Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Minutes of the Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee With the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, November 26, 1947
| Present: | The Congress |
| Senator Hickenlooper, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy | |
| Senator Vandenberg, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee | |
| State Department | |
| Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary | |
| Mr. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff | |
| Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary, CPC | |
| Department of National Defense | |
| Mr. Forrestal, Secretary | |
| Atomic Energy Commission | |
| Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman | |
| Mr. Strauss, Commissioner | |
| Dr. Bacher, Commissioner | |
| Mr. Wilson, General Manager | |
| Mr. Marks, General Counsel | |
| Mr. Volpe, Deputy General Counsel | |
| Research and Development Board | |
| Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman |
Subject: A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States.
Decision:
Subject to the opinion of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, to open negotiations with the British and Canadians as proposed by the Executive departments and agencies represented at the meeting.
Implementing Action:
- 1.
- State Department to make preliminary informal contacts with British and Canadian Embassies in preparation for projected conversations.
- 2.
- Chairman of Congressional Committee, Senator Hickenlooper, to convene, at an appropriate time, a meeting of the Joint Congressional Committee to review the proposal of the Executive departments and to have a report on the progress of negotiations.
Discussion:
The group had before it a paper, “Recommendations Concerning a Program of Negotiations with the British and Canadian Governments Designed to Overcome Present Misunderstandings and to Increase the Amount of Uranium Ore Available to the United States,” dated November 25, 1947 (annexed to these Minutes as Tab A),1 which was the joint work of the Department of State, the Department of National Defense, the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Senator Hickenlooper opened the meeting stating that he was confident that this session would be useful in making clear the nature of the problem, but that it was desirable to convene a full meeting of the Joint Congressional Committee as early as possible. The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett, introduced the proposals cited above, stating that they represented the joint view of the interested Executive departments on which it was hoped to obtain the concurrence of the Congressional leaders and the appropriate committees.
Mr. Lilienthal referred to the testimony of the then Under Secretary, Mr. Dean Acheson, to the Joint Congressional Committee on [Page 872] March [May] 12, 1947, in which Mr. Acheson had traced the history of the so-called war-time agreements among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and indicated the principal action taken under them. Since then the Committee had from time to time received further information with regard to particulars of the atomic energy program of this country and to the effect on it of the international situation. The Atomic Energy Commission’s chief concern was with the raw materials situation which was distinctly unfavorable. The prospects for more efficient and economical extraction processes which would reduce our dependence on imports were real but still remote. All concerned with the problem now agreed that in order to meet our requirements, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be necessary for us to obtain considerably better than a fifty-fifty division of future production. The situation had become so tight that, on the date of October 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had addressed a letter to the Secretary of State2 directing his attention urgently to the need for improving the raw materials situation. Since then, there had been continuous consultations among the Secretary of State, Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Defense Board, and the Research and Development Board. A project for negotiations with the British and Canadians had emerged from these conferences. The Commission stood ready to supply technical information and assistance in these negotiations which would be directed by the Department of State. Since the national security would primarily govern our conduct of the negotiations, Secretary Forrestal and Dr. Bush would naturally have a leading responsibility.
Mr. Wilson described the present raw materials situation, the extent of stockpiles in this country and in the United Kingdom, and the manner in which raw materials have hitherto been allocated. He reinforced with detail the conclusion that our raw material situation would be very poor for a critical period of some three or four years unless we could obtain a dispersion of a portion of the stocks in the British Isles and a satisfactory allocation from South African and Congo production. (Discussion of stocks, quantities and locations off the record.)
Mr. Lovett said that our raw materials situation appeared to be critical. Moreover, it was complicated by two factors. First, our arrangements with the Belgian Congo were with a private company, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. Second, the only other important source of materials now known was in South Africa. There was very little leverage that we could apply to South Africa through credits or the Marshall Plan or other means. South Africa was not a participant [Page 873] in the Plan. Moreover, she was a great exporter of wealth through gold. She provided considerable credits to Great Britain. With respect to Belgium, our arrangements with the Congo were satisfactory at present, and any attempt to gain further concessions from the Belgians through European Economic Recovery legislation would appear as an attempt to obtain concessions already secured to us by commitments entered into in mutual good faith. Although the need for discussions with the British and Canadians arose out of an unfavorable raw materials situation, such talks would give us the opportunity to settle an unclear situation with respect to the war-time agreements which had a bad effect on relations with Britain and Canada. Both of these countries had the impression that the United States had not made good on its commitments in those agreements. We were in receipt of three notes from the British Prime Minister asking us to implement what the U.K. considered to be our obligations in regard to cooperation. We had not been able to make a concrete reply to these communications, either affirmative or negative, because of uncertainties about the McMahon Act and the effect of the war-time agreements. It was high time such a situation was cleared up. Moreover, it had been apparent for some time that our efforts to secure multilateral control through the United Nations had reached a stalemate.
