711.61/4–2448: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1
459. Top Secret, eyes only for the Ambassador. A careful analysis of the present situation leads us to believe that as a result of the Communist defeat in the Italian elections, the Kremlin is now confronted with the necessity of making a very fundamental decision which will perhaps set the course of future events in Europe to a considerable degree.
As we see the matter, the Kremlin is faced with the following alternatives. It may decide to accept the situation created by the passage of the ERP and by the outcome of the Italian elections, adjusting itself with minimum loss of face to the fact that at the present juncture Europe outside of the iron curtain has in effect been denied to Communist power. On the other hand, it may come to the conclusion that to accept without counter-action this blow to the prestige of the Communist movement would place the Soviet Union so clearly on the defensive as to set in motion a train of events which would eventually jeopardize the security of its power in Eastern Europe and at home. In the latter case, the tendency might be to undertake some spectacular further move designed to recoup the loss of prestige inherent in recent developments.
A determining factor in their decision would undoubtedly be their estimate of the U.S. reaction to any such move. Should a miscalculation as to the attitude of this country lead the Soviet Union into actions which would set off World War III, there would undoubtedly be a searching inquiry into the record as to whether this Government had used every facility at its disposal to dispel any such miscalculation. We feel, therefore, that it is of vital importance that a true picture of the purposes and policies of this Government should be brought home to the Soviet Government at this time.
We have had these considerations very much in mind during the last few months but have felt that an approach to the Soviet rulers [Page 835] prior to the passage of ERP and the Italian elections would only have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and lack of confidence on our part in the efficacy of our present policies.
We have no great illusions as to the possibility of convincing the Soviet rulers of the real nature of our policy but feel that the time has come when some such attempt must be made. We have in mind your seeking an interview with Stalin at which you would stress to him the following main points:
Begin 1. That any further encroachment by the Soviet Union, by countries under its control, or by Communist parties dominated by it, beyond the present limits of Communist power, would be regarded by this country as an act of Soviet aggression.
2. That it is definitely not true that this Government is aiming in any way, shape or form at an imperialistic expansion of its own power or at the preparation of military aggression against the Soviet Union or any other country in Eastern Europe or elsewhere.
It is true that United States policy is active and vigorous in defense of the principles of the UN Charter and is going to remain that way and we will resist on that basis armed aggression and efforts at Communist penetration and capture of other governments. But this could be a menace to the Soviet Union only if the Soviet Union had itself embarked on aggressive policies and if such a U.S. policy were regarded as an obstacle to aggressive Soviet designs.
He could be assured categorically that this Government has no plans which need concern the Soviet Government provided the Soviet Government itself and political groups which look to it for guidance are willing to let other Governments live at peace and achieve economic recovery. End
What we have in mind is merely a statement of U.S. position and policy and in no sense an indirect bid for agreement or even negotiation at this time.
We are aware that any such approach might be seized upon by Stalin as an occasion to offer some sort of a division of the world into spheres of influence. This would, of course, be unthinkable even to contemplate.
Before making more precise the type of message that you might deliver to Stalin, we would like to have your views as to:
- (a)
- The advisability of some such approach; (particularly as to the possibility of its being regarded as provocation by the Soviets).
- (b)
- The possible content of a U.S. statement; and
- (c)
- In what form it should be (from the President personally or merely under instruction from Secretary Marshall).
If you consider that the idea of an approach along the above lines has merit, we would of course elaborate on the statements which you should make to Stalin.
- At a cabinet meeting held on April 23,
according to a memorandum dated April 26 by Acting Secretary of
State Robert A. Lovett, by prearrangement with the President this
telegram was brought up for discussion and was approved. The
telegram was proposed as a precautionary measure covering the
following two points, on which the approval and recommendations of
Ambassador Smith were requested: ↩
“First, the determination of this country to insist on its rights in Berlin and elsewhere and to resist further aggression against free states; and
“Secondly, an assurance to the Soviet Union that this country has no imperialistic or expansionistic programs or plans; that it seeks peace with the Soviet Union and does not want war or disturbances which might lead to war.” (821.00/4–2648)