501.BC Armaments/2–1347
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)
Subject: Disarmament Resolution Now Before Security Council
At yesterday’s meeting of the Council1 the preamble and paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the proposed resolution regarding armaments were [Page 411] approved, the latter in the long form desired by the United States, with the U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining. It is expected today to vote on paragraph 4 over which there is no controversy and then on the resolution as a whole.2 The Chairman has indicated that the vote on the resolution as a whole will be substantive. While it is impossible to say for certain whether Gromyko will veto, the chances are he will not. If the resolution goes through, the new commission will be excluded from any encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission.
As you will recall, the Department sent over Mr. Acheson’s signature on February 10, a telegram expressing the view of the Department and the War and Navy Departments that the resolution was “seriously defective in three respects in those portions not relating to jurisdiction of AEC.”3 On February 11 Mr. Herschel Johnson telephoned me, after having talked to Senator Austin, indicating that these views, were on the whole sound, but that the tactical situation prevented Senator Austin’s opening up the agreed points of the resolution.4 I emphasized how concerned we—and the War and Navy Departments—felt but it was obvious that the U.S. Delegation was not going to make any special effort to reopen the resolution.
In our telegram we included among “comments and suggestions” the statement that “it is desirable not press issue to a vote in Council at present.” I reiterated this view in telephone conversations with Mr. Herschel Johnson on February 11 and with Mr. Blaisdell5 on February 12.
When talking to me Mr. Herschel Johnson proposed that Senator Austin might make a statement in the Council giving our interpretation of the clause requesting the commission to submit proposals within three months. I replied that I thought such a statement was an absolute minimum and I reiterated that view in my conversation on February 12 with Mr. Blaisdell. Senator Austin did not mention this point at the Council meeting on February 11, nor, according to the summaries available to us, did he do so on February 12.
I strongly recommend that in order to make the best of a bad situation, Mr. Acheson telephone Senator Austin at once to impress upon him the fundamental importance of making a public statement of our [Page 412] interpretation of paragraph 3. Such a statement should contain two points:
Regarding the negotiations culminating in this resolution, see “The Establishment of the Commission on Conventional Armanents,” by James M. Ludlow in the Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1947, pp. 731–740, 743.
- (1)
- Our view that the request for a report within three months is merely an expression of hope and an injunction on the commission to proceed as quickly as possible. In connection with this point, the Senator should, I believe, reiterate and emphasize the principal points made in his own statement on February 4 and in Secretary Marshall’s statement to the press on February 7 to the effect that disarmament cannot be speedy, that practical steps for reduction of armaments cannot take place until after the peace settlements have been made, and that the goal is the establishment of security and not disarmament for its own sake.
- (2)
- That we do not regard the order of sub-paragraphs A and B of paragraph 3 as having any significance. Indeed, as we have constantly stated, we think the “how”, that is, the provision of safeguards, must be dealt with first.
I realize that, after the leadership which Senator Austin has asserted with respect to paragraph 3, he may feel that to make these statements will place him in an embarrassing situation. That is unfortunate, but it will be much less embarrassing to the United States in the long run than would action which might mislead the American people and indeed undo the good results of Secretary Marshall’s press statement. Moreover, it would also be less embarrassing than would our appearing to drag our feet at the end of the three months.
I cannot refrain from pointing out that the Delegation in New York has in effect ignored a telegram from the Department and has not only accepted, but has strongly advocated, language which we and the War and Navy Departments told them we regarded as “seriously defective.” To my knowledge the only notice paid to this telegram was Herschel Johnson’s telephone call to me complaining in effect at our quibbling over “semantics.”
The War and Navy Departments are, if possible, more deeply concerned than I at developments in New York.
- Reference is to the 102nd Meeting of the Security Council, February 12.↩
- For the text of the resolution adopted as a whole by the Security Council at its 105th Meeting, February 13, by a vote of 10 in favor and the Soviet Union abstaining, see SC, 2nd yr., Suppl. No. 5, pp. 58–59.↩
- Telegram 43 to New York, February 10, p. 404.↩
- Memorandum of the telephone conversation under reference is printed on p. 406.↩
- Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.↩