Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent

London, July 17, 1948—7 p. m.

3249. For Lovett (Eyes Only) from Douglas.

I.

It seems to me that, among others, there are six major alternatives from which we can select our proposals in response to the recently received Soviet note:¹

1. We can agree, when the duress of the blockade has been removed, to discuss the entire German question, either commencing with the Berlin situation and proceeding to other matters after there has been an exploration of the specific subjects and the relative general positions of the Soviet, or plunge directly into the whole of the German problem, meanwhile postponing the application and putting into effect of the London agreements. This course would probably have the effect of putting off the establishment of a German political organization in the western areas for an indefinite period, probably, because of the intervention of winter, for approximately a year. In view of

(a) The history, extending over three years, of Soviet expressed or implied refusal to take the steps necessary to achieve economic unity;

(b) The Soviet unwillingness to agree to the creation of a German Government based, generally, on the federal principle;

(c) Soviet exaction of reparations from current production;

(d) The type of social, economic, and political organization of the Soviet zone;

(e) Soviets’ obvious ambition to participate in the control of the Ruhr;

(f) Soviet disruption of the Allied Control Council; and

(g) Soviet apparent liquidation of the Kommandatura;

it is most unlikely, if indeed it is not certain that the discussions will produce no more of a solution than the many discussions which have been held in the past, excepting possibly currency in Berlin and frontier currency controls. Moreover, the failure of such discussions to formulate a solution would, unless our rights to be in Berlin and to enjoy access to the western sectors were acknowledged, expose us to later reimposition of the blockade. An advantage to acquiescing in discussions of this character would be to convince some of the “doubting Thomases” like Leon Blum in France, that the German problem cannot be resolved by negotiation with the Soviets. Time might be gained, if time is an advantage.

2. We can agree to the holding of discussions, as outlined in Paragraph 1 above, without postponing the application and putting into effect of the London agreements. It is as unlikely, if indeed not as certain, that discussions under this alternative would be as futile as under Paragraph 1 above. The failure of them to provide a settlement would, unless our rights had been in the meanwhile recognized, make us equally vulnerable to the reimposition of the blockade. An advantage to acquiescing in such discussions under these circumstances would similarly be to convince the “doubting Thomases” that this course of action is hopeless.

3. We can follow the line, somewhat liberalized, as to the discussions and deleting reference to specific date of receipt of the Soviet reply, suggested in Embtel 3217.² This course, if it is practicable, might lead the Soviet to lift the blockade or at least give us a more solid legal base from which we might attempt to exercise our rights of access. Even, however, were our legal rights to be reinforced by international affirmation of them, the attempt to enjoy them might precipitate, if not a war on a grand scale, a series of armed conflicts.

4. We can follow the course of alternative 1 or 2 above, and simultaneously take the question of rights to be in Berlin and enjoy access to the western sectors to the appropriate organization of the UN for determination if this is practicable. This alternative might meet with opposition from the Soviet, or at least stiffen their position in any discussions. It would, however, provided our rights were affirmed, tend to make it more difficult, although, of course, not impossible for the Soviet to reimpose the blockade after the failure of the discussions.

5. We can abandon Berlin. The effect of this course of action, however, would, I think, be a calamity of the first order. Western European confidence in us, in the light of our repeated statements that we intend to remain in Berlin, would be so shattered that we would, with reasonable expectancy, progressively lose Western Germany, if not Western Europe. Fear, uncertainty and lack of faith in us would weaken the determination of Western Germans and the people of Western Europe, and would probably cause failure of the European Recovery Program, if it would not cause the beneficial effects, which we hope it will produce, to evaporate like water on a hot stove.

If, however, we are to abandon Berlin, we should soon begin to set the stage for it and be prepared to make spectacular commitments and to take unmistakably impressive acts designed to restore confidence among the Western Germans, and the Western Europeans in our unflinching resolution. These commitments and acts should include definite and irrevocable participation in a military alliance which might take the form of

(a) A regional pact or some other form; they might include also,

(b) The reinforcing, if this practicable, of our ground forces in Germany;

(c) The substantial building up of our air force in Western Europe;

(d) Such other steps as would restore a broken faith; and

(e) The evacuation by air of such Germans in the western sectors as choose to migrate to the western zones. The naked abandonment of Berlin, unaccompanied by truly spectacular commitments and really impressive actions would probably be disastrous.

6. We can propose to the Soviets, in accordance with the suggestion in their note that they carry the responsibility of providing the essential foodstuffs and raw materials for the German population of the western sectors of Berlin. This course would, unless associated with or followed by redress of the present situation, mean, I think, at least a partial surrender of our position, and might lead, ultimately, to our evacuation of Berlin.³

II.

1. If we are to abandon Berlin, an advantage of holding discussions under I 1, 2 and 3 above, is that we would gain time during the course of the summer months before winter sets in, in which to condition public opinion for abandonment and to take the spectacular steps with which it should be associated.

2. Since it is almost a certainty that discussions will produce no agreement with the Soviet in regard to Germany, except on very limited matters, we must, I think, ultimately face one of three probable alternatives:

(a) Abandon Berlin as a naked act and risk losing Europe;

(b) Abandon Berlin under the circumstances referred to above; or

(c) Be prepared to attempt, through the employment of all the devices at our command to enjoy our rights to be in Berlin and to have free access to our sectors, facing the risk of war. These alternatives outlined above may have been painted in shades that are too black and white; there may be a series of shadowy grays.

III.

Provided always that we are not placed in the position of discussing or negotiating under duress, I believe that the wise course of action is to agree to discussions commencing with the situation in Berlin, but without slamming the door to discussion of such other matters as may seem to be appropriate in the light of Soviet behavior during the discussions on the Berlin situation and in the light of exploration of the additional items the Soviet indicate should be included on the agenda and their positions on them.

Without having the opportunity of exchanging views and of examining the proposal with qualified members of the legal profession (to which low level I have not yet sunk, or to which high level I have not yet risen) I think the alternative suggested in Item 4 may be worth serious consideration. It is remotely possible, but I think very unlikely, that such discussions might develop agreement on one or two specific items having to do with currency reform and the mutual protection against the effect of separate currencies in the two zones. It is even more remote and more unlikely that they would produce some sort of a modus Vivendi.

IV.

I presume you have explored the possibility and the advisability of some oral representation to the Kremlin to obtain some indication as to whether it is the Soviet intention to resolve the issue by forceful means.

V.

Is it possible to have some indication of the line of thought prevailing in the Department? It would be very helpful here.

Sent Department 3249, repeated Berlin for Murphy and Clay as 336.

Douglas

1. Reference here is to the note of July 14, p. 960.
2. Not printed; In it Douglas gave his view of the problem confronting the three Western Powers. He felt they needed the confirmation of their right to be in Berlin from an appropriate international agency. Once this was obtained, any interference with that right would be an act of aggression by the Soviet Union. From this point of view the question of Berlin should be submitted to the Security Council as soon as possible. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1548)
3. In telegram 1335, July 15, from Moscow, not printed, Smith expressed his feeling that the Soviet note was even more uncompromising than he had expected, and felt that the Soviet offer to supply Berlin with food undercut humanitarian arguments of the western powers’ note. The danger of armed conflict had become greater and the sending of an armed convoy to break the blockade would run serious risk of precipitating war. In view of this Smith wanted to explore the situation further through a second note (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1548). Caffery also suggested the sending of a second note, but wanted to sound out the Soviets with a deal whereby the blockade would be lifted simultaneously with the announcement of renewed quadripartite negotiations (telegram 3715, July 16, from Paris, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1648).