Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

top secret
Washington, July 20, 1948—8 p. m.

2842. For Douglas. We are concerned that in discussion of various courses of action regarding Berlin, focus may become distorted concerning our primary objective, which is lifting of intolerable land blockade urtel 3276.2 This still remains our primary purpose and is not affected by Sov announced offer to furnish food.3 While announcement may be chiefly propaganda device it may have double-edged significance if implemented since it might relieve to some extent immediate pressure of Berlin food problem but at the same time facilitate Sov domination of the city. In any event purported offer does not solve question of raw materials or land blockade against Allied forces.4

We still hold to advisability of direct oral approach to Moscow. Written reply at present juncture presents two risks. On the one hand, a note containing indispensable outspoken refutation of Sov charges could harden Sov prestige position to point of inflexibility. On the other hand, a conciliatory note which ignores these charges and obscures issue of illegal Sov blockade would offer impression of weakness. For your own info we consider latest Brit draft falls within latter category. Besides the objections you cite, draft note in para 7 appears to propose negotiations under continuing duress of blockade.5

We still strongly believe that possibility of solution should first be explored through direct oral approach (see Deptel 2819, July 196). If our approach is rejected by Soviets, we should then reply by disclosure of intent and nature of action taken in Moscow, together with statement of our case along lines of first Brit draft submitted to us. We think it may then be absolutely necessary to take the matter to the United Nations as soon as possible in order that the next successive [Page 975] steps be carried out without delay. We are at present considering what action in the nature of retaliation outside of Germany, sanctions or use of armed convoys might be required to maintain our position in Berlin in event UN action unsuccessful in lifting blockade.

Marshall
  1. Repeated to Paris as 2745 and Moscow as 827.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. On July 20, the Soviet Union announced that it had decided to place 100,000 tons of wheat and similar quantities of other products at the disposal of the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin.↩
  4. In telegram 3313, July 21, from London, not printed, Douglas replied as follows: “Regret that I may have given the impression that our primary objective, i.e., the lifting of the land blockade against the western sectors of Berlin, was in my own mind becoming lost in or distorted by discussions of various courses of action. I can give you every assurance that this is not the ease, and I very much doubt that it is in Bevin’s mind.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2148).↩
  5. Following the receipt of the Soviet note, Douglas, Massigli and Strang worked out the text of a draft reply. The reference here is to the first draft, transmitted in telegram 3255, July 18, from London, not printed. Ambassador Franks delivered a second draft (not found in the Department of State files) which Douglas thought was not relevant to the issues and did not protect western rights in Berlin. The last draft of the note was transmitted in telegram 3320, July 21, from London, not printed.↩
  6. Supra.↩