740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]
top secret   us urgent
niact

3361. For Secretary and Lovett.

1.
I misunderstood Bevin when I reported that he thought the time was running against us in Berlin. What he meant was that time might be running against us in the presentation of a note or the making of oral communications to the Soviet. As to Berlin, he feels that time is running in our favor, that the air lift augmented by the additional 54’s had in the past and would in the future continue to surprise and wear down the Soviet.
2.
As to Bevin’s intentions, purposes and determination, there can be no question whatsoever. They were re-affirmed this morning in strong language. Once again he said “the abandonment of Berlin would mean the loss of western Europe.”
3.
Without disclosing the substance your short telecon message on [Page 983] Soviet aims1 I drew Bevin out again on his position in regard to possible Soviet objectives, (a) He will not withdraw from Berlin under Soviet pressure; (b) He will not cancel or halt measures already taken or planned for the western zones; (c) He will not agree to any commitment direct or indirect concerning the outcome of the negotiations; (d) He will not agree to any agenda while we are under the pressure of the blockade; (e) The only consideration which he is prepared to extend to the Soviet for the lifting of the blockade is an agreement to convene the Council of Foreign Ministers, the calendar which would have to be agreed to subsequent to the removal of the blockade.

I have had no doubts as to Bevin’s position on these points and I hope this will dispel any suspicions which you may entertain.

4.
Bevin is prepared to wait for the French to join us in making oral representations in Moscow. In this connection is not unlikely according to Massigli, whom I saw this morning, that a French Government will take office tomorrow and be prepared to act with us. This new government if Marie obtains the necessary absolute majority in the Assembly, will include probably Schumann as Minister of Foreign Affairs. It will not imply any modification of French foreign policy.
5.
As to invoking the United Nations, Bevin is disposed favorably to consider it though he makes no final commitment now on the point because while it may not provide a legally valid affirmation of our rights or approve a resolution directing the Soviet to lift the blockade, the support of a substantial majority would give us a moral and political position from which we could make our next moves. He would consider seriously under certain circumstances the imposition of sanctions and would be prepared under appropriate circumstances to view sympathetically among other things the dispatching of a convoy but he thinks it unfortunate if hints of such moves gain any currency.

[Here follow comments on the British draft note and attempts to make it cover the substance of telegram 2819, July 20, to London, page 971.]

Douglas
  1. The transcript of this telecon is not printed; in it the Department of State speculated that the Russians were likely to use the pressure of the blockade to precipitate negotiations on Germany at which the Western Powers would be forced to negotiate on Soviet terms. Washington then postulated the following six Soviet objectives and the U.S. reaction to them: “Totally Unacceptable: 1. To withdraw from Berlin under Soviet pressure. 2. To cancel or halt measures already taken in Western zones. 3. Any commitment, direct or indirect, concerning the outcome of the negotiations. Possibly Acceptable: 1. Discussions in Berlin concerning currency or any other matters affecting the quadripartitie administration of the city. 2. Meeting of the CFM to discuss German matters as a whole but with agenda to be fixed by mutual consent subsequent to lifting of blockade. 3. CFM meeting under same conditions to consider any questions falling within the competence of the four powers alone.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048)