740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–948: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
niact
1930. Eyes Only for the Secretary. I read Department’s 1081 of September 81 and while I am obliged to record the fact that I do not agree entirely with the Department’s line of thought as indicated in [Page 1143] the first three paragraphs thereof, I shall limit my comments to the following:
This message says, correctly, that all main points of disagreement derive directly from the position of the Soviet Government, that we have lost our juridical rights in Berlin, that we do not accept this view, and that we have consistently asserted our co-equal rights as victors. So far so good. The message then says, “The time has come to recognize that all the troubles stem from this wide open difference and we are convinced that we must now insist that the Soviet Government recognize these rights.”
It seems to me that after this statement, if it means what it says, the balance of the telegram is rather unnecessary. The Soviet Government will not recede from the juridical position it has taken on this question during our entire conversations. Both Stalin and Molotov have asserted this repeatedly as we have repeatedly asserted our own juridical position. Consequently, during our conferences here both sides have tacitly recognized the irreconcilability of their respective positions on this fundamental question and have presumably sought a modus vivendi for Berlin which would remove conditions of duress and permit high level discussions during which the fundamental point of issue, i.e., our juridical rights in Berlin, might possibly be resolved concurrently with the solution of other outstanding questions regarding Berlin and Germany. It has been my understanding from the beginning that this is all we could hope or indeed were instructed to do, and this fact has certainly been made clear in all our reports.
Paragraph 2 of suggestions on proposed aide-mémoire states that Western conferees here should inquire whether Soviet Government recognizes that we are in Berlin by right and therefore have co-equal rights, duties, and obligations in the city; and that if Molotov indicates that the position of the Soviet Union remains unchanged, the three Western representatives would report accordingly to their governments. I can assure you that Molotov, or Stalin for that matter, will answer such a question with a categorical “no” as both of them have done on repeated occasions during the past month.
Since we have consistently taken the line here that the modus vivendi on which we were seeking agreement would be entered into by the three Western powers without prejudice to their juridical rights in Berlin, and have so informed Molotov, it is now, in my opinion, too late to decide to break on the juridical issue itself. The fact that we continued to talk for over a month after juridical positions had been made clear on both sides would inevitably become known and would be capitalized by Soviet propaganda, I believe it would be preferable to take as an issue, not Soviet refusal to recognize our rights juridically, but demonstrated Soviet determination to terminate those [Page 1144] rights unilaterally and destroy our position in Berlin in practice, i.e., by failure to honor Stalin’s commitments regarding control functions of Finance Commission, by proposed new restrictions on transport and trade, and by their continuing efforts to destroy unified, duly elected Berlin city government. Proposed final statement to Stalin (Deptel 958, August 17, as amended2) seems in fact prepared on this basis and would still be used for break with minor modifications to bring it up to date.
Incidentally, I do not see why the continuation or termination of conversations would in any way affect our ability to resist Soviet Government action toward taking over the city government of Berlin. If we cannot effectively fight the devil with fire now, I doubt if we can do it later. Possibly we are too nice on such matters.
In three previous messages (Embtels 1772, August 273; 1749, August 254; and 1663, August 175) I have stated in effect that if any agreed solution is reached, it will necessarily be a compromise, without clear Soviet admission of quadripartite authority, but that if a compromise solution is not reached and the struggle for strength continues at an accelerated pace, everything will depend not only on our willingness and ability to face the issue in Berlin on a long-term basis, but even more on the willingness and ability of our allies and the population of Berlin’s Western sectors. I have also pointed out that our governments must decide whether we are prepared to deal indefinitely with the situation now existing in Berlin in the event of breakdown of present conversations, or if our ability to cope indefinitely with the Berlin situation is doubtful, what concessions we would be willing to make to relieve the situation. I have indicated that these concessions might have to be substantial. In none of the replies that I have received has there been an indication that this basic strategic question has been considered and a definite line of action, beyond immediate reference to UNO, decided upon. I do not ask to know what this decision is, but it would certainly help my digestion if I knew that it had been taken.
Sent Department 1930. Department pass Berlin Eyes Only for Clay and Murphy as 373; Paris Eyes Only for Caffery as 319; and London Eyes Only for Douglas as 207.