlin or Vienna by Russian blockade tactics.

5. Mr. Bevin does not himself believe that either the Russians, or still less the satellites, want war at the moment. No doubt the United States Government has heard that Moscow has ordered the Communists in France and Italy to drop direct action, for fear that this might involve them in war. The Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments are showing signs of hesitancy and the Markos⁵ gang is said to be split by internal dissensions. Moreover, no signs of military preparations in Russia itself, Eastern Germany, or the satellite countries have been detected. All this goes to confirm Mr. Bevin’s reading of present Russian policy, which is that they intend to do all they can to wreck E.R.P. and to cause us the greatest political embarrassment everywhere, but without pushing things to the extreme of war. The danger, of course, is that they may miscalculate and involve themselves in a situation from which they feel they cannot retreat. That is why Mr. Bevin thinks that His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government are called upon to show particular prudence at the danger points.

6. If we can steer a safe course over the next year or so, Mr. Bevin believes that we can, if we so resolve, call into being a sufficiently coherent and self-confident system in Western Europe to discourage the Russians from attempting adventures there. We may even see a change in Russian tactics. But success will, in Mr. Bevin’s view, depend both on the combination of toughness and prudence which we show in the intervening time and on the determination with which we push ahead with the task to which we have set our hands.

7. On the other hand, Russia may suddenly become conciliatory and this would be the most dangerous phase. The democracies may then be misled and ease up on the creation of the solidarity which is so essential for the future peace of the world. Should this happen, whilst we must be ready to negotiate if the Russians make advances, we must at the same time go on with our organisation and with the development of our unity.

Washington, April 30, 1948.

1. This document was handed to the Secretary by the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, at an interview at noon on April 30. In a covering memorandum the Secretary remarked that the key sentences stressed “the necessity for a policy of moderation and patience combined with firmness in the relations of the US and UK with the USSR.” The Secretary told the Ambassador that he fully agreed with this view, “but pointed out that it is not always easy in actual practice to be sure that these criteria are applied in exactly the right proportion to particular policies.”
2. Ernest Bevin was British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. Georges Bidault was French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
4. The fifty year treaty for collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for collective self-defence had been signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, among the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. For text, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 7367, or Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1948, pp. 600–602.
5. Gen. Markos Vafiades was commander in chief of the Greek Communist guerrilla army, and President and Minister of War of the so-called “Provisional Democratic Government” established by the guerrillas in the Macedonian mountains on December 24, 1947.