740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1448

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

top secret

I went to see the President, as you requested, this afternoon to bring him up to date on the latest developments in the Berlin situation. He had a copy of the note,1 which he read, and said he considered it as a total rejection of everything we had asked for. I told the President that we were studying the note and that there were several aspects to it, but that his conclusion was the same as we had reached as to its main substance.

I outlined for the President the status of the B–29s and told him of the telecon talk with Ambassador Douglas this afternoon.2 I told him that although the British, after having held back and missed what we regarded as the psychological moment, were now eager to have these planes come to England, but that we thought the matter required further consideration in view of the Soviet note, and it therefore was to be discussed tomorrow at eleven by the National Security Council for recommendation to him.

[Page 967]

The President said he was completely in agreement with this course of action and felt that the question of dispatching these planes should be most carefully considered in the light of the Soviet note.

Charles E. Bohlen
  1. The reference here is to the Soviet note of July 14, p. 960.↩
  2. Transcript not printed; see footnote 3 to memorandum of conversation by Lovett, supra.↩