United States Atomic Energy Commission Files
Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Commissioners
[Here follows mention of those present at a meeting at the White House on April 16, 11:15 a.m.: the President; Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and” the Navy; Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War; James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; and Lilienthal. The memorandum next describes the first part of the meeting, which was devoted to discussion of production and allocation of fissionable materials.]
The President asked if there had been any improvement in the raw materials picture and what we thought could be done about it. I replied that our import situation from Belgium and elsewhere is not in good shape; that the Belgium miners had reported that another shaft had to be driven and imports might be at quite a low level; that we were not completely sure that this was correct and we hope to try to check the matter.
Secretary Patterson asked if the division of 50–50 with UK and Canada continued and I said it did. I said that the most important development recently had been our determination to press forward with recovery processes which regrettably had not been prepared earlier and that this in a couple of years, with good luck, might fortify but would by no means cure our situation.
Reference was made to the feeling by the British and Canadians that our position on exchange of information was wrong. Secretary Patterson said the British were bitter about it. Admiral Leahy said he could not see why that should be; that there was no agreement to [Page 805] that effect. He was reminded that there was an agreement but that it had been explained to the British that the McMahon Act made that agreement one that the Commission could not carry out in respect to exchange of information. I stated that the Commission had from the outset been considerably and deeply concerned that the existence of this agreement with UK and Canada had not been laid before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; that we appreciated the difficulties of such disclosure but that nevertheless it made things much more difficult than if the disclosure had been made; and that further it would be most inappropriate if the reporting concerning the agreement came from the Commission rather than from the State Department.
The President made some reference to Churchill understanding that there was no agreement beyond the end of the war and the President said that he had made no such agreement. Admiral Leahy again said that he knew of no agreement. I stated as tactfully as I could that our information was that there was an agreement known as the Quebec Agreement; that it covered not only raw materials and exchange of information but also matters relating to the use of atomic bombs in warfare. The other participants in the conference dropped the matter of the agreement at this point and I left it only with renewed expression that I hoped that disclosure by the State Department would be made. I said it was important that in our relations with the UK we bear in mind that some of the most substantial uranium possibilities were those in South Africa in the Rand Gold area. The President asked if this were uranium or a by-product and I explained that it was a by-product in the mining of gold and that while the concentration was not high it was fair and the quantities were large.
Secretary Forrestal said, with some impatience, that he thought that the British claims on us were wiped out by the 7½ billion dollar loan [sic]1—or so I understood him.
I stated that another question I wished they would keep in mind was the matter of a test of atomic weapons; that a substantial number of the assemblies were weapons that had never been tested and that this was not a good situation. I said that the Commission was thinking about the matter and hoped that the broad public policy issues involved could be worked out. I said that Dr. Bacher2 was of the opinion that a test probably should not be held within the continental limits of the United States. The President said that the New Mexico test had been successful. I pointed out, however, that virtually everybody in the state knew of the test but that voluntary censorship in war-time had kept [Page 806] it rather secret but that we could not rely upon that in peace-time. Admiral Leahy suggested some isolated island in the Pacific. I said that the test should not be an elaborate one with great fanfare such as Bikini, that monitoring devices would catch the fact that a test had been made almost anywhere in the world. Secretary Patterson asked about Australia. The President seemed of the opinion that a test held for technical reasons was probably entirely suitable. I said the matter would be brought back to them again when we are farther along.
I repeated the fact that the program had a number of weak spots and that it would take great energy and much money to strengthen it. I said, referring to the Secretaries and the President’s Chief of Staff, that the Commission would hope that these three gentlemen would assist in stating the security reasons for monies needed; whereupon the President said that he will be glad to take a hand and to ask John Taber3 to come “right in here and talk it over”.
This was the extent of the conference.
- For documentation on United States–United Kingdom financial relations, see vol. iii, p. 1 ff; especially, p. 48.↩
- Robert F. Bacher, member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- Representative John Taber of New York, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.↩