Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to an Executive Session of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, May 12, 1947

Washington, May 12, 1947

top secret

At the outset if you will bear with me I should like to say a word about security considerations, of which I am sure we are all aware, but which cannot be overemphasized. Of course, there is the obvious danger of leaks about figures, sources and production quotas which are, of course, prime military secrets. But what I propose to discuss chiefly with you are certain secret bilateral international arrangements which were made during the war with regard to atomic energy.

Some of the collaboration with other nations provided for in these arrangements still continues. At the same time we are trying to secure the adoption by the United Nations of our proposals for a multilateral system of international control of atomic energy. We have made no new bilateral arrangements and are not undertaking anything in the way of cooperation which is inconsistent with our effort in the United Nations. We are, however, actively going ahead with our own program which we would presumably be prepared to mesh into any international regime adopted by the United Nations.

If efforts to achieve the latter should fail, we would, of course, re-examine the question of further unilateral and bilateral arrangements, with your advice and counsel.

In the meantime, any leaks about the war-time arrangements would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to distort the records and our motives. It might suit the Russians’ book to represent our United Nations effort as insincere. Consequently whenever we widen the circle of knowledge or speculation about these arrangements we do so at some risk to the effort to get international control of the atom.

Moreover, it is a fact that in the countries where we obtain raw materials there are strong elements, either actually within the government or in opposition, who are trying to break up the arrangements under which we obtain our supplies.

In Belgium, for example, the Communists have been vigorously pushing for abrogation of the contracts under which we get all the production of the most important uranium source in the world, which is in the Congo. Just now they have withdrawn from the Government, at least partly so that they can bring greater pressure to bear on this very issue. Already there is some deterioration in the position because the government has been forced to announce that it will nationalize uranium and has begun a small research program in Belgium which means bringing materials and research into Europe where they might become available to the Soviet Union. Any publicity on our contracts with Belgium would strengthen the hand of the Communists and might easily make it very difficult for us to get the imports we vitally need to keep the program running.

I should now like to outline for you the principal existing arrangements.

The development of atomic weapons and the discoveries made in the field of atomic energy are to a large degree the product of international cooperation. The United States, by reason of its position, resources and technical facilities, not the least of which is the skill of its scientists, has probably made the major contribution to this development. Nevertheless, our advances in the field owe a great deal to the contributions made by Great Britain and Canada, and certain other countries “which control the sources of some of the indispensable raw materials.

In late 1941, when the fate of Europe hung in the balance and war menaced the United States, Mr. Roosevelt proposed to Mr. Churchill that there should be cooperation in research in the field of atomic energy which was proceeding actively in the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States.¹ As a result of discussions on the initiative of the two Chiefs of State, a very important decision was made to concentrate further development in this country where research could be carried on in comparative safety and where our greater resources ensured quicker results. This was part of the pooling of effort and wise division of resources which made possible the winning of the war. British scientists, and some scientists who had fled from the continent and were assisting the British, came to this country and assisted materially in our researches.

The British had and still have much to contribute. Their scientific and theoretical knowledge of the processes has practically parallelled our own, although, partly as a result of the decision to concentrate development in this country, their industrial “know-how” has lagged far behind. From the beginning there was much to gain by cooperation with the British and the Canadians; the latter, for example, are in a position to supply current operating data on one of the few heavy water piles in existence.

In order to bring the project to fruition as soon as possible, it was decided in August 1943 to establish a Combined Policy Committee on which there was high level representation of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Policy Committee^* was established by an agreement signed at Quebec by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt on August 19, 1943.

This agreement was primarily designed to govern collaboration in the atomic energy field during the war period. Under it, interchange of information was provided for within certain limits. In the field of scientific research and development, full interchange was maintained between those working in the same section of the field; in matters of design, construction and operation of large scale plants information was exchanged only when it was considered that such exchange would hasten the completion of weapons for use in the war. The Combined Policy Committee kept under review the broad direction of the project.

The signatories agreed not to use the weapon against each other; not to use the weapon against third parties except by mutual consent; and not to communicate information on this matter to third parties except by mutual consent.

It was early recognized that for security reasons there would have to be some control of patents. Consequently, under the agreement, it was arranged that in each country all personnel engaged in the work, both scientific and industrial, would be required to assign their entire rights to any inventions in this field to their respective governments. Arrangements were made for appropriate patent exchange in instances where inventions were made by nationals of one country working in the territory of another. Such patents, interests and titles as are exchanged, however, are held in a fiduciary sense subject to settlement at a later date on mutually satisfactory terms.

As an example of the kind of continuing cooperation for which the guidance of some combined policy committee is required, there may be cited the question of declassification of scientific information. Obviously, unless there were some synchronization of releases by the various countries possessing scientific knowledge there would be great risks to security.

The atomic energy project relies in its present state of development almost exclusively on imported raw materials. In 1944, it was realized that it would be necessary to control as far as possible all the ore indispensable to the process and also to insure a continued supply from abroad.