We had been considering our course with respect to the British and Canadians, and our future policy in the UN”, in relation one to the other. We had reached the time when we must solve once and for all the ultimate disposition of the raw materials in question. The existence of a stock-pile in Britain was disadvantageous to the security of the United States. We wanted to get the use of it and have it brought to this country or Canada for storage. We also wanted the British to limit the input of raw materials in the U.K. to the use which could be made of them. This we hoped to hold to a minimum. We had to consider two factors in this connection: First, excessive British optimism about the imminence of industrial applications. We would try to overcome this optimism, but hitherto the extent to which we could do so had been apparently limited by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act. The question of British national pride and the prestige of any current British government was involved. In Britain’s precarious productive situation, the government had to give assurances to the people that it was doing its utmost to develop atomic power as a source of industrial energy. Uranium had acquired a symbolic value bound up with nationalism and defense. The monetary value of the uranium stockpile in Britain was relatively little. We had reason to believe that the British would never sell or hypothecate it just to acquire a small amount of dollars which would have relatively little effect on their financial position.
[Page 874]The Atomic Energy Commission spokesmen had underlined the value of South Africa. We had to reckon on strong British influence on South Africa, an area which was of key importance in the British strategic plans for the post-war commonwealth, and one in which they were not prepared to abdicate. We had also to consider the character and influence of Prime Minister Smuts.3 If he should acquire the British view that the United States had not been faithful to its commitments, it might well influence him against making an agreement satisfactory to us. This was a current concern since Smuts was recently in London, attending the Royal wedding, and it was known that the British were going to tackle him on the subject of uranium.
In summary, our negotiations with the British and Canadians should be aimed at (1) “tidying up” the war-time agreements, (2) dispersal of the stockpile in Britain, (3) getting a satisfactory share of Belgian production, (4) restricting storage in Britain to the amount which could be used in current projects, (.5) obtaining British and Canadian support in negotiations with South Africa. In all negotiations we had to realize that it was a very difficult thing for the government of one country to propose and justify the surrender of its stock of uranium to another country. We had no assurance of complete success in our negotiations. Therefore, we had to consider all possible levers and incentives which might be used. We had received many intimations a year ago and more recently on working levels that the British were interested in exchanging information with us. We knew also that the Canadians felt very strongly about this, and General McNaughton had often complained that the cooperation of Canada with the United States was a one-way street with the advantage flowing exclusively to the United States.
Of course, any question of exchange of information with other countries had to be considered with reference to the national security of this country, and could not be justified unless we stood to gain information or other concessions thereby which would improve our security position. Dr. Bush and Mr. Forrestal could talk to that point. He had received the impression that what the British and Canadians might ask would be relatively small and that we might profit thereby. In any case, the Department of State does not feel that it could start negotiations with the other countries unless it had a clear mandate as to how far it might go, or what it might say with respect to these matters.
Dr. Bush believed that agreement on the question of exchange of information might contribute to an atmosphere in which the allocation of raw materials could be arranged in a mutually satisfactory manner. There were definitely certain areas in which interchange of information would contribute to the security of the United States. For example, [Page 875] (1) we needed all information we could get on Russian production and procurement. To get this a world wide information net was required and our collection net would be widened to the extent that we could cooperate with the British. (2) It was most important to know when the Russians might set off a bomb. To know this we ought to have a world-wide meteorological testing system for radioactivity. Here again our facilities could be pieced out by joining up with the British. (3) There were considerable areas of scientific research and development in which the British and Canadians had information which we should acquire. American scientists had great respect for the work of British scientists in this field. For our maximum progress and security, Dr. Bush would advocate a reasonable exchange of information. Exchange was important in another way. We had developed methods for protection of personnel working with radioactive materials. We would be in a bad moral and political situation, if what we had developed was not available to other countries who shared with us the arrangements whereby the materials were procured in the first place.
