711.61/4–2648: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
774. Part 1.
Our general views on this most important matter are best expressed by quoting message which I was drafting as recommendation to Department when your 459 arrived. Begins:
“It seems to me that the Communist setback in Italy may well mark time [turn] of tide in Western Europe, always providing there is no faltering in our present line of action. At this juncture, a most important if not determining factor influencing Kremlin’s future decisions will be estimate of determination speed with which our announced policies will be followed and implemented.
“Believe therefore that I should have a very frank and blunt talk with Molotov at first favorable opportunity in order that there may be no illusions in mind of Polit Bureau as to seriousness of our intentions. I prepared him for this in my last interview by stating that prior to my departure on trip I was about to make I would seek an appointment for discussion of general relations between our two countries (I expected at that time to go to Berlin and US).
“My thought is that I should remind Molotov of my first conversation with Stalin two years ago at which he was present.1 On this occasion I pointed out that while last thing US wanted was a divided world the line of policy being followed by Soviet Union would inevitably produce crystallization of the ‘western bloc’ which Soviet statesmen so strongly opposed. I also pointed out to Stalin that while neither nation wished to spend a major part of its income on armaments, unless the growing suspicion and tension were alleviated, this arms race desired by neither was certain to follow. I also stated that the burning question in the minds of almost every American was ‘How far is the Soviet Union going to go?’, to which Stalin answered ‘We are not going to go much further’.
“I would then review briefly the major developments which have taken place during my two years here, and point out that Soviet policies which I questioned in this first conversation had produced reactions in the West very much in accordance with my estimate at that time.
“Would then say that US is absolutely unable to take seriously the constantly reiterated charge that ERP is in any way a threat to self-determination or sovereignty of any nation, and that it is quite apparent no statesman in Western Europe believes this either; that the policy we are following represents the considered conviction of the entire US Government and is supported fully by the vast majority of American people who are convinced that world peace depends on restoration [Page 837] of stable and prosperous world economy, and who are willing to devote America’s last resources to attainment of peace which they devoted to prosecution of war; that there is no slightest threat, actual or implied, to Soviet Union in our ERP if, as so often announced, the policies of the Soviet Union are also peaceful and non-aggressive, but that ERP is a fact, that it will be fully implemented, and that it will succeed (should be amplified on lines Deptel 459; see part two below).
“If Department concurs, would appreciate advice and suggestions for improvement and modification of above.”
Part 2.
Specific comments on Deptel 459 are:
- (1)
- We are inclined to believe that Kremlin has already taken its immediate decision regarding Western Europe (less Germany and probably Austria) and that this decision is not to press present line of policy to point of provoking actual hostilities.
- (2)
- That insofar as Kremlin is concerned, words mean very little, and that neither my own statements nor those of any US official will have much effect. The considerations which will affect subsequent Soviet decisions are what we actually do, both at home and at the various critical points of contact. Aside from ERP, the Kremlin is watching UMT, selective service, and American rearmament.
- (3)
- However, for the record in the event that the Soviet Union actually does undertake some spectacular move to recoup loss of prestige, it would be both necessary and desirable that our purposes and intentions be laid clearly on the line. Must state here we doubt if Italian defeat looks as dark to the Kremlin as the Italian victory looks rosy to us, since it is after all first Soviet setback in a series of almost uninterrupted successes.
- (4)
- If we are wrong in original premise, and if basic decision is yet to be made, believe the choice will lie between (a) accepting the present impossibility of further major advances in Europe and changing direction of main effort toward south and east while consolidating western orbit, and (b) in intensifying aggressiveness of present line of action in Europe with calculated risk of war. In either case, item one of main points mentioned in Deptel 459 will appear to Kremlin to be an ultimatum; and before expressing final opinion we would appreciate more definite information of the specific intentions of the US in event of further Soviet encroachment in Korea, Greece, Palestine, Iran, Scandinavia, and Asia. Will we, for example, react positively if there is a Communist coup in either Indochina or Burma? Our first reaction is to doubt if language as strong as that suggested by Department is justified in our present situation. We must not threaten any action which we are not firmly decided and prepared to undertake.
- (5)
- We concur in substance of item two, which parallels but amplifies our own line of thought (see part one above) and essence of which should constitute main line my remarks.
- (6)
- Agree with Department that presentation of our intentions would very likely either provoke an abrupt counterattack or, as suggested, might lead to a broad hint regarding spheres of influence. If latter, then our reply would be immediate reiteration of our adherence to UN principles and determination not to compromise our own.
- (7)
- Realize myth that still persists in large section of US opinion that one has only to “see Joe and everything will be all right”, and if primary purpose were to establish evidence for the record this would be important consideration. However, my own opinion and that of all the Chancery officers favors an approach to Molotov at this juncture, first because it is logical follow-up to what I have already said to him, and second, because I believe it is equally effective. If I attempt to see Stalin (and I might well be refused) it could be misinterpreted or even interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on a small success before UMT or other concrete manifestations of our policy have been acted upon. We believe also it would formalize the matter more than is desirable at present, and possibly present Stalin with welcome opportunity to issue public soporific reply calculated to slacken our vigilance and preparedness effort. A final consideration is my conviction that I should approach Stalin only with concrete proposals or in a real crisis.
Accordingly, I recommend against a formal statement and would prefer an informal but strong approach to Molotov, possibly with the introductory statement that the President (or the Secretary of State) had approved my suggestion that I speak to him very frankly with regard to US policies and the general relationship between our two countries.
If choice of timing had been left to me, I would, aside from any personal consideration, have made the approach either before my departure on leave as logical follow-up to my previous conversation and review of two years in Soviet Union, or after my return from Europe where presumption I had just talked to our various Ambassadors and to Western European statesmen would add weight to my remarks. I am quite willing to do it either way Department desires. However, if Department favors approach before I depart (as suggested by cancellation of impending leave) believe there should be minimum delay. Moscow is like a small town, and there will be all sorts of wild rumors and speculations as to why I have not left on schedule.
- For the report of the interview between Stalin and Ambassador Smith on April 4, 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, p. 732.↩