Practically none of the raw materials lie in territories under the direct control of the United States. The Belgian Congo and certain areas of the British Commonwealth are the principal suppliers. We realized then that British cooperation in procurement would be of the utmost importance in assuring continued operation of the process, at least at the stage of development existing then and now. Accordingly, an instrument known as the Combined Development Trust Agreement was signed on June 13, 1944, by President Roosevelt and former Prime Minister Churchill, governing joint acquisition of uranium and thorium supplies. The following were its principal provisions:

A Combined Development Trust^† was established. The functions of the Trust are to:

1. Explore and survey sources of uranium and thorium outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., U.K., and the Governments of the Dominions and of India and Burma.

2. Acquire supplies outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., U.K., and the Governments of the Dominions and of India and Burma;

3. Provide storage and safekeeping of such supplies.

Under this Trust Agreement the two governments undertook to secure fullest possible control over uranium and thorium ores within their respective jurisdictions.

The United Kingdom undertook to approach the Dominions, India, and Burma with the view to having these governments secure control over uranium and thorium ore deposits within their respective jurisdictions.

The Combined Development Trust was made the agent of the Combined Policy Committee and subject to its direction and guidance.

All the ores, supplies, and properties acquired by the Trust were to be held in trust for the two governments jointly, subject to allocation or other disposition by the Combined Policy Committee.

The expenses of the Trust were to be provided one-half by the United States and one-half by the United Kingdom.

The Agreement and Declaration of Trust were to remain in full force and effect until extended or revised by the signatories after cessation of hostilities. The signatories agreed to recommend to their respective governments, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of hostilities, the extension and revision of this agreement to cover postwar conditions and its formalization by treaty or other proper method.

On September 19, 1944, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill discussed the program further at Hyde Park. An aide-mémoire of their conversation indicates that the two Chiefs of State agreed that the time had not arrived to tell the world about atomic energy with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use.²

They also envisaged that full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing atomic energy for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

On November 16, 1945, President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King initialed a memorandum stating (1) that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada; (2) that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust should be continued in a suitable form, and (3) that the Combined Policy Committee should consider and recommend appropriate arrangements for this purpose.³

It will be obvious to the Committee that these principal agreements contain much which bore solely on the conduct of the war; it is also clear that although hostilities have ceased we still are not in a state of peace. We are actively studying how much of these agreements should be continued in effect in order to assure the development of atomic energy and our own national security. In any case, so far as the Department of State is aware, the departments of this government charged with responsibility for atomic energy development have not taken any action under these agreements, especially as regards international arrangements, inconsistent with either the general constitutional obligation of the Executive Departments to the Congress or with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

After V–J Day we began to consider with the British and Canadians the question of the form which future cooperation should take. Any proposals for new agreements will be scrutinized in the light of Executive responsibility to the Congress, the Atomic Energy Act and our obligations as members of the United Nations.

Pending any further standing arrangements it is obviously most important that a supply of raw materials be assured in at least the current volume. Within the framework of the Combined Development Trust, a series of agreements have been made with either the governments or the principal suppliers in areas where the key deposits of uranium or thorium exist.

One arrangement has been made with the Union Minière of Belgium for the purchase of all the ore which can be produced economically in the Belgian Congo through October 27, 1955.

There is an agreement between the United States and Brazil for the purchase from Brazil if available of 3,000 metric tons of monazite thorium-bearing sands a year for three years, with ten successive options to extend the agreement for three years each. In accordance with the Combined Trust Agreement we have made it possible for Britain to obtain some supplies from this source.

An agreement with the Netherlands covers all sources of thorium under Netherlands jurisdiction, particularly the Netherlands East Indies. Provision is made for the purchase of 200 metric tons of monazite thorium sands a year for three years with six successive options to extend the agreement for three years each.

An approach was made to Sweden but it was impossible to reach the usual agreement with that country. The Swedish Government has, however, undertaken to prohibit the export of uranium-bearing materials and to consult with the United States and the United Kingdom before taking any action involving the export of uranium to other countries.

The greatest known source of thorium-bearing monazite sands is in Travancore, a princely state in India. An agreement was recently concluded between Travancore and the British which provides that within a period of three years, from January 1, 1947, Travancore will sell 9,000 tons of monazite to the United Kingdom. We, in turn, will be able to get Travancore monazite from the British Ministry of Supply or a consignee designated by it.

1. For the text of Roosevelt’s letter to Churchill, October 11, 1941, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, footnote 3, p. 3.

2. As of March 1, 1947, the members of the Combined Policy Committee were:

   • United States—Secretary of State, Hon. George C. Marshall, Chairman Secretary of War, Hon. Robert P. Patterson Dr. Vannevar Bush
   • United Kingdom—The British Ambassador to the U.S., the Rt. Hon., The Lord Inverchapel Field Marshal, the Lord Wilson
   • Canada—The Hon. C. D. Howe [Footnote in the source text.]

3. As of March 1, 1947, the members of the Combined Development Trust were:

   • United States—Mr. Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman
   • Dr. C. K. Leith
   • Mr. Joseph Volpe, Jr.
   • United Kingdom—Mr. R. Gordon Munro, Deputy Chairman
   • Mr. Arthur D. Storke
   • Canada—Mr. G. C. Bateman [Footnote in the source text]
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492–493.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 75.