740.00119 Council/3–1048: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber), at London
844. Ausdel 3. Reber (Eyes Only) Following are conclusions of JCS opinion, endorsed by Secretary of Defense,1 which is based largely on same general considerations Delsec 1588:2
- “(a) From the military point of view it is undesirable that a peace treaty, involving the withdrawal of occupation forces, be concluded with Austria at this time.
- “(b) If it is determined that the political and economic considerations involved are overriding and that an early conclusion of the treaty is desirable, provision should be made whereby the occupation forces are not withdrawn until such time as the Austrians have organized, equipped and trained a security force reasonably adequate to perform the tasks envisaged in the treaty.
- “(c) Regardless of the trend of treaty negotiations at the present conference, Austria should be permitted to begin now the organization of her armed forces.”
Soviet attitude in discussions to date makes it appear unlikely that treaty can be obtained which will adequately guarantee Austrian political and economic independence. This, together with JCS opinion, gives us two reasons for believing that settlement can not be achieved which will protect Austria and western Europe against communist expansion. We have demonstrated reasonable willingness to negotiate by authorizing concessions requested Delsec 1614.3 The paramount, guarantees on which we must insist include the supremacy of Austrian law, quadripartite arbitration of disputes and lump-sum settlement, as outlined Ausdel 2.4 Re latter you will understand it may not be a question of actual sum but observance of requirements laid down in approved Feb 6 memo. Dept leaves to your discretion how these points can best be brought out in future discussion. If negotiations on Article 35 break down on these issues, which we consider essential to Austrian independence, we trust our action will be understood by public opinion in Austria and elsewhere.
We endorse JCS recommendation c above and envisage it might be used as basis of possible proposal in ACC Vienna, which if agreed by western powers could be notified to Deputies meeting in connection with current treaty talks. Please discuss this matter with British and French.
Dept requests you consider whether time is not approaching when [Page 1475] we should make our over-all position respecting Article 35 clear in the discussions. US is committed to Moscow Declaration and Potsdam assets agreement.5 Under latter we enjoy equal rights with others but realize effort must be attempted to achieve treaty in which assertion of rights of four powers will not militate against Austrian independence, without which treaty would have no meaning. US considers Austrian independence so essential to European pacification that it has carried large financial burden in Austria for over 2½ years whereas Soviets have continuously weakened Austrian economy. Present Soviet stand is completely unreasonable and reflects upon nature Soviet interests in Austria and their good faith.
Re Delsec 1626,6 we note from Vienna’s 284, Mar 7,6 that Gruber’s thinking is not dissimilar to our own in allowing Austrian Govt greater autonomy under occupation in event no treaty is obtained. We would wish to consider this further after receiving views of Keyes, other western delegations, as well as Austrian Govt. (Sent to London as 844; repeated to Vienna as 216 eyes only Keyes and Erhardt).