Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London, July 26, 1948—10 p. m.

3389. For Lovett from Douglas. Smith, Bohlen and I met this morning for 2 hours with Strang and others representing the British. During the latter part of the meeting we were joined by Massigli for the French.

1. We discussed the question of oral representation:

(a) To whom;

(b) By whom;

(c) The substance and purpose;

(d) Whether in part from prepared notes or written draft to which the 3 powers agreed in advance and a directive for the exploratory discussions.

Smith, Bohlen and I advanced at considerable length the arguments in favor of approaching Stalin instead of Molotov, Smith making clear that the approach could not be made by him for the two governments, and suggesting, personally, that the best procedure to follow would be for the 3 Ambassadors to request of Molotov a meeting with Stalin and Molotov for the 3 Ambassadors (if Peterson, the British Ambassador is in Moscow, or if not the Chargé d’Affaires).

2. This afternoon discussed with the same group the second phase; namely the program for the future, including draft of a note to be sent to the Soviet in the event that the approach to Stalin receives a rebuff or produces a negative response.

3. In regard to reference to UN, the question arose as to whether, assuming that the time factor permits, it would not be preferable to seek action by the GA rather than the Security Council. British agree with the staff memorandum sent me in Deptel 2876, July 22,¹ on this subject.
They are inclined to think that there would be more abstentions in the Security Council than we would perhaps anticipate, and that, therefore, the appeal to it might not produce the sort of moral and political support which we are seeking. This they felt could, however, be had by ⅔ vote in the GA. Whether in the latter body the matter should be brought under article II or XIV was a question. Article XIV seemed to be preferable, but in any event, without committing Mr. Bevin, the British were disposed to agree that the Soviet should be placed on notice under the circumstances referred to herein, that the question would be put to the UN.

4. Both the British and Massigli asked where we would go from there, assuming that the Soviet refrained from raising the blockade.

5. Later this afternoon, we met with Bevin, Strang, Peterson, Dean and Roberts for the British. After a long discussion in which Bevin, with a considerable amount of petulance at times and plaintiveness, combined with a resistance to approaching Stalin, for reasons previously reported, finally indicated that he would recommend to his Cabinet an approach to Stalin along the following lines:

(a) The US, UK (if Peterson is there, otherwise the Chargé d’Affaires) and the French Ambassadors to present to Molotov a very short communication reciting the situation, that their governments considered the situation that had arisen over Berlin to be very serious, and requesting a meeting with Stalin and Molotov. Smith and Peterson, with Bohlen and Strang, are preparing this brief communication.

(b) If this request is agreed to, the three Ambassadors to meet with Stalin and Molotov and our Ambassador Smith, if he is the senior, to state the position of the three governments using notes derived from a carefully prepared paper agreed to by the 3 governments. Smith, Bohlen, Peterson and Dean are preparing this paper, and in addition, instructions to the Ambassadors for the exploratory discussions which it is hoped will follow after the oral presentation of our position. This paper has not yet been drafted, but will be a reconciliation between, on the one hand, the tone of the British note,² as amended by the language which I have suggested and discussed with Bohlen, and the substance of your 2819.³ It will probably be much shorter than the British note.

(c) In case these approaches receive a rebuff or clearly negative reaction, Bevin agrees that we should prepare strongly worded note, probably along the lines of the first British draft,⁴ concluding with the proposal that the matter be referred to the UN. On one last pointy however, Bevin wants further discussions as to its technical features. This note need not be completed before Smith returns to Moscow. It would be prepared by Strang and me and Bohlen as long as he is here. (Embtel 3361, July 24⁵)

6. Bevin sought light on a complete program based on his observation (Embtel 3361, July 24) that if we lost Berlin, we lose Europe. After submitting the issue to the UN, what steps do we take?

(a) Economic sanctions;

(b) Pressure elsewhere in the world?

The former he feels will not be effective against the Soviet; the latter he does not contemplate as a practical step. Alternatively, an armed convoy which may precipitate real trouble. If so, he feels strongly that meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff should get about their business as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, but quietly, in order that should trouble come, we will be better prepared to meet the situation. In this connection, he asked the question as to when men would be called up under our recently enacted Selective Service Act (Embtel 3388, July 26⁶).
British have been demobilizing their forces, but are now reviewing the matter to determine whether they should not stop the demobilization in order that they could maintain their non-commissioned officer personnel, so essential to the remobilization of an army.

7. Bevin expressed the view that the Soviet were very troubled and would be prepared to enter into discussions. He even went so far as to say that we might arrive at a settlement with them under the terms of which the Soviet would agree to retire to the Oder. This we think is very wishful thinking.

8. At one time during the early part of the talk with Bevin, he indicated plaintively that he would agree to make approaches to Stalin solely because the US was pressing for it. To this both Bohlen, Smith and I promptly and emphatically said that we were not pressing any government to take this position merely because it was ours; that our purpose was to obtain the best agreed approach. Later I personally saw Bevin and reiterated that if he were not sincerely persuaded as to the wisdom of this procedure, to say so quite candidly, but he gave me his assurance that as long as the program outlined above contemplated going to Molotov first, it had his sincere approval.

Sent Department as 3389; repeated Paris as 420; repeated Moscow as 160; repeated Frankfurt (for Clay and Murphy) as 8.

Douglas

1. Not printed; it contained a preliminary study of certain U.N. aspects of the Berlin question (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2148). The Department’s views on the reference of the Berlin question to the United Nations were further elaborated in telegram 2974 July 28, to London, not printed. For substance, see footnote 6, p. 993.
2. The note under reference here was transmitted in telegram 3320, July 21, from London, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2148).
3. July 20, p. 971.
4. This draft was transmitted in telegram 3255, July 18, from London, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1848).
5. Ante, p. 982.
6. Not printed.