500.A/2–1347
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Subject: Disarmament Matter
In the absence of both Senator Austin and Herschel Johnson I dictated the following message to the Senator’s secretary and asked her to get it to him as soon as possible. I asked her to tell the Senator that I would, of course, be delighted to discuss any aspect of this with [Page 413] him but that if he had any very serious question and felt his time was too short he might wish to telephone you.
At Mr. Acheson’s staff meeting this morning he raised the question of the present status of the disarmament matter and we discussed this situation with particular reference to two points.
The first point was Langenhove’s1 ruling yesterday that the final vote on this resolution would be considered a substantive vote.
If this is considered a substantive vote, that is, a substantive vote on a matter which seems to us down here as essentially procedural, as a matter of precedent, we might get into future difficulties with the Russian veto on procedural matters which they would claim were substantive.
Furthermore, if this is considered a substantive vote, that is, a vote on the disarmament resolution, and if the Russians abstain, would their abstention be considered as a veto or as a waiver of their right to veto? Our general position is and has been, of course, that an abstention is not a veto.
We are not entirely clear here what the situation is in New York with regard to Langenhove’s ruling. We talked in Mr. Acheson’s meeting about the possibility of challenging this ruling, that the final vote would be a substantive one.
In any events it Was the sense of the meeting that our position should be made clear: first, that in agreeing to a substantive vote on this particular matter we were not agreeing to a precedent, and second, that an abstention on a substantive vote does not constitute a veto.
The second principal point which was discussed in Mr. Acheson’s meeting was the three months clause, that is, the language which would call on the new Commission to make a report within three months. There is no disposition here to put the Senator in a straightjacket but the feeling continues to be strong that this particular clause is quite bad. Secretary Forrestal apparently seems to feel in particular quite strongly about this. Mr. Acheson asked me to take up again with the Senator whether there is any chance even at this late date of getting the three months clause out of the resolution.
On the other hand, if, in view of the tactical situation in New York, the Senator feels this is not possible, Mr. Acheson wanted me to ask whether it would not be possible for the Senator to make very clear in the proceedings, that is, in the discussion in the Council, that in agreeing to this three months clause we emphasize the reservation which is formulated in the words “which the Commission may be in a position [Page 414] to formulate”. The sense of the discussion in Mr. Acheson’s meeting was that we should make clear in the Council the realities of the situation with particular reference to two points: first, the realistic difficulties standing in the way of accomplishing any very substantive results in this very complex field in so short a time; second, the relationship of the whole disarmament matter to progress in other closely related areas involved in the whole development of collective security, particularly the conclusion of the peace treaties with Germany and Japan.
- Fernand van Langenhove, Permanent Belgian Representative to the United Nations; President of the Security Council in February.↩