740.00119 Control (Austria)/3–1048: Telegram

The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State

secret

296. In light of international developments of last two weeks and their repercussions on Austrian public and leaders, we feel unable to express assurance that should all occupation forces be withdrawn following conclusion of treaty, Austria could successfully resist Soviet encroachments (reDeptel 197, March 71). Sovereignty and independence under those circumstances would be decisively conditioned her exposed and isolated position and by lengths to which Soviets have shown they are ready to go.

We believe that from political point of view treaty is still desirable but only if fulfillment of following conditions are guaranteed before evacuation of troops: (1) that western economic aid to Austria through ERP or otherwise is uninterrupted and is adequate to permit continued recovery (2) that Austria is brought into full participation with Whatever measures of economic and political collaboration may emerge in Western Europe during next few months and (3) that Soviets by one means or another understand, as they now presumably understand, from presence of our troops here that effort on their part or their satellites to take over Austria after evacuation would result in immediate counteraction on part of western powers.

We consider that Austrian political leaders are substantially in agreement with this point of view and realize that withdrawal of western forces under present circumstances is not only unlikely but undesirable. While they continue publicly to urge conclusion of treaty official position now emphasizes rearmament to preserve independence frontier guarantees and rejection of extraterritoriality.

Chief reason why government continues unofficially to support treaty is fear that failure now may lead to partition of Austria. While consensus of opinion appears to be that Soviets would prefer not to partition largely because they are reluctant to consolidate our position in western zones, it is widely felt that in case of further failure to agree on treaty draft toward partition might in present atmosphere prove irresistible. There is no doubt that Soviets can swallow up eastern zone of Austria at any time they so desire and this is risk we inevitably run by prolonging [military] occupation. This risk seems less, however, than greater hazard of possible loss of all Austria in case of premature evacuation of western powers.

Sent Department 296, repeated London for USDel 56.

Erhardt
  1. Same as telegram 793, supra.