500.A/2–747: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
us urgent
43. Urtel 124, Feb 7.1 1. We wholeheartedly support your firm insistence on language clearly removing from proposed commission’s jurisdiction all matters within competence of AEC. Gromyko’s attitude in subcommittee is added evidence of absolute necessity of such language if work of AEC is not to be endangered.
2. Dept fully recognizes difficulties of tactical position and desirability of not insisting on any matters not deemed essential. We feel, however, that subcommittee’s draft is seriously defective in three respects in those portions not relating to jurisdiction of AEC. War and Navy Depts also gravely concerned on these three points.
- a.
- Use in para 1 of expression “the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the establishment of international control”. This paragraph as it stands embraces SC action regarding both atomic energy and other armaments. Unless “and” is replaced by “including”, so that last part of phrase will read “including the establishment of international control”, it could be argued that this para authorizes submission to SC and consideration by it of proposals concerning prohibition or limitation alone without provisions for practical and effective safeguards. USSR could for example maintain that this would justify it in insisting that SC consider its proposed convention for prohibition of atomic weapons.
- b.
- Inclusion of phrase “within the space of not more than three months”. Even though it be made clear, as texts we have seen do not now make clear, that this phrase modifies subparagraph A as well as B, it is still open to serious objection. US Govt is convinced that it will not be possible for Commission to formulate within three months proposals regarding either safeguards or other aspects of