868.00/8–2148: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
1640. We concur fully in Department’s analysis of probable USSR tactics in GA vis-à-vis Greek question (Deptel 1124, August 6) and with its conclusion that Soviet campaign for political solution to preserve maximum of Markos and/or KKE forces and prestige may well start before end of Markos episode. This connection … and Sofia’s clear telegram of August 121 repeated Athens as 82, indicated that Soviet campaign to obtain political solution already started. Press campaign apparently commencing in Bulgaria suggests one possible Soviet approach may be recommendation for “cease fire order” along lines adopted by UN in Palestine.
[Page 139]We also agree that, using as starting point stigmas which Communist propaganda, uninformed press reporting, etc., have succeeded in attaching to Greek Government, USSR undoubtedly will endeavor divert GA consideration of essential factors by attacking internal Greek policies, perhaps particularly that of executions since this to Russians is very heart of successful Greek struggle against Communists. We further agree that both Greece and US must prepare answer these attacks, but believe they may best be met by positive presentation Greek position on its merits. Alternative policy could be represented as last minute attempt reverse or cover up previous Greek policies and might well have unfortunate effects on international opinion and jeopardize success Greek struggle against Communists.
In specific case of executions, reversal present policy would not afford protection against anticipated Soviet attack in GA nor substantially strengthen our position. On contrary, to do so would we believe tend play directly into Soviet hands by (1) confirming to questioning public correctness of Soviet interpretation which, loudly trumpeted by Soviet propaganda machine, has been refuted by US both to public and, in private, to other United Nations members (Deptels 558, May 72 and 605 May 15); (2) conceding to Communists what their past tactics (Ladas assassination, propaganda barrage, protests, etc.) were designed to achieve, that is, stopping of executions; and (3) actually according them “favorable political solution” which their anticipated tactics are designed to attain, that is, opportunity save “hard core” for future armed attempt.
As we see basic problem, Greeks have succeeded in defeating, although not yet completely routing latest Communist attempt (Markos) conquer Greece, and unless prevented by outside influences Greeks will reduce immediate problem to police proportions this year. US task is therefore two-fold: (1) To see that nothing prevents Greeks from finishing job well started or robs their victory of its effectiveness, and (2) to protect Greece as UN member from outside aggression, that is, block new Communist attempt from across border by, inter alia, creating or strengthening necessary UN machinery to achieve this end. US tactics to attain first objective, as far as UN concerned, must be primarily defensive particularly since this objective is one which anticipated Soviet tactics in GA principally designed frustrate. Unless we feel we have sufficient ammunition to accomplish this we might well borrow leaf from Soviet book and adopt delaying tactics, even to point of recommending that GA consideration be postponed until [Page 140] late in season “in light of new situation in process of development”. Pursuit of objective (2) would thereby be delayed but not unduly, for consolidation or military victory against Markos must be effected in coming weeks if it is to be accomplished this year, and consideration of Greek case would remain on agenda for discussion before end of session.
We do not, however, believe delaying tactics should be necessary since Greek case is far stronger in our opinion than world opinion believes. We think Greek representative should early in GA meeting make crystal clear that Greece is not requesting UN assistance in putting down internal rebellion which it can and is handling itself, but is on other hand seeking UN action in primary function of UN”—to prevent external aggression (Chapter 1, Article 1, paragraph 1 of Charter). Greece’s friends in UN” should, therefore, confine themselves to point at issue, aggression from without, and dismiss Communist attacks on Greek internal policies by reference Greek statement and by stressing UN obligation to protect members from aggression and to refrain from intervention in internal affairs member states.
Greek statement concerning its internal policies could be forceful and we believe convincing. To take the question of executions, since Department appears feel this weakest link: From liberation in 1944 to August 1, 1948 as result of two major armed Communist attempts overthrow legitimate government and almost continuous minor activities of treasonable character, Greek Government has executed after legal process 1824 persons, 234 (2 during last month) as result of crimes arising from and in connection with first Communist attempt (December 1944 revolution) and 1590 (102 during July) arising from current Markos movement. These figures should be considered in light extreme ruthlessness of Communist conduct and the numbers openly involved in movement which doubtless have exceeded 50,000 since 1944.
State not only pardoned thousands of political crimes (treason) but also adopted lenient policy towards those guilty of criminal acts in first Communist attempt, and in disregard of its own laws failed execute death sentences against majority of those duly convicted of heinous common crimes in vain hope its leniency would contribute to peaceful settlement. This policy has been deliberately misinterpreted and portrayed as weakness by political interests determined to exploit these criminal elements, and Greek state ultimately forced in self protection to enforce justice more firmly. Greek state did not do so, however, until it was obvious that political leadership behind these criminal elements was irreconcilable and Greece had been plunged into [Page 141] second major and even bloodier armed conflict, this time flagrantly aided and abetted from across northern frontiers.
Even in midst of struggle for its very existence, Greek policy has been extremely lenient; fair trial is afforded, only those guilty of most flagrant acts of open treason are condemned to death, and sentences of many of these are commuted to imprisonment. (Policy regarding execution of sentences not rendered by full majority of court remains same as previously reported. Embassy despatch 444, April 143.) Legal stand, against which guilt is measured is clear and understandable to all and is not, per se, political in character. Policy toward even those actively fighting in rebel ranks is extremely liberal; those who can prove they were forcibly recruited and who have no previous criminal record are held to have been “misled” and are released to find their place again in society (separate telegram this subject will go forward shortly).
With reference general problem, while believing firm Greek policy not only justified but essential to defeat of Communist rebellion and ultimately to slowing down and eventual stopping of “cycle of killing” in Greece, we agree Greek Government has not derived fullest advantage possible leniency actually shown. To this end such propaganda as has been directed against guerrillas emphasized “forgiveness” for rank and file. Government contemplates, when Markos ranks are in full rout, issuing appeal to rank and file to return to normal life. Exact form, substance and timing of this appeal has not as yet determined, but we believe both US and Greek Governments must resist those elements within their respective countries which, for partisan political or other reasons may agitate for full political amnesty. Though this may and perhaps should be granted in effect to all who can be deemed to have been “misled”, cannot be done until after the state has successfully reasserted its dominance and then only in practice, not as matter of stated policy. At that time, we believe Department’s suggested “de-Markosization” and rehabilitation plan should serve as useful solution, although continued firmness will be essential to repression of anticipated program small-scale but wide-spread sabotage and terrorism by Communists. Essential to success of any such plan, however, is impartial and unbiased administration of justice, which must remain free as possible of personal or political influence, Greek or foreign.
Sent Department, repeated London 157, Paris 100, Belgrade 75, Sofia 73. Department please pass Moscow 60.