Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048

Record of Teletype Conference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

[Extracts]

top secret

Washington, July 22, 1948—2 p. m.
London, July 22, 1948—7 p. m.

Conferees

Washington	London
Under Secretary Lovett	Ambassador Douglas
Ambassador Murphy2	Mr. Keith
Mr. Saltzman
Mr. Beam
Mr. Reber

[From Washington]

Subject 1:

At National Security Council meeting today presided over by President and attended by high military officers and cabinet members, it was decided to increase air-lift materially by adding C–54’s.³ It was the strong feeling of the Council that oral approach should be made along lines of our 2819⁴ for reasons paralleling those given in our earlier telecon today.⁵

[From London]

Answering your Subject 1 Bevin has some objections to the line suggested in Deptel 2819.

[From Washington]

Subject 2:

A.P. London dispatch in this afternoon’s Star is headlined “West reported ready to grant part of Berlin demands” etc. Article starts “The western powers were reported by a British official today to have agreed tentatively to widen negotiations over Berlin to include several other German problems”. Cannot something be done to stop this type of talk which because of its volume is leading us to conclusion they are trying to prejudge case and force our hand.

[From London]

Answering your Subject 2. I shall take this matter up again with both Bevin and Strang.

It has been a source of worry for a considerable period. On each occasion that I have mentioned and discussed similar report emanating from an official British source both Bevin and Strang have denied that anything has been given out from the Information Center or the FonOff Press Agency.

That is all for the moment from this end.

[Here follow the texts of questions and answers exchanged in the House of Commons during a discussion of the German situation.]

[From Washington]

Subject 3:

To get this subject back on the rails the basic question with us is whether the British note⁶ is a backdown or not. It seems to us that the technique of handling is secondary. The main thing is that we now sense in Bevin since his return from The Hague⁷ a definite weakening. We think his note is very damaging and that it fails or any public note fails to accomplish the purpose aimed at in the oral route and misses the main point hoped for in the stronger version of note.

[From London]

Just returned from long meeting with Bevin and with Massigli.

As to the meeting with Bevin.

A. He feels that an approach to Stalin would be a great mistake that it would restore the Communist prestige throughout Europe for it would be construed as an appeal by the Western Powers to him thus making the Soviet regime symbolized by Stalin dominating force in Europe. Moreover, he disagreed that previous personal approaches to Stalin had been helpful.

B. As to an approach to Molotov he thinks

a. That oral representations will be construed as leading from weakness.

b. He thinks that Molotov will not agree to receiving three Ambassadors together, that Peterson advises him that Molotov has not in the past done this and that he, Molotov, will consider a joint meeting with three Ambassadors as constituting pressure. Bevin does not want to be rebuffed.
In this request.

c. He thinks that unless a written document is left that the oral conversations will be inaccurately reported and that therefore we will take great risks in this respect.

d. Bevin believes that an approach even through Molotov is a mistake but will consider—is disposed to agree with it and will present it to the Cabinet this evening solely because he wants to go along with us.

C. If HMG agree to oral representation Bevin believes that a written document even in the form of a memorandum or an aide-mémoire should be read and left with Molotov under an injunction that it is not to be published or that the substance of it is not to be released to the press. This is the only way in which we can be protected against misinterpretations and distortions.

He believes also that the substance of the document should follow the lines of the latest British draft note with such minor changes possibly to strengthen it which we might suggest.

Finally, he believes that the Ambassadors should ask for separate appointments in order to avoid a rebuff which he is confident a request for a joint meeting would receive.

As to Massigli, the following personal views were expressed:

A. As to Stalin, he doubts very much that Stalin would grant an audience. If he were to grant one it would be almost impossible to obtain a joint audience for more than one Ambassador, even if the French Ambassador were in a position to represent his Government.
Finally, while he understands our reason for this approach he doubts that it would be productive.

B. As to an approach to Molotov, Massigli doubts that the Ambassadors could obtain a joint audience that they would have to go separately.
He also believes that they must be carefully briefed with a written document of substantially identical language which they must be prepared to leave behind with him.
Massigli’s personal view is that he prefers a note drafted along the lines of the latest British effort to which Bidault has given his consent.
Massigli will put the matter to his Government.

I will probably get HMG’s answer tonight.

What are your comments on the procedure which Bevin has suggested and which HMG may accept?

Bevin feels that he is doing his utmost to carry what he calls a fearful and a bankrupt France and that the pressure on him in the effort to maintain a united front among the Western European Powers is very great burden which he is trying desperately to carry.

In view of the present French situation where no Government exists is it your opinion that either an oral approach or a written note should be postponed until a French Minister of Foreign Affairs can act with authority?

[From Washington]

Subject 4:

We are mystified over Bevin’s reasoning on question of oral approach to Stalin. The idea meets with general approval here. An oral approach to Molotov leaves us cold and we could understand his reluctance to receive three Ambassadors jointly. Routine transmission of note to Molotov would not serve purpose we have in mind. Do you believe it might be useful to drop hint to Bevin that he might prefer us to risk individual approach to Stalin? We fail to see how this would build up Stalin. If Stalin refused interview it would be significant fact for record. Molotov could then be tried. As to leaving an aide-mémoire we consider that equivalent to a note. Therefore the note would either have to be strong as in the first draft reply or great damage would be done. As a record it should be possible with Stalin to agree to have an agreed minute of the conversation prepared by our and their interpreter.

