SPA Files: Lot 55D323

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George H. Haselton of the Division of International Security Affairs

confidential

Summary of the Discussion at the Meeting on Monday, May 26

Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by describing the difficulties which the Military Staff Committee Report1 had encountered in that Committee, and no doubt would meet in the Security Council,2 and pointed out that one of the methods, perhaps, of resolving this deadlock would be for the United States at this time to offer to make available to the Security Council certain forces, facilities, and assistance in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. He stated that, in his opinion, it would require six to eight weeks of processing a paper if it were decided to adopt this plan. The statement was made that there were some domestic arguments for this plan to offer forces to the Security Council, one of which was that an element of uncertainty would exist in the U.S. post-war military planning so long as the strength of the forces which the United States would make available to the Security Council was not established.

The opinion was expressed that an offer emanating from the United States at this time would look like a hollow gesture if no other nation joined in making a similar proposal. Mr. Bohlen3 agreed that there might be some merit in the plan if there were any chance of its achieving its objective, of bearing some fruit, but he was afraid that this would not be the case and that we might be manufacturing additional trouble for ourselves. He pointed out that the end result might be that U.S. troops would be the only forces available to the Security Council and that they might be the only ones employed in the event of an international emergency, a situation which certainly would not please the Congress.

Mr. Cohen believed that this plan to make an offer of forces, assistance, and facilities would not increase the chances of achieving unanimity [Page 478] on various matters with the Russians, whereas if unanimity did exist it was easier to take action under Article 106 of the Charter. He also suggested that the United States might conclude an informal, more preliminary, special agreement with the Security Council which could be couched in very general terms.

Mr. Raynor4 stated that an offer of such forces from the United States at this time would be interpreted by the Soviets as applying pressure upon them, and, in his opinion, there were more important matters which should be emphasized at the moment.

It was agreed that the proposal to make U.S. forces available to the Council would be placed before certain members of the War and Navy Departments in order to obtain their reaction.

  1. See footnote 1, p. 468.
  2. Although the Military Staff Committee submitted its report on April 30, the Security Council did not begin consideration of it until June 4.
  3. Charles B. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
  4. G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.