Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2848

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Washington, July 28, 1948.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In accordance with recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² in which I concur, it is requested that the British and French Governments be approached by your Department with strong requests for maximum air support for the present supply operation for Berlin.

It is also requested that discussion be initiated with the British and French Governments with a view toward developing preliminary plans for the use of composite (British, French and United States) armed convoys for the supply of Berlin. In this connection and for your information only, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not recommend supply to Berlin by armed convoy in view of the risk of war involved and the inadequacy of United States preparation for global conflict. They believe it prudent, however, to plan for such an operation in the event that:

a. Every other possible solution to the Berlin problem has first failed or been discarded.

b. Current evaluation indicates that the effort is likely to succeed.

c. The United States has first determined that risk of war in the near future and for the Berlin cause is acceptable, and³

d. All possible time shall first have been gained and used for adequate preparation for the attempt to supply by force and for full-out major war action in support thereof if war results.

It should be impressed upon the British and French Governments that these discussions for the development of preliminary plans do not in any way represent a decision by the United States Government that these armed convoys should be used at the present time, but that the United States Government reserves its decision in this matter pending further developments in the Berlin situation.⁴

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

1. Attached to the source text is the following memorandum by Samuel Reber, dated July 28:

   “General Norstad telephoned me this afternoon to ask that action in respect of the first paragraph of this letter be withheld pending further word from him as to the desirability of the approach to British and French Governments concerning air lift. General Norstad explained when the paragraph was adopted the British effort seemed to be diminishing but that as of this morning they had stepped up their air support to the fullest extent possible. Consequently any request for further support would be superfluous at present and open to misunderstanding. With regard to the second request contained in this letter it is understood that a further communication will be sent by the Secretary of Defense modifying this request and that no action need be taken until the second letter is received.”

2. The reference here is to a memorandum by Forrestal to the National Security Council (NSC 24) of July 26, not printed, transmitting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military courses of action with respect to the situation in Berlin. (Executive Secretariat Files)

3. In a memorandum to Lovett, August 3, not printed, Kennan suggested the following language for this paragraph:

   “It has been duly determined by the Executive Branch of the Government that in its judgment the issues involved in the Berlin conflict are such as to justify an insistence by this Government, even at the risk of war, on retaining its position in Berlin, including full access to its forces and to the population subject to their authority.” (Executive Secretariat Files)

4. According to information provided by the Department of Defense, Secretary Forrestal, in a memorandum dated July 30, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had forwarded the letter printed here to the Secretary of State. Subsequently, Forrestal explained, the Secretary of State had advised him that the question of planning for armed convoys should not be raised at the governmental level in view of the reconstitution of the French Cabinet and had recommended that the matter be taken up promptly with the British through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal said that he concurred in the Secretary of State’s recommendation and that he had withdrawn his request. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate planning for armed convoys in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal informed the Secretary of State of his action in a letter of July 30, not printed. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3048)