Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048

Record of Teletype Conference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

[Extracts]

top secret

Washington, July 26, 1948—5:30 p. m.
London, July 26, 1948—10 p. m.

Conferees

Washington	London
[Under] Secretary Lovett	Ambassador Douglas
Mr. Samuel Reber	Ambassador Smith
Mr. Jacob D. Beam	Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Dean Rusk
Col. Gerhardt (Army)
Mr. Hickerson

From London

We have a lot of pre-conference material for you. Following are the texts of:

(1) Instructions to Ambassadors as to method of approach and alternate procedures depending on Soviet reply to request to see Stalin,

(2) text of aide-mémoire to be left individually by three representatives with Molotov, and

(3) oral presentation to be made to Stalin if possible, or Molotov.

These texts have been agreed by Peterson, Smith, Bohlen, and myself and Massigli, subject to confirmation by three governments. The British cabinet is meeting now to consider them and we should have their decision very shortly. Massigli anticipates no difficulty with the French Government.

Ambassador Smith is leaving this afternoon for Berlin and will proceed tomorrow morning if clearance can be obtained for Moscow.

Instructions to the Three Representatives at Moscow.

1. You should request interview with Molotov and leave with him following aide-mémoire. Your colleagues will likewise be requesting individual interviews to leave identical communications.

2. If Stalin agrees to receive the three representatives, the senior Ambassador will make to him oral statement as set forth in immediately following telegram [transmission]. In order to ensure complete accuracy, senior Ambassador will speak from notes, and should not in his initial statement depart from text agreed by governments.

3. If Stalin agrees to receive three representatives separately each will make same statement.

4. If Molotov replies that Stalin is absent, or gives some other reasonable excuse why he is unable to receive representatives, the three representatives should request a joint interview with Molotov in order to make the oral statement to him, in accordance with procedure in 2 above.

5. Every effort should be made to obtain an agreed record of the conversation at which oral statement is made, whether to Stalin or Molotov.

6. Stalin or Molotov should be informed during the interview that the three governments do not intend to make an official release of the conversation except by mutual agreement. In the event of a serious and damaging unofficial leakage of a nature to make publication necessary, the three governments would give the Soviet Government the utmost possible notice. For your own information only, if premature release is carried out by Soviet Government, we shall be prepared for push-button release.

7. For your own information only, if Stalin or Molotov refuse to receive the representatives for obviously political reasons, the next step is under active consideration by three governments.

French draft [aide-mémoire]:

“The (blank) government have given the most serious consideration to the note delivered by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and have exchanged views with the British and American Governments on the similar notes received by these governments. The (blank) government does not accept the contention in the Soviet note that the right of the western occupying powers to participate in the occupation of Berlin no longer exists, and while they do not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of the allegations contained in M. Abramov’s note of July 14th, they would like to make it plain at the outset that they cannot accept the Soviet version of the facts nor the interpretation placed on them.

“Whatever may be the reasons which have led the Soviet authorities to decide [on] the restriction of communications between Berlin and the Western Zones of Occupation of Germany, whether these reasons be technical as was first stated, or political, as M. Abramov’s note would seem to indicate, the measures taken by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have created an abnormal and dangerous situation, the gravity of which does not need to be emphasized.

“The Soviet reply of 14th July offers no constructive suggestion for the bringing to an end of the abnormal situation in Berlin. Nevertheless the (blank) government, as any peace loving government, holds the view that this situation is capable of settlement. They trust that the Soviet Government share this view: the question of negotiation has never been, and is not the issue. The willingness to negotiate in the absence of deeds has always been there. In the opinion of the (blank) government, the best way to a solution of the present difficulties lies in direct approach. They think that a frank discussion between Generalissimo Stalin and yourself on one side and the representative of each of the three western occupying cowers on the other side should give the opportunity of finding a solution. I accordingly have been instructed by my government to request that you should arrange an interview between Generalissimo Stalin and yourself on the one hand and the French Ambassador, the U.K. Chargé d’Affaires and myself on the other hand in order to discuss the present situation in Berlin and its wider implications.”²

[Oral Presentation]³

You should speak on the following lines in order to probe Soviet intentions and to test their willingness to find a peaceful issue from the present situation.

Begins “It is not our purpose at this time to rebut in detail charges contained Soviet note. Highly important however to make completely clear certain fundamental points in position of U.S.–U.K. and France and to clarify position of the Soviet Union which in certain respects is obscure. The three governments must reemphasize their right to be in Berlin to be unquestionable and absolute. They do not intend to be coerced by any means whatsoever into abandoning this right.

“Action taken by Soviets in interfering with rights in connection with occupation, derived through the defeat and surrender of Germany and through international agreement and usage, by interrupting communications between Berlin and western zones, thus interfering with duties of allied military forces of occupation, is viewed with extreme seriousness by governments of U.S., U.K. and France. It is incumbent on them to take such measures as are necessary to assure the supply of their forces and discharge of their occupational duties. U.S., U.K. and France do not wish situation to deteriorate further and assume that Soviet government share this desire. The three governments have in mind restrictive measures which have been placed by Soviet authorities on communication between western zones of Germany and western sectors of Berlin. If these measures arise from technical difficulties such difficulties can be easily remedied. The three governments renew their offer of assistance to this end. If in any way related to currency problem, such measures are obviously uncalled for, since this problem could have been, and can now be, adjusted by representatives of the four powers in Berlin. If, on the other hand, these measures are designed to bring about negotiations among the four occupying powers they are equally unnecessary, since the governments of the U.K., U.S. and France have never at any time declined to meet representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss questions relating to Germany. However, if the purpose of these measures is to attempt to compel the three governments to abandon their rights as occupying powers in Berlin, Soviet Government will understand from what has been stated previously that such an attempt could not be allowed to succeed.

