Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments ¹

secret
RAC D–15/2

Washington, May 27, 1947.

Subject: United States Position Concerning a Request by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for Information on Existing Armaments and Armed Forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the paper entitled “United States Position Concerning a Request by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for Information on Existing Armaments and Armed Forces,” which was enclosed with your letter of 8 May 1947² and on which their views were requested.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement with the major feature of the subject paper, that any request for information on armaments for the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be strongly opposed. They believe, however, that such a position on armament disclosure would be weakened by support for disclosure of information on armed forces. Manifestly, to oppose one while supporting the other would be inconsistent, and logical maintenance of such a position would be difficult.

Since the purpose is to prevent armament disclosure, the place to stop it is at the beginning, and the beginning, since armed forces and armaments are so closely related, is disclosure on either subject. As set forth below, there are compelling arguments against armed forces disclosure, against the thesis that the United States is actually already committed to such disclosure and against the usefulness or need of any such data that could be obtained at the present time.

This document consists of comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Doc. RAC D–15/1, May 6, p. 474.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate that information regarding the over-all strength of U.S. armed forces is available in official government publications, appropriation bills, etc., to those who seek it, and therefore, that any such disclosure to the Commission for Conventional Armaments would not necessarily have serious, direct and adverse effect on our national security.

They would point out, however, that indirectly such action may nevertheless have considerable adverse effect on that security. Communist aggression tactics now threaten a number of countries located on the perimeter of the Soviet-controlled area in Eurasia, particularly Turkey, Greece and Iran, and it is “the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the effect of the United States taking a position agreeable to the disclosure of numbers of armed forces would be to place heavy pressure on these friendly nations to make like disclosures, obviously inimical to their security interests because of the intelligence value of such disclosures to an aggressor. The importance of this intelligence would be increased wherever United States assistance was provided, particularly in cases of military aid.

Furthermore, information as to members of United States armed forces would collate and confirm to the world accurate figures as to our own military status, a matter of increasing gratification to agresor nations and of embarrassment to us as our military establishments are reduced.

The United States did not insist upon verification of information in connection with a census of armed forces when the matter was under discussion in the Security Council last year, presumably since the census was not directly related to the subject of regulation of armaments. Such is not now the case, however, since the information would be requested by the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has consistently been that, whenever the subject of information on armed forces is considered as an integral part of the question of armament regulation, it should be done only “with appropriate measures of international verification”. Otherwise, the information so provided by the various nations will be of no appreciable value in that there will be no assurance of the accuracy necessary for any work which might be undertaken in connection with it. In fact, distorted information before the Commission might well be a source of real danger in arriving at conclusions therefrom. And, finally, for the United States to support such a proposal at the outset of regulation of armament discussions would be at least to condone a departure from the fundamental United States principle of international verification in connection with all matters pertaining to the regulation of armaments.

The United States should therefore, in light of the foregoing, oppose a move in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to initiate a request for information on armed forces at an early stage in its work on the grounds that the information is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and that such information, without verification—which is obviously impossible at this time—cannot possibly serve any useful purpose at this stage of the discussions.

In addition to the foregoing comments on information regarding firmed forces, two other suggestions regarding the Conclusions and Recommendations of the position paper are offered:

a. The phrases, “except as it may be related to a specific plan” and “only as a part of an over-all program,” used in the subject paper to qualify opposition to requests for information on armaments do not seem to be sufficiently positive. To make them less general in nature, it is believed that use should be made of the stipulations in paragraphs 2c and 3b of Appendix “A” of the position paper.

b. It is stated in Conclusions that an any case information on composition and disposition of units of armed forces should not be required. The Recommendations in the position paper omit this proviso. For consistency and definiteness, the Recommendations should be appropriately amended.

Summarizing the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest a rewarding of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the position paper as follows:

“IV. Conclusions

It is concluded that:

a. Information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except in response to the requirements of an over-all program for the regulation and reduction of armaments developed in a sequence which gives priority to the control of atomic energy, the peace settlements and the implementation of Article 43, and with adequate safeguards, including verification, to insure that all nations conform to the same standards with respect to the information disclosed.

b. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that there will be a move in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to initiate a request for information on armed forces and armaments at an early stage in its work.

c. Disclosure of information on numbers of armed forces would not have direct adverse effect on the security interests of the United States provided that information on composition and disposition of unit is not required. However, such disclosure, being also required from certain nations friendly to the United States and currently under foreign pressure, might adversely affect their security. It would also serve to collate and confirm information on United States armed forces which is currently available only in diffuse form in unclassified government publications and press releases.

d. Taking all considerations into account, the disadvantages of acquiescing in a request for information on armed forces (as distinguished from armaments) outweigh the advantages.

e. The United States should oppose any proposal requesting information on either armed forces or armaments in connection with the Work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except under the conditions set forth in subparagraph a above.

V. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. The above conclusions be approved.

b. The United States Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments be instructed:

(1) To emphasize the United States view on all appropriate occasions that information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except in response to the requirements of an over-all program for the regulation and reduction of armaments developed in a sequence which gives priority to the control of atomic energy, the peace settlements and the implementation of Article 43, and with adequate safeguards, including verification, to insure that all nations conform to the same standards with respect to the information disclosed.

(2) For the present, to oppose strongly any request for information on either armed forces or armaments except under the conditions set forth in subparagraph b (1) above.

(3) Subject to further review and instructions when the situation arises, to be prepared to support a request for information on armed forces (excepting composition and disposition of units) provided that in so doing he is able to gain clear assurance that the United States position set forth in subparagraph b (1) above will be accepted as far as information on armaments is concerned.

c. A copy of this paper be forwarded to the United States Mission to the United Nations.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. Lalor

Captain, U.S. Navy Secretary

1. Sent to the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments as SM–8290, May 26; circulated within the Committee as RAC D–15/2, May 27.
2. Not found in the files of the Department of State.