868.00/8–1448: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece
1207. Dept gratified by apparent statesmanlike resistance of Sophoulis and Tsaldaris to threatened disintegration coalition Cabinet (Emb-tels 1563 Aug 11 and 1591 Aug 141).
While Dept cannot evaluate Liberal allegations of inability effectively control Ministries allotted to them, it is curious that they should risk what control they do exercise by threatening resignation.
Does explanation perhaps lie in belief supposed US “preference” for Liberals will either force concessions by Populists which would improve Liberal electoral prospects or, if resignations accepted, that freedom would be regained to attack Govt in view eventual electoral campaign? Latter connection there would seem danger that Liberals and centrists, especially of Lambrakis–Tsouderos school, may be sufficiently alarmed by apparent strong rightist trend Grk public opinion to seek support of Grk leftists and “liberal” world opinion by again espousing appeasement policy towards fellow-travelers and communists.
Dept believes that US policy of general support of broadly based Govt, in effect present coalition, without involvement in questions of particular combinations or personalities has been useful and should, if feasible, be continued. It would, however, seem mistake to give Liberals impression that coalition is considered sacred by US and that they may accordingly indulge in any extravagance with assurance of US support. Best means of avoiding abovementioned danger of Liberal flirtation with Left would, of course, be urge them remain in present Coalition. However, if coalition breaks down despite best efforts, it would seem preferable in view of this danger for us to remain completely aloof rather than attempt influence formation of combination in which Liberals would have upper hand.
[Page 138]Intimation to Liberals we are unwilling intervene in any crisis they might precipitate might be best means avoiding threatened coalition breakdown.
In addition, obvious arguments might be used that crisis would undermine Army and public morale and thwart necessary united effort mop up remaining guerrillas and launch reconstruction program after Grammos, that it would seriously weaken Grk position during GA, and that it would provide wedge desired by Communists to reinsinuate themselves into Grk political life. It might also be helpful if Populist and Liberal leaders could be persuaded to postpone differences by agreeing on definite later date for fixing time and circumstances of elections. Date selected might be late winter or early spring by which time it should be clear whether guerrilla problem has been reduced to police proportions and whether satellite neighbors disposed respect status quo Greece. If elections judged feasible, political leaders might then decide either to maintain coalition or relinquish power to mutually acceptable service Govt under neutral figure. Because of possible interim death or incapacity Sophoulis, it would of course be preferable that other Liberal leaders should participate in such agreement and that concurrence of political chiefs outside Govt likewise be secured.
Dept realizes you are in best position determine most appropriate and proper means of safeguarding US interests in connection with recurrent and delicate problems created by Grk internal politics, and would appreciate your comments this subject.
- Neither printed; the former message advised that “With advent significant Grammos victories and renewed hopes return normal political life, continuation of coalition government again threatened by dissension.” (868.00/8–1148)↩