Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy)

top secret   us urgent
niact

Washington, September 11, 1948—7 p. m.

1610. Personal for Clay and Murphy. We have been engaged for the past few days in trying to resolve the difference of views between ourselves on the one hand and the Brit and French on the other.

This morning the Brit Amb brought in to the Secretary a personal message from Bevin¹ which made it clear that no matter what we say the Brit Govt will not accept the line of approach as set forth in our aide-mémoire.² The French are taking the same position.

Accordingly, we have just sent the following to Douglas by telecon.³

“We are confronted here with an important difference in policy between the British and French on the one hand and ourselves on the other. This fact has been apparent from the very beginning of the consideration of the approach to Moscow. Please let us therefore not confuse the issue by ascribing the difference to draftmanship, minutia, et cetera, but deal solely with this main issue.

Our preferred line of approach, supported by Clay, Murphy and Smith, is that our next approach to Stalin should be in such manner as to bring the matter to a head in such a way as to permit the governments to make the fundamental decision as to whether or not it is worthwhile to continue the discussions. This, in our opinion, could only be done if the Russians are given clear evidence of our willingness to break if they persist in their attitude.

The British and French on the other hand clearly, either because they believe it or because they wish to believe it, are inclined to leave the issues blurred and offer the Russians an opportunity to prolong the discussions on what we would regard an unsatisfactory basis and under most humiliating conditions in Berlin.

We feel that this difference is so deep as to confront us with the following alternatives:

1. To put the importance of three-power unity ahead of everything else and, in effect, go along for one more round with the British and French, or

2. To follow what we genuinely believe to be correct policy in regard to the Soviets and the Berlin situation and insist upon our views even at the expense of different approaches in Moscow.

It is these alternatives that we have been debating today with the Secretary and Senator Vandenberg who is here in Washington and Sec Royall and Draper.

We have come to the conclusion that on balance the importance of maintaining tripartite unity is the controlling factor and while profoundly disturbed by the dangers of the British and French type approach, we will reluctantly go along for that reason.

The foregoing is for your information only since we do not formally wish to record our reservations to the British and French. We do feel, however, that if we are to adopt the general lines of the London aide-mémoire at the present meeting that there is little point at the same meeting of raising the question of Soviet actions in Berlin even in a separate document. The only point, in our view, in so doing would be to link it with the continuance of the conversations. Even to raise it in a separate document will undoubtedly bring forth a strong Soviet rejection of protest probably plus a justification of the action of the Communists in Berlin which would make it very much more humiliating for us to then proceed with discussions in Berlin. Unless we are prepared to make a cessation of these actions a condition precedent for continuance we had better not raise it at the next meeting. With this understanding, we would be prepared to accept, in order to meet British and French views, the following procedure from now on:

1. A presentation of the London aide-mémoire with stronger language in regard to instructions.

We therefore feel that for the last two sentences of the penultimate paragraph of the London aide-mémoire there should be substituted the following language:

‘The divergencies which have accordingly arisen on these questions are so serious that the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States feel compelled to inquire whether the Soviet Government is prepared to affirm the understandings outlined herein and to issue the necessary instructions to the Soviet Military Governor, confirming the agreed intention of the directive in regard to

(a) the lifting of all restrictions on communications, transport and commerce imposed after March 30, 1948, without imposition of any new air or other restrictions; and

(b) the control by the financial commission of the financial arrangements contemplated in the agreed directive, including control of the operations of the Bank of Emission with respect to Berlin as specifically confirmed by Premier Stalin; and

(c) a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany, based on control by the four occupying powers, recognizing the continuation of the right of each of the occupying powers to import food and fuel for the use of the Berlin population and to control the proceeds from the sale of all goods imported into its sector.’

2. If the Soviets refuse to issue such instructions, the representatives should be instructed to state that they must report the Soviet attitude to their governments and terminate the interview.

3. In this event, there must be a firm and unmistakable commitment on the part of the French and British for the immediate dispatch of a note along the lines of the draft Reber brought with him plus the reference to the Soviet action in Berlin as a reason for the impossibility for further discussions and inclusion of the statement on rights along the lines of our draft on this subject. This note to be agreed on textually and to be dispatched as soon as the Soviet refusal of the aide-mémoire has been received.

4. Should Stalin agree that the necessary instructions should be sent to the Governors, we would be willing to accept a reference back to Berlin for a period not to exceed 72 hours at the most and that this time limit is to be announced publicly.

5. In the event that the Military Governors do not reach a clear and satisfactory agreement during that period, on equally firm British and French commitments there should be no further conversations in Moscow but the final note appropriate revised should be then sent to the Soviet Government.

The foregoing must be regarded as a whole and we would not be prepared to accept the British aide-mémoire unless the commitments in regard to the dispatch of the note in 3 and 5 are unequivocal and clear.

We are not putting this forward for bargaining purposes but as the absolute outside limit that we could go in order to meet the British and French views. You should make this entirely plain in presenting it to Bevin.”

Sent USPolAd, Berlin, for Clay and Murphy, rptd Moscow, personal for the Ambassador, and Paris, personal for the Ambassador.

Marshall

1. Not printed; a copy of Bevin’s message is attached to a memorandum of conversation by Bohlen, September 11, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1148).
2. Not printed; the text of the aide-mémoire under reference here was transmitted in telegram 1089, September 10, to Moscow (repeated to Paris as 3539), not printed. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1048) For the agreed tripartite text, presented to Molotov September 14, see telegram 1101, September 12 to Moscow, p. 1152, and footnote 3 thereto.
3. The transcript of this telecon is not printed.