Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Minutes of a Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, November 24, 1947
| Present: | Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lovett |
| Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Kennan | |
| Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary | |
| Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal | |
| Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board | |
| Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Lilienthal | |
| Mr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission | |
| Mr. Herbert Marks, General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission |
Subject: A second meeting to consider: “A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States.” The Committee had before it two drafts of “Recommendations”, the original State Department text of October 24, 1947 (annexed to Minutes of November 5, 1947 as Tab A);1 and an Atomic Energy Commission revision of November 22, 1947 (annexed to these Minutes as Tab A).2
Decision:
To approve the paper presented by AEC, modifying the original State Department draft, except that it was agreed that recommendations should take account of fact that some exchange of information with British and Canadians, the extent to be explored in projected conversations, would be in interest of U.S. national security.
[Page 867]Implementing Action:
Department of National Defense, AEC, and Research and Development Board to consult on revision of recommendation to be presented to American members of CPC, and, if approved, to Congressional leaders.
Discussion:
Mr. Lovett said the group should know as background that there was strong Congressional sentiment for including special clauses on uranium procurement in the European Economic Recovery legislation. If our negotiations were unsuccessful we would be faced with this probability. He described actual and anticipated European reactions to any proposal to make procurement of uranium by us a condition precedent, under the Economic Recovery legislation, for aid to European countries. Such reactions might be expected to have an adverse effect on U.S. policies. Moreover, insofar as its effect on countries producing or owning uranium, such a course would be meaningless or ineffective. No British Government could be expected to sell uranium, or put it up as collateral, for an amount in dollars which would make little impression on its financial crisis but which would place the government in the position of surrendering an asset far more important in terms of political and national security value. South Africa was not a participating country in ERP and moreover already had both gold and dollars. Belgium also had dollars, and there were existing arrangements covering our procurement of Belgium uranium.
The record on the matters at issue with Britain and Canada was confused, and was the cause of some bad feeling among the three countries. This condition had been allowed to exist for some 15 months, and the impact on our foreign relations generally had to be considered. As the political situation grew tenser, there was increased need to retain the good will of reliable allies. We had reason to believe that it might not be too difficult to reach an agreement with the other countries. With the advice of the Commission and of the Defense establishlishment, the State Department would be willing to undertake negotiations.
It was the attitude of the Department that in these negotiations uranium should not be made a quid pro quo for European aid. These negotiations should be largely based upon considerations of the national security. They should also take account of possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange of information on atomic energy development, although the State Department agreed that we should not offer to link raw materials and information. It would be desirable to secure the suspension of all the war-time agreements, except those portions which applied to the Combined Policy Committee and to the Combined [Page 868] Development Trust. It should be possible to secure the transfer of most of the British stockpile to this hemisphere, part in Canada and part in the United States, and to reduce the input of materials in the U.K. in the future so as to balance consumption.
However, in negotiating for these objectives, the State Department would have to be given a clear indication of the upper and lower limits of offer which it might make. The Department believed that the AEC revision of the recommendations currently before the Committee did not afford sufficient latitude for negotiation because it appeared to exclude even the possibility of discussing exchange of information with the British, during the course of the projected talks. Mr. Lovett also explained that unless our problem with the British and Canadians could be worked out in the very near future, there was a real danger that they might become the subject of Congressional debate and that procurement of uranium might become mixed up in the Marshall Plan discussions to the detriment of our foreign relations generally.
Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Marks explained that only when the discussions were actually in progress could we determine accurately how much exchange of information might be considered feasible in the national interest and in conformity with the Atomic Energy Act. Only then would we know what the British wanted, and what information they might have that we wanted. The Commission felt that the proposals in the State Department draft had the effect of offering more than might later be found feasible to grant, in view of the provisions of the Act and our national interest. Mr. Lilienthal referred to Section 10 of the Act, and the very strong restrictions which it imposed.
There was some discussion of the effect of the language in Section 10 and elsewhere in the Act setting forth its primary objective as “promoting the national security.” Mr. Lovett pointed out that the State Department had been willing to seek a change in the Act to facilitate such exchanges but was quite willing to go along on a present law if there was common agreement on its interpretation.
Mr. Forrestal felt that if exchange of information would benefit the U.S. he would not hesitate within the limits of his authority to defend such exchange on the grounds that it would promote the “national security.” Mr. Lilienthal said that instead of a “blank check” to the negotiators to offer anything required in the way of information, it would be both more fruitful and more prudent to go before the Joint Congressional Committee, after we had established what the British and Canadians wanted, with instances of the fields of information in which exchanges might be profitable to us, having determined whether the information was on the one hand within our power to grant and, on the other likely to contribute to our national security.
Dr. Bush believed that the process should be started by asking the [Page 869] British and Canadians what their requirements were. We already had gained an idea of what they wanted, and it might be held to come under the heading of “basic scientific information” exchange of which was permitted under Section 10(a) (2) of the Act.
Mr. Gullion believed that all were agreed on the strategy and sequence to be followed in the negotiations but that the draft offered by the Commission did not afford sufficient latitude to the negotiators, nor any real indication to Congress as to what we really intended, nor any particular incentive to the British to warrant their going on with the talks, much less dispersing their long-held stockpile. On the other hand, the Department’s original draft offered a basis for exchange which permitted exchange of scientific information, but made all other exchanges subject to ad hoc determination. This was, in fact, the same offer which this Government had been prepared to make in November 1945, at a time when the pressure on us to do something of the kind was less than it is now. Mr. Lovett pointed out that the McMahon Act had been passed since that time and other things had happened which required modification of the language proposed in 1945. Mr. Marks believed that Section 10(a) (2) of the Act which had been referred to should not be regarded too optimistically as providing a basis for exchange of scientific information with the British. It had been included in the Act primarily to govern the process of declassification, and not with a view to furnishing a warrant for secret exchanges among the British, Canadians, and Americans to strengthen their basic atomic energy programs.
Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Wilson reported on the recent “declassification” discussions among the three countries, and it was the sense of the meeting that these offered encouraging prospects for the success of the discussions which had been envisaged.3
The AEC representatives had taken advantage of the occasion presented by these meetings to ask the British and Canadian scientific representatives informally what they required in the way of information from us. Mr. Wilson gave the substance of their replies which indicated that the requirements of the other countries appear to be moderate, and of such nature that a good case could be made out for supplying them in our own interest.
Mr. Kennan pointed out that frankness was required in our dealings with the U.K. and Canada. The negotiations should be designed to produce a continuing working arrangement and attitude of mutual confidence which would govern any future cooperation in the field. The State Department was not proposing merely a “one time deal” or a contract to cover a specific situation.
[Page 870]Mr. Lovett said that this Government should not be placed in a position where it might be accused of “stalling” on the issues involved, especially since there was some feeling that we had already done so more than once. There should be no reference in the negotiations to any exchange of information if, in fact, this Government did not seriously contemplate implementing such an exchange. It was clear that some such question would be raised by the British and the Canadians, and we should not be in a position of refusing even to talk about this, while pressing the question of raw materials exclusively. The Commission, the Defense Establishment, and Dr. Bush were in the best position to say whether such an interchange would be beneficial to us and how much we could offer. All the State Department wanted was a clear indication of how far it could go in the negotiations.
Mr. Lilienthal agreed that AEC and Defense should give State some indication of whether exchange would be beneficial and as to what line it should take on this point in the negotiations. He went on to say that if the State Department believed uranium should not be tied into ERP he believed that could be taken as the sense of the meeting. He believed the Commission would be guided by State’s opinion in this matter.