Mr. Lilienthal emphasized that in the view of the Commission, no interchange of information was justified unless it could be found to be in our own interest. The Commission had examined the fields in which interchange would be beneficial to us. Some light on this matter was cast by our experience in joint procurement of raw materials. Cooperation in procurement was to our advantage and we had continued it. In a collateral way we had seen the utility of interchange of information in this field, for example, with respect to procurement and treatment of low grade ores. The Commission had recently conducted on behalf of the U.S. talks with the British and Canadians with respect to declassification of secret information. Mr. Wilson explained that during the war classified information had been jointly developed among the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. The U.S. had developed a Guide (the Tolman Guide) setting standards for that gradual declassification of information which was necessary for security reasons, and also to advance the development of atomic energy. The British and Canadians used the American Guide, but there had grown up some tendency to interpret it differently, and some danger that information still classified in country A might be released by country B. It was to insure synchronization that the talks had been held. The conferees had arrived at agreement on a basis of synchronization in an atmosphere of complete understanding.
The Commission had taken advantage of this meeting to ask in an informal scientist-to-scientist way what it was that the British and Canadians required in the way of interchange of information. The U.K. and Canadian scientists present were those who presumably knew most about the requirements of their countries’ programs. The Canadians [Page 876] wanted (a) information as to health and safety procedures, including (1) safety of workers in radioactive materials, (2) disposal of radioactive wastes, (b) The most advantageous use to which Chalk River (in which we had a heavy investment) could be put when it entered into operation. The British wanted information similar to that required by the Canadians on health and safety. This was particularly important since the Labor Party and Government had been critical of us for withholding health information, and because the British facilities were located in the Thames watershed containing the largest agglomeration of persons in the British Isles. The British also wanted information about the preparation and use of isotopes which, of course, had humanitarian justification. They wanted information about extraction chemistry and the installation of a “closed cycle” in a diffusion plant which they wish to construct. It appeared from their specifications that British research was following a line parallel to our own and that they were confronted with similar problems. The clear inference was that we could certainly profit by solutions which they might have worked out.
Mr. Lovett thought that the time was peculiarly ripe for us to settle many of the issues outstanding between ourselves and the British and the Canadians. Mr. Gullion pointed out that there had been working level intimations that the British might be interested in the kind of settlement we proposed. They had not for some months pressed their demands for information with the same intensity as they did in the notes from Prime Minister Attlee around the first of the year. It was probable that the general tautening of the international situation and the increasing division between East and West had brought the British around to accepting a regime in atomic energy matters which took realistic account of these trends. Mr. Kennan said that the mere fact that we would open talks with them would weigh heavily with the British. What they probably wanted was a reaffirmation that special atomic energy relationships existed among the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Such a relationship had often been cited publicly, prior to the Atomic Energy Act, but not subsequently. Mr. Lovett agreed and emphasized moreover that the apparent collapse of any real hope of getting agreement on multilateral control in the UNAEC should also influence our approach toward the British and the Canadians. We had to consider the worth to us of reliable allies.
Secretary Forrestal said that circumstances seemed to impel, and to favor, negotiations along the proposed lines. This was the first time that the various loose threads relating to these matters—i.e. wartime agreements, the question of exchange of information, the raw materials situation—had all been brought together, and it was now apparent that we had once and for all to settle these problems. His concern was, [Page 877] of course, in the national defense and the line we proposed to take appeared to be in the interest of the national defense. If it worked out that what suited our security needs also favored those of countries friendly to us, so much the better. But we must approach the matter primarily from the interests of our national security.
Mr. Lovett referred to the fact that the Syrian representative at the United Nations, Dr. Khoury, had informed our representative that the Arab world as a whole relied on U.S. possession of the bomb to protect it from being overrun; moreover our delegate had received similar intimations from the French; thus the question was wider than one of our Anglo-British [Canadian?] U.S. security system.