Your reference to British attitude.

It is our strong desire that [not?] to slam the door that causes our preference for oral approach before committing ourselves publicly in form of note. To our minds note could only

(a) Slam door if it reflected accurately our determination or

(b) Constitute a grave public weakening our position if it followed lines of British draft which Soviets would be quick to exploit.

[From London]

Your Subject 4. I think it might be helpful to suggest to Bevin that he might prefer US to attempt an individual approach to Stalin on behalf of the US Government that is what I understand the question in the middle of your para 4 to be. It was somewhat garbled.

Question: Would an individual approach by the US along the lines indicated suggest either to Stalin or the Soviets that there was a division of opinion among the three Western Powers? And whether you value it or not I agree, for it is the only way in which we can avoid being [on] one or the other horn of the dilemma. My difficulty is in persuading the French if they are able to act at all now and the British to go along with us. I shall, however, continue to try to persuade them for I take this to be your instruction to me. As a matter of fact I think I suggested oral approaches almost a week ago and again elaborated on the idea on July 17th. That is all.

[From Washington]

Subject 5:

Re para [subject] 4

We only wished your opinion regarding possible unilateral approach by US. Do not yet mention this to Bevin.

Will discuss latest Cabinet decision with Lovett who had to leave and the Secretary and reply soonest.

Nothing further here.

[From London]

Please hold on one minute. Strang is in my office and I am going to see him.

We have a clear unclassified short one for you would you take it?

Sorry not for you, forget it.

Yes.

We are holding on a minute until Amb. returns from his office.

Strang has just given me on behalf of Bevin the following information.

The Cabinet late this afternoon agreed

(a) That a communication should be made to the Soviet Government orally.

(b) That it should be given separately by the respective Ambassadors rather representatives for Peterson HMG’s Ambassador is not well and is in England on leave. Ambassador Smith would, of course, make the first approach.

(c) That the oral communication should follow normal procedure and be made to Molotov. The Cabinet is still opposed to making an approach to Stalin for the reason that it believes that such an approach would reestablish Stalin’s position and the Communist prestige now waning in Europe.

(d) That a written record of the oral representation should be kept and left behind not as an official communication. An aide-mémoire but solely for the purpose of accurately reflecting what was said.

(e) That the line of the oral representation should conform generally to that of the latest British draft with such changes and amendments as Bevin may consider. He wants, however, the substance and tone of the note maintained. He gives me assurance that this is not to be construed as a “back down” but for the purpose orally of steering away repeat steering away between the two horns of the dilemma.

(f) That if the US wants Ambassador Smith to make additional representations he, Mr. Bevin, would like to know what they are so that HMG may consider whether they should be used by the British representatives also.

(g) That we should not wait for the French.

(h) That action should be taken by if not before the weekend for in Mr. Bevin’s opinion time is running against us. Moreover, a debate will be held in the House of Commons on Foreign Affairs concentrated principally on the German situation early next week.⁸

Mr. Bevin asked that we be assured that it is his anxiety to act with US if it is at all possible.

In the light of the above information which Strang has given me it seems to me offhand that there are two points at issue between us.

First, whether we will agree to approach Molotov orally or whether the British will agree to approach Stalin orally and second, whether we can accept the substance and tone of the British note as the basis for Ambassador Smith’s oral representation.

That is all.

We would like to add the following. We would like your comments.

Thank you very much. If you think this a land of beer and skittles you are wrong.

1. In the source text all the transmissions from Washington preceded the first transmission from London. The individual transmissions have been rearranged in their most likely sequence. The conference lasted several hours with occasionally long delays between the transmissions.
2. General Clay and Ambassador Murphy had been summoned to Washington on July 19 for consultations and to report to the National Security Council and the President on the situation in Berlin.
3. At its 16th meeting, July 22, the National Security Council agreed to add 75 C–54’s to the airlift. At the same meeting, the Council reiterated the determination of the United States to remain in Berlin, agreed to proceed with the construction of a new airfield in Berlin, concurred with Clay’s plan to reduce the number of dependents in the city, and discussed Clay’s oral report on the situation in Germany. (NSC Action 84, Executive Secretariat Files) Clay had also discussed the Berlin situation with President Truman and various members of the Cabinet on July 19, and with Secretary Forrestal at dinner on July 20. For accounts of these discussions, see Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 368, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 459–460, and Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 124–126.
4. London telegram dated July 20, p. 971.
5. The transcript of the telecon under reference is not printed; in it the Department of State told Douglas that its reasons for going directly to Stalin had been transmitted in telegram 2867 (supra), but indicated that it might consider an approach to Molotov and discussion of the Berlin situation along the lines of telegram 2819 (p. 971) if the British and French continued to oppose the idea of an oral approach to Stalin. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048)
6. The reference here is to the draft note transmitted in telegram 3320, July 21, from London, not printed; see footnote 5 to telegram 2842, July 20, to London, p. 974.
7. Bevin had been at The Hague attending the meetings of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Nations, July 19–20.
8. In telegram 2888, July 22, 8 p. m., to London, not printed, the Department replied that it did not share Bevin’s view that time was running against the Western powers in Berlin, and expressed the opinion that it was “… preferable to have the French with us and a delay of two or three days may make this-possible.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2248)