740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2448: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
1414. British estimate that Soviets anxious to discuss overall German questions and possibly prepared compromise on Berlin situation raises basic question as to whether their immediate objective is to push western powers out of Berlin or to force them to major concessions in Germany. With due allowance for indications mentioned in London’s 3280,1 must say have not detected any real evidence of urgent Soviet desire to negotiate overall German questions. Our estimate Kremlin’s present attitude is rather as follows:
Though western airlift, contrary to original Soviet expectations, probably means that real hunger can be staved off indefinitely, time is still working entirely in favor of Soviets, if they desire to make position western powers in Berlin untenable. For besides war of nerves against non-Communist German elements, the economic life of western sectors cannot be supported by food alone. By now it is apparent that airlift cannot supply sufficient coal, other raw materials and consumption goods or solve problem of outward shipment (i.e. disposal) of western sector production to any real degree. For these reasons, prediction of increasing economic stagnation and difficulties given in Depinfotel July 202 appears accurate, and Soviets are undoubtedly realistic enough to have figured this out for themselves. In currency field they already seem to have won important advances, judging from several recent press reports, in that their currency is fast becoming the main medium exchange throughout Berlin, thus promoting assimilation Berlin’s economy with that of surrounding Soviet zone and Soviet-controlled areas in general.
Soviet offer of food to Berliners from all sectors, as well as apparent move to “help out” western sector business concerns (mytel 1402, July 232) indicate clearly the path Soviet plans to follow in winning eventual control over entire city. Soviets must be convinced they need only sit tight with present blockade in order to eventually force western powers out.
In thus suggesting that Soviets are, for time being at least, primarily interested in liquidating Berlin as center of western reactionary [Page 985] influences, I do not mean to imply they are abandoning their objectives western Germany. As is so often the case, their policy is probably based on two possible alternatives. Hence if—though only if—sufficiently attracted by western concessions overall Germany, they might be induced for time being to forego battle for Berlin and return to fold of quadripartite government. Their minimum price would probably be liquidation trizonia and bizonia, to which another concession, equally unacceptable from western viewpoint, should perhaps be added, i.e. quadripartite Ruhr control. Furthermore, their reply to western notes and behavior since then certainly does not suggest they contemplate any relaxation of blockade until western powers agree their demands. In this connnection, they are undoubtedly counting fully on western unwillingness to resort to force to endeavor break overland seige.
If they are primarily interested in overall German discussions and questions, following points also appear arguable. They have pushed things pretty far, as regards Berlin, for a return to status quo ante, particularly as regards currency measures. They have gone very far in their statements that Berlin is part of Soviet zone and in the rising propaganda crescendo, which began early April, demanding withdrawal of western powers in view their criminal activities (looting of city and Soviet zone, espionage and disruption). Their imposition of hunger blockade itself a rather decisive step, for Soviets must have realized such crude tactics would deal heavy blow to their prestige and popularity among Germans, and had better therefore be carried through to finish, once begun. And if primary Soviet objective is to use Berlin crisis to produce negotiations on overall German question, and really wished to resolve the Berlin crisis would they not have gone somewhat further in this direction than they have, for instance by a somewhat more tempting reply to our first overture?
On balance, I am inclined to believe Soviets feel sure of winning battle for Berlin in next few months and that they see no haste for engaging in overall discussions and would demand a good deal before terminating the seige. And in any event, I believe that such concessions as we might be willing to make would, if accepted as the price for a temporary lifting of the blockade, only postpone the day when Soviet pressure to force us out of Berlin will be reapplied.
Sent Department. Department please pass Berlin 251, Paris 215, London 94.
- Not printed; the indications were two reports by General Robertson. The first was a statement by Colonel Kirsanov of the Soviet Information Services in Berlin that if the West would withdraw the Deutsche Marks from Berlin the situation would get easier. The second was a conversation with a Swiss journalist who had contacts with the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin. The journalist indicated that the Soviet Government was seeking an agreement which would avoid loss of prestige by either side. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2048)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