Senator Hickenlooper said that what we proposed in all its implications amounted practically to a military alliance. He did not undertake to oppose it on this ground, or to say that it should not be so, but he thought the implications should be clear. He concurred in our objectives as Mr. Lovett had outlined them and believed that the measures we proposed to secure them would gain support from his Committee. However, rightly or wrongly, the Atomic Energy Act contained some strong prescriptions with respect to exchange of information which had not so far been emphasized. Consequently it was obvious that anything that might be done had to be something that could be done within the law. Dr. Bush referred to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act containing the restrictions on dissemination of information. Section 10(c) provided for the encouragement of dissemination of scientific information. He believed that what the British wanted might be held to come within the definition of scientific information. Moreover, in the paragraph introducing these restrictions, as well as in the preamble of the Act, it is stated that the Act and the information policy were to be administered with reference to the overriding consideration of “promoting the national security.”
Senator Hickenlooper emphasized the desire of the Committee to be of help. The Committee had proved to be a completely dependable repository of classified information. There had been no leaks. His work with the Committee had convinced him that no subject was closer to the interest of the average American, and none on which lack of popular confidence could create more unrest than our atomic energy policy. Nothing could alarm this sentiment more than some indication, however mistaken, that the Government was giving something away, or dissipating national security in atomic matters, to gain some other less important objective. We had, therefore, to keep constantly before us the fact that all our proposals had to be firmly anchored in our security interest. Our negotiations had to be successful, and we must emerge with an arrangement which brought the stockpiles to this country. If this could be made agreeable to the other country concerned, [Page 878] well and good. But that country should realize that the United States was the source of the common security of those who claimed to have the same ideas as we do. Cooperation was desirable, but strength to preserve the common weal lay in this country and here alone.
Mr. Lovett agreed with the Senator. He pointed out that we should not, however, underestimate the strength of the British position in these talks, nor overestimate our chances of success although they seemed to be quite good. The British were in a very strong position. They did have stocks in their possession. They had as much influence in the Belgian arrangements as we did, and they had their Empire affiliation with South Africa. It was, of course, too much to say that the U.K. would venture to put herself in opposition to us on so important a matter, but it was possible that she might think that we needed less material than we thought we should have. Here was where the bargaining process would come into play. Moreover, the British were now at a point of extraordinary national self-consciousness. Their government was willing to apply extremely stringent controls to their people to gain its ends. Feeling as they did, the Government could not be expected to toss away the uranium stockpile lightly. Moreover, there was the feeling of resentment toward us because of our action with respect to the war-time agreements. We could no longer, in the present world situation tolerate the degree of disaffection which these agreements produced. Circumstances were now very opportune for us to settle with them and abrogate them except insofar as they were useful to us.
Senator Vandenberg expressed himself strongly to the effect that no arrangement would be acceptable which continued to place this country under obligation to consult another country before it could use the atom bomb. The provision in the war-time agreements to this effect absolutely had to go. There could be no question of coming to an agreement with Britain on these points, or, for that matter, of favorable consideration of aid to Britain if this provision remained. It was, of course, desirable to reach an amicable understanding with the British, but it was inconceivable that we should go to pains to aid Britain financially, and in other ways, if she refused to see that the disposal of material proposed by us was in our joint interest. It was inadmissible that she should hoard uranium, making no use of it at all, when it might be made into weapons for protection of the democratic world. He would not insist that our negotiators start by using the lever of financial aid on the British but the British should be left in no doubt as to the effect their failure to come to a meeting of minds with us would have on projects for assistance to the United Kingdom. There might even be a real advantage in his explaining the facts very frankly to the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel. [Page 879] It should be clearly understood that by the time the long-term Economic Recovery Program legislation came before the Congress our differences with the British should have been settled. If not, the Senator would certainly try to see to it that any future legislation or further loan assistance to the British took account of their failure to meet us at least half-way. With this proviso, he believed that exchange of information, to the extent it could be accomplished within the law, was acceptable. So far as he personally was concerned, the outline of negotiation which the group had before it was satisfactory. Mr. Lovett replied that the Senator’s reservations with respect to further financial assistance were fair enough. He did not think it was necessary for us at this time to lay the cards on the table for Ambassador Inverchapel, and he thought that we should and would be able to gain what we wanted through normal diplomatic negotiation. There was no harm, however, in keeping the “big stick” in plain sight in the corner, even if we gave no indication of an immediate disposition to use it.
It was agreed with the two Senators that while an early full meeting of the Joint Committee was highly desirable, the Department of State should begin meeting with the British and the Canadians with a view toward the saving of time, which was vital, both because of the raw materials situation and in relation to the legislative program.