Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.20/7–3048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

secret

Washington, August 16, 1948—7 p. m.

Gama 1246. Proposal respecting absorption of NDC battalions into GNA (Amag 1454¹), as did P–47 request (Amag 1445¹), raises important questions with reference US policy toward future support of Greek Military Establishment. Present policy, as you know, contemplates assistance to Greek armed forces sufficient only to eliminate guerrilla forces as a security menace and thereafter to maintain Greece’s internal security, not to resist an armed invasion or for any other purposes. For your info there is no present indication that there will be any change in this policy.

Dept’s info indicates that defeat of Grammos concentration is imminent and that following this defeat additional military action will be required in other areas before guerrilla menace is brought under control. It is assumed that all of the ensuing action may not necessarily require full strength present GNA and NDC. Reestablishment of internal order in Greece, however, need not mean complete annihilation or capture of all guerrilla groups, since some residue of guerrilla activity in mountains Greece is likely to continue indefinitely, and not necessarily as organized instrument of communist policy. US policy is to assist Greece in reducing guerrilla forces to point where they can be controlled by a Greek army of police proportions and such gendarmery or NDC units as may be required.

Once this objective has been achieved, Greek armed forces should be reduced as quickly as practicable to size and types required to sustain a successful neutralizing action, and should ultimately reach a level not greater than that which Greek Govt can support from own foreign exchange earnings. It is recognized that support of even a drastically reduced military force will constitute serious drain on Greek external financial resources and will thereby increase Greek foreign exchange deficit, and that this factor will have to be taken into account in estimating total of economic assistance required by Greece in future years. Greek military expenses can, however, be strictly controlled under terms present agreement between US and Greek Govts and will constitute legitimate drain upon Greek domestic and foreign financial resources as in case other ERP countries.

Proposal to absorb NDC battalions into GNA seems to run counter to foregoing considerations, since units absorbed would be given more permanent status. Statement in Amag 1454 that changes could be effected within budget not understood in light of fact no firm allocation has yet been made by Dept between Greece and Turkey of presently authorized funds (see Gama 1001²), and in light $50 million cut which Congress intended should reduce Greek allocation to $150 million in event guerrilla forces substantially defeated this season, which now appears possible. If premise of Congress is met, it will probably not be practicable to request restoration of cut.

In view these considerations Dept cannot now concur proposal contained in Amag 1454 or any other action involving greater permanence or increase in size or cost of Greek army and AMAG is requested to review present and prospective military situation in Greece and report soon as practicable your recommendations:

1. Size Greek army, navy, air, NDC, and gendarmery forces that will be required:

a. To conduct necessary operations following defeat of Grammos concentration during period required to bring guerrilla movement under control, and

b. To maintain neutralizing action against residual guerrilla forces, and

c. Your best estimate of time schedule for reducing to these levels.

2. What types of current supplies and equipment now on order or currently projected will not be needed if recommended reduction in size of Greek armed forces and change in their mission is effected.

3. Earliest practicable date on which Greek armed forces can be taken off US army rations now being furnished them, and responsibility for their feeding placed on economy of Greece.

In determining amount and timing of reduction in future US military assistance to Greece overriding consideration is necessity for eliminating guerrilla threat to internal security and providing reasonable assurance against its reappearance. It remains our policy to assure that Greece continues a free and independent state, and at no point must impression be given either to Greeks or to rest of world that US has lessened its determination to assist Greece in maintaining independence and territorial integrity.

In addition to foregoing military estimates yon are requested to advise economic and political effects to be anticipated from reduction size of army and US assistance and measures that will be required to alleviate any acute problems created.

For time being none of foregoing should be discussed with Greeks.

Marshall

1. Amag 1454, July 30, and Amag 1445, July 28, neither printed; but see paragraph numbered 6 in Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of August 11, p. 127.
1. Amag 1454, July 30, and Amag 1445, July 28, neither printed; but see paragraph numbered 6 in Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of August 11, p. 127.
2. Dated June 23, p. 108.