740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2048: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
niact
no distribution no stencil
2819. Eyes Only for Douglas. High-level conferences over the weekend and today, including discussions with Foster Dulles and ending with confirmation by the President himself, have resulted in a firm determination of U.S. policy in the Berlin matter. It is that the United States is resolved to maintain its position in Berlin and to take all measures necessary for the exercise of its rights, including the fulfillment of supply of the population of its sector.
In the pursuit of the foregoing policy, this Government is prepared to use any means that may be necessary.2 However, careful analysis of the Soviet note does not support the view that the Politburo is definitely determined upon a course of action leading to war. We do not feel, up to the present, that the Soviet Government has committed itself so irretrievably to maintain the blockade as to preclude the possibility of some face-saving retreat on their part. In these circumstances, precisely because we are firm in our determination to carry this matter through to the end, we feel we should explore every possibility which might lead to an agreed solution.
We therefore believe that prior to the dispatch of a formal note, which might elevate the matter further into the realms of prestige considerations, an effort should be made to approach Stalin directly. This, however, could only be done on an agreed three-power basis with the senior Ambassador in Moscow speaking for the three Governments, and on the understanding that the French and British Governments share our determination in this matter.
If the idea of an approach to Stalin, in accordance with the above procedure, would be acceptable to the British and French Governments, the Ambassador representing the three powers might be instructed along the following lines:
Begin. 1. The Ambassador on behalf of the three Governments should inform Stalin of the extremely serious view which the three countries take of the situation created in Berlin as a result of the restrictions on communications between the western zones and the [Page 972] western sectors of Berlin. The reasons given in the Soviet note do not justify action of this nature and therefore cannot as such be accepted.
2. The U.S., U.K. and France are in Berlin as a matter of unquestioned right. Under no circumstances will they withdraw from Berlin under duress, whatever methods may be employed by the Soviet Military Commander.
3. The Governments of the U.S., U.K. and France consider that by international agreement they have an occupational duty with respect to the supply of the western sectors of Berlin and that they will take all measures which may prove necessary to assure the supply of their forces in Berlin and the discharge of their responsibilities towards the civilian population of these sectors.
4. The three Governments do not wish for war and assume that the Soviet Government holds the same view. However, the three Governments cannot tolerate indefinitely actions of the Soviet military authorities which constitute a grave encroachment upon the military positions of the three Governments and an attempt to prevent their military forces from performing occupational duties laid upon them by an international agreement to which the Soviet Government is a party. Methods of coercion, irrespective of their motivation, obviously can lead to war if the Government applying such methods continues to pursue them to the end.
5. In so far as negotiations are concerned, the three Governments have never refused to discuss German matters in the appropriate place and in the appropriate manner. In fact, the three Governments are entirely prepared to discuss any question affecting Germany or any matter in dispute concerning the European settlements which fall within the agreed competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
6. The question of negotiation is therefore not the issue. The difficulty lies in the measures still in force in Berlin which restrict the right of communication between the western zones and the western sectors of Berlin. The Soviet Government must understand that, irrespective of any questions of negotiations, we cannot tolerate the continuation of this situation with respect to the supply of Berlin.
7. The Ambassador should state that it is not clear to the Governments of U.S., U.K. and France exactly why the admitted restrictions on communications between Berlin and the western zones have been put into effect by the Soviet Government and would appreciate clarification on the following points:
- (a)
- If as indicated in the note these measures are genuinely caused by the currency problem or by any technical difficulties, they are obviously insufficient to justify the nature of the Soviet counter action since such causes could have been and can be adjusted by the representatives of the four powers in Berlin.
- (b)
- If these measures are designed to bring about negotiations with the three western powers, they are entirely unnecessary since at no time did these countries refuse a straight-forward proposal to negotiate on any subject within the competence of the four powers.
- (c)
- If, however, the real but undisclosed purpose of the blockade is either (a) an attempt to force the western powers to withdraw from Berlin, or (b) an attempt to compel them to abandon the measures they have been forced to take in the administration of the western zones in the absence of general German settlement, then Stalin must understand that these efforts cannot and will not succeed.
8. The Ambassador should state that on the assumption that it is not in the interest of the Soviet Union any more than it is in those of the three western powers to allow this situation to move in the direction of war, it should be possible for the four Governments to find some way of getting around the difficulties in order to bring to an end the highly dangerous situation that has developed in Berlin as a result of the Soviet measures.
9. In the event that Stalin’s reply to this inquiry should indicate that the measures in Berlin are caused by either “a”or “b”of 7, the Ambassador should invite his views as to the means of overcoming the difficulties and would be prepared to discuss with Stalin some practical arrangement which would provide a resolution of the Berlin situation without loss of prestige to either side, possibly along the lines of re-opening of the communications by rail, road and water to Berlin with a simultaneous announcement of an agreement to resume negotiations in Berlin at an agreed later date or an announcement of a four-power meeting to consider broader questions. End.
The Ambassador would not be authorized to commit the three Governments in regard to any arrangement proposed by Stalin or worked out in the discussion but would report fully to the three Governments the results of his visit for consideration by them.
It is our thought that this diplomatic step, which would be kept secret as long as possible, would be taken before any reply were sent to the Soviet note. If Stalin’s reaction were negative, we would not only reply to the note but would take the matter to the United Nations with a view to assuring our rights in Berlin.
We would like you to get Bevin’s views at once on this approach. In view of the French Governmental crisis, we do not propose to take it to the French until we have heard from Mr. Bevin.3
- This telegram was repeated to Paris as 2719, Moscow as 823, and Frankfurt as 39.↩
- At this point in the source text, Bohlen had crossed out before transmission the following: “whatever the consequences. However, we do not feel that there are any grounds for assuming that the Russians have definitely determined to pursue their methods of coercion to the point of war. Apart from general considerations”.↩
- In telegram 3786 from Paris and, 1373 from Moscow, July 20, neither printed, Ambassadors Caffery and Smith both expressed their agreement with the policy set forth in this telegram (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2048).↩