740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2148: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
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2867. For Douglas Eyes Only. Brit Emb presented urgent communication to us from Bevin along lines your 33111 this afternoon. We fail to comprehend Bevin’s “strong dislike” to oral approach.
Regarding objection (a) we consider matter is of sufficient gravity to justify this kind of appeal. Highest authorities here are aware of implications of this step. Furthermore an approach to Stalin is not a new departure and has sometimes produced results in the past.
Regarding objection (b) we would retain control of place and manner of subsequent discussions since procedures and proposals would be submitted by senior ambassador to three western governments ad referendum. Objective on which he would concentrate would be to insure that agreement to subsequent discussions would result in lifting of blockade.
Regarding objection (c), susceptibilities of Soviet Foreign Office seems to us of minor importance.
We still oppose suggestion of delivery of written note prior to, or concurrently with any approach in Moscow. In our view, latest British draft2 is redolent with appeasement and we fail to see how necessary expression of determination could be conveyed in Moscow discussion in conjunction with presentation of a note of this character which, whatever outcome of such discussion, would do us great damage when [Page 976] published. In any communication for the record we simply cannot let Soviet charges against us gain acceptance by failure to reply or to emphasize intolerable interference with our occupation rights and responsibilities in Berlin. Furthermore oral approach in all likelihood will produce a more rapid answer and enable us to evaluate situation whereas note may not be answered for some time, thus prolonging delay in clarifying situation.
Please impress upon Bevin the necessity of a coordinated plan of action to be worked out step by step. The difficulty with his proposal is that it does not envisage what would follow possible Soviet rejection of note. As we see it our program involves successive steps. First, the oral approach which gives needed flexibility and safeguards in present situation whereas written communication at first step may well freeze Soviet position. If this approach through diplomatic channels without publicity fails in solution we should then have recourse to strong note rejecting Soviet arguments and placing problem before UN. We consider it essential to utilize to the maximum UN procedure although we appreciate that it would in all likelihood involve Soviet veto and probably reference to a special sesion of the Assembly called for the purpose before taking the necessary action to continue supply of Berlin which might have to take the form of armed food convoys. Substance foregoing given to Brit Emb this afternoon together with suggestion that as previously agreed negotiations be centered in London.
We concur with Bevin that press reports of Soviet intention to furnish food and possibly electricity, presumably on their terms, does not alter basic issue of our position and rights in Berlin, although it is undoubtedly intended to influence our air lift and may provide pretext for insistence upon cutting down this method of supply. In separate telegram tomorrow we are replying to your inquiry regarding UN procedure.
- Not printed; in it Douglas reported that he had discussed the substance of telegram 2819, July 20 (p. 971) with Bevin who still felt very strongly that an oral approach to Stalin at this time would be a mistake. Bevin gave the following reasons for his feeling: “(A) It would constitute a removal of diplomatic and political maneuvers from the hands of the Foreign Ministers, and would, necessarily, prematurely place the responsibility in the heads of states. (B) It would put Stalin in the position, which Bevin is confident he would take, of agreeing to discussions, suggesting Moscow as the seat of them and defining the agenda in accordance with his own desires, thus putting Stalin in the position of being able to dictate to the three western powers where the negotiations were to be held and the subjects to be discussed. (C) It might have an adverse effect and aggravate prejudices in the Soviet Foreign Office.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2148)↩
- The reference here is to the draft submitted in telegram 3320, July 21, from London, not printed. See footnote 5 to telegram 2842, supra.↩