“In spite of recent occurrences the three powers are unwilling to believe that this last reason is the real one. Rather, they assume that the Soviet Government shares their view that it is in the interest of all four occupying powers, of the German people and of the world in general to prevent any further deterioration of the position and to find a way by mutual agreement to bring to an end the extremely dangerous situation that has developed in Berlin.

“The Soviet Government will however appreciate that the three governments are unable to negotiate in the situation which the Soviet Government has taken the initiative in creating. Free negotiations can only take place in an atmosphere relieved pressure. This is the issue. Present restrictions upon communications between Berlin and the western zones offend against this principle.

When this issue is resolved, such difficulties as stand in the way of resumption of conversations on the lines set out above should be removed.” (At this point Stalin would be invited to express his views and asked to clarify the Soviet position.)

In the event that Stalin shows a disposition to find a reasonable way out you would say that your government would be prepared to discuss some practical arrangement which would provide a solution of the Berlin situation. Such an arrangement might be along the lines of a reopening of communications by rail, road and water between Berlin and the western zones, with a simultaneous announcement of an agreement resume negotiations on Berlin and an announcement that a four power meeting will take place to consider other outstanding problems affecting Germany or broader questions within the agreed competence of the four powers. You should make clear that the agenda for any discussions would be agreed upon subsequent to the lifting of the blockade.

It is understood that in this conversation the Ambassadors would not be authorized to commit the three governments in regard to any arrangement proposed by Stalin or worked out in discussion, but would report fully to their governments the results of the conversations for consideration and confirmation by them.

Mr. Bohlen is now present.

Mr. Keith is now present.

The three documents have been approved by British Cabinet with a few minor drafting changes which will follow. British wish to send Roberts to Moscow since their Ambassador cannot return for reasons of health. Roberts would like to return with Smith in latter’s plane. This would involve one day delay as Roberts cannot get to Berlin until tomorrow. Smith feels and I agree it would be very helpful to have Roberts and one day delay not important.

[Here follow drafting changes suggested by the British Cabinet.] Massigli has agreed text and informs us in his opinion his government will agree but formal agreement probably will not be forthcoming until tomorrow when instructions will be sent directly to Moscow and confirmed to Massigli here.

As regards a formal note to British and French in regard to persistent leaks and what appear to be inspired statements I have spoken to Bevin on three different occasions and to Strang more frequently. This morning Strang agreed that he would reiterate the old standing orders that no person in the Foreign Office was to respond to any question whatsoever put to him by a newspaperman whether friend or foe in social gatherings or otherwise.

It is very difficult to pin the source of leaks and apparently inspired statements. I have however run two to the ground in the French Embassy.

I have therefore spoken to Massigli and asked him to issue to all members of the Embassy staff the same sort of injunction which we follow in the American Embassy. In view of the above it is my personal opinion, however irritating and dangerous the news stories of the past have been, it would be better to await further developments before sending a formal note.

[Here follows the text of the original draft of the oral presentation.]

That is all here. Do you have any comments?

From Washington

1. This general approach seems satisfactory to us as fair combination our 2819⁴ and British note.⁵

That’s all here. Further UN material coming by wire tomorrow.⁶

Either static bad or message written in Chip’s handwriting. Suggest resort to smoke signals hereafter while Bohlen there.⁷

1. The source text appears to be a corrected and edited version of an earlier record or transcript of this teletype conference.
2. For the final text of this aide-mémoire as handed to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin on July 30, see The Berlin Crisis, pp. 15–16, Cmd. 7534, pp. 54–55, Germany 1947–1949, pp. 209–210, Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs, p. 592, or Berlin Senate, Berlin, Quellen und Dokumente, pp. 1503–1504.

3. The text that follows is a revised draft of the oral presentation and includes changes suggested by the British Cabinet. The text of the original draft of the oral presentation was transmitted later in this telecon, but that part of the record has been deleted.

   For the final text of the oral presentation as made by Ambassador Smith to Stalin on August 2, see The Berlin Crisis, pp. 17–19, Cmd. 7534, p. 55, Germany 1947–1949, p. 210, or Berlin, Quellen und Dokumente, pp, 1504–1505.

4. Ante, p. 971.
5. Not printed.
6. In telegram 2974, July 28, to London, not printed, Douglas was informed that reference to the Security Council would open up a broader range of possibilities than would consideration by the General Assembly. Secondly, the Security Council was immediately available, while the General Assembly would have to convene a special session. If the situation warranted, after consideration by the Security Council, the Berlin question could be submitted to the General Assembly at its next session in September. (501.BC/7–2848)
7. On July 27, another telecon was held between Washington and London in the course of which the drafts of the instructions, aide-mémoire and oral presentation transmitted in this telecon were apparently agreed. The transcript of this telecon in the Department’s files is incomplete (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048). Ambassador Smith then returned to Moscow, and on July 29, he was instructed to approach Molotov in concert with his British and French colleagues, telegram 873, July 29, to Moscow, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2848).