Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent
niact

Moscow, September 12, 1948—1 p. m.

1950. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Dept’s 1098.¹ I am glad you have taken decision that maintenance of tripartite unity is overriding factor and am sure this is correct. However, do not believe recent Soviet actions in Berlin should be completely ignored and while I agree with Department’s views that separate document would simply evoke usual strong Soviet rejection to effect that “democratic forces” in Germany will assert themselves regardless of our efforts to suppress them, I think matter can be handled in another way. Believe that at end of discussion on other subjects I should make a very blunt statement to Stalin to general effect: that in spite of our previous representations to Molotov on necessity for creating favorable conditions for negotiations in Berlin, the aggressive and provocative line taken by Communist minority there has not only continued but has intensified; that we are not such fools as to believe for one minute that this aggression could have begun or could continue without active support and prompting of SMA; that while we have so far deliberately restrained ourselves (Berlin’s 411, August 19 from Clay²), we are perfectly capable of continuing discussions in atmosphere of calm and courtesy in conference room and at the same time meeting such aggression and opposing it on the ground with all means at our disposal; that he must recognize, as we have, that this means a wider range of unresolved problems to be settled by negotiation; but that he and Molotov certainly underestimate us if they believe us so blind to reality as to continue, under present circumstances, to permit our rightful position in Berlin to be made untenable or to be undefended simply in hope that by timid conciliatory attitude the atmosphere of negotiations would be made more fragrant.

Of course, we will have to back up any such statement and this means that in Berlin it would be necessary for us to act exactly as though the discussions had failed completely until we knew definitely that they had succeeded. I know our people in Berlin are already reacting to aggressive Communist attitude but would appreciate Clay’s opinion regarding some such statement as that outlined above.³

I have seen Bevin’s private instructions to Roberts regarding next step and our proposed aide-mémoire and I am sure both he and Chataigneau would associate themselves with a strong statement to Stalin if it can be supported by action in Berlin.

Sent Dept 1950.

Dept pass Eyes Only to Berlin 379, London as 211, Paris 323.

Smith

1. Same as telegram 1610, supra.
2. Not printed.
3. In telegram 2309, September 13, from Berlin, not printed. Murphy reported Clay’s views on such a statement. Clay believed that it would be most desirable, because of the necessity of softening the western approach to Moscow in order to obtain the agreement of the three governments. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1348)