740.00119 Council/3–1148: Telegram

The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Reber ) to the Secretary of State

top secret

1010. Delsec 1632. From Reber. The present position re Austrian treaty discussions may be summarized as follows:

Soviet representative is consistently taking position that submission of Soviet proposal in January proves desire on part of Soviet Government to conclude treaty and its willingness to make concessions. On other hand, re-iterates that refusal of western states to accept all provisions in Soviet proposal demonstrates unwillingness to reach an agreement and their lack of sincerity. While avoiding clear-cut refusal to negotiate any points of his proposal, it seems clear that he nevertheless is not prepared to recede in any acceptable degree but is working to try to place responsibility for lack of progress on other delegations, particularly UK and US in order to apportion blame in event possible failure negotiations.

After endeavoring unsuccessfully to elucidate further precision of Soviet proposal thereby establishing its impact on Austrian economy, we have consistently maintained that any settlement must be based on our obligations both under Moscow and Potsdam and enable an [Page 1476] independent Austria to survive with sociable [viable?] economy which in our opinion is not possible under the present Soviet proposal. Within the framework of these principles and the stipulations of the February 6 memo, including supremacy of Austrian law, arbitration of disputes and lump sum settlement based on Austrian capacity to pay, we have indicated our willingness to consider possible modifications of these sections and have tried to demonstrate the sincerity of our purpose by our willingness to make suggestions and to agree to discuss any points. The British and French have followed a similar course of action with, of course, some difference in emphasis. British delegation, for example, is more rigid in its insistence upon defining specific properties which allows opportunities for Soviets to pretend to believe British reluctant to make progress.

Although it cannot yet be deemed a certainty, I do not consider that there is any present possibility of agreement in these discussions. As stated in Delsec 1626 March 8,1 Soviet unwillingness to consider any adjustment must however be brought out with more clarity before any suggestion for concluding meetings can be entertained. This remains the opinion of French and British delegations, although British are inclined to force the issue. I can agree provided the opportunity is carefully selected. In the event of break we recommend that extreme care be taken in the formulation of realistic political and economic policy providing a greater degree of autonomy for Austria which will help to prevent any possible combination of Socialist and Communist forces in Austria and will render more difficult partition of Austria by Soviets. It is recognized however, that the longer the occupation the greater the risk of partition.

In general, we concur with recommendations contained in Vienna’s 296, March 102 and the suggestions put forward by British in regard to arming Austrian gendarmerie (reference MA telegram 70–898 March 73). It is difficult for us here to see, however, what further steps can be taken in order to carry out JCS recommendation “C” contained in Deptel 844 March 104 as undoubtedly Soviets through ACC could block any further progress. Matter will, however, be discussed with British and French at earliest opportunity.

Austrian Socialists now in London have expressed grave concern over food situation and fear results of any gap between interim aid shipments and ERP help.

Sent to Department 1010, repeated to Vienna for Keyes and Erhardt (Eyes Only) 26.

[ Reber ]
  1. Not printed.
  2. Ante, p. 1473.
  3. Not found in Department files. For documentation on the arming of the Austrian gendarmerie and army see pp. 1356 ff.
  4. Supra.