740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1048: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1
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1092. For the Ambassador (Eyes Only). Depts 10812 consisted of summary and excerpts from our messages to Douglas sent during the course of five-hour teleconference. For that reason they probably did not express in full clarity the development of our thinking on the subject of our juridical rights in Berlin.
We have been conscious, as you have, that the Soviet denial of our continuing rights in Berlin has been the underlying basic issue throughout the entire discussions. Almost all of our messages to you have referred in one form or another to our understanding on this point and our 9583 was built entirely around this issue for use in the event that Stalin in the second meeting had proved to be adamant on the specific points under discussion.
We believe we were all in full agreement that the possibility of working out some practical arrangement to deal with the immediate situation in Berlin should be put to the test, with complete reservation on both sides of their position, but with the obviously reasonable assumption that of course no action would be taken by the Soviet Govt to prejudice our position. The practical arrangement which the United States, United Kingdom, and France sought with the Soviet Union in the Moscow discussions was intended to make possible the negotiation by the four Occupying Powers in a subsequent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers all outstanding questions concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole. At no time, even tacitly, did we accept the Soviet thesis that we had lost our rights in Berlin and indeed maintained consistently during the conversations precisely the opposite. The practical arrangement, for settlement of the currency and trade issue, we were prepared to try to work out obviously required for any chance of success Soviet acceptance in good faith of the obvious necessity of refraining from taking a position in the discussion or taking action on the spot, which would have the purpose or effect of unilaterally nullifying our rights or rendering our position in Berlin untenable. Sokolovsky’s position during the meetings in Berlin and with even greater force the Soviet-inspired disorders designed to overthrow the city Government legally elected under quadripartite supervision make it plain that the Soviet Government seeks to nullify our rights in Berlin. In such circumstances, it seems clear to us that the question of rights can no longer be adequately handled [Page 1146] by unilateral reservation on our part. The fact that we have not previously brought this issue to a head but have been content merely to maintain our position, does not, in our view, in any sense preclude us from raising it definitely now in the face of the Soviet attempts unilaterally to destroy these rights in violation of existing agreements. On the contrary, since we have never accepted the Soviet thesis of the loss of our rights, we feel that in the face of their present attitude and actions we have not only a right but an obligation to make our position perfectly clear at this stage. As to the manner of raising it, we are very much impressed with the points made in your 19304 and as you will have seen from the text of the statement on the subject of rights5 to be made in the event that the Soviets refuse to change the attitude taken by Sokolovsky on the directive, we have embodied therein a good deal of your language.
We have had careful consideration given to this point by the Legal Adviser and feel that we are on completely solid ground. It is his view that the light of the three major assaults upon our equal rights in Berlin, i.e., (1) blockade, (2) refusal to implement quadripartite currency control, and (3) attack on Magistrat, we must refrain from actions which might be construed as acquiescence on our part and that conduct as well as words can be viewed in such circumstances as waiving contested rights. Therefore we believe that any further discussions [Page 1147] in Moscow must treat these three facts as part of a general Soviet plan to nullify our juridical rights in Berlin.
We feel that we should either require from the Soviets that they expressly recognize our equal rights or that they refrain from taking action inconsistent therewith, the latter being a minimum demand.
As you will have seen from our draft, we take the latter course and feel we can do no less. If the Soviets refuse, they would be faced with the ultimate necessity of having to justify in the UN not merely a failure to recognize our rights but also unilateral violation on their part of existing agreements.
As to the more fundamental questions raised in your telegram under reference, you may be sure that the major consideration of our future course of action has been under constant study here, the Defense establishment and the National Security Council.
- Repeated to London as 3588, Paris as 3553, and Berlin as 1605.↩
- September 8, p. 1140.↩
- August 17, p. 1053.↩
- Supra.↩
- The reference here is to a draft statement of
rights, transmitted during a telecon between Washington and London September 10, the
transcript of which is not printed. It read:
“As the Soviet Government is aware, throughout these discussions, the Governments of France, the U.K. and U.S. have consistently maintained that they are in Berlin by right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and defined in quadripartite agreements, and as such have co-equal rights, duties and obligations in regard to the administration of the city of Berlin. The three western governments were, however, willing to consider in good faith any practical arrangements for dealing with the existing situation in Berlin which would not prejudice and impair their rights and duties as occupying powers.
“As a result of the discussions in Berlin and in particular the attitude adopted by the Soviet Commander in Chief and the actions tolerated and even encouraged by the Soviet military authorities in complete denial of these rights, it is obvious that the Soviet Government is acting on the principle that these rights no longer exist. As has been made plain throughout these discussions, this is a position which the Governments of France, the U.K. and U.S. cannot and will not accept.
“It is obvious, therefore, that so long as the Soviet Government continued to pursue a unilateral course of action designed to nullify the rights of the western powers in the city of Berlin and to undermine their position there, no foundation exists upon which to conclude any satisfactory arrangement of a practical nature to deal with the problem of communications and trade between Berlin and the western zones and the currency for that city.
“In the interest of creating conditions necessary for successful conclusion of these conversations, the Governments of France, the U.K. and the U.S. would like to know whether the Soviet Government is prepared to confirm that it will honor the principle of quadripartite administration of the city and refrain from any course of action prejudicial to the rights, duties and obligations of the three western powers as co-equal occupying authorities.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048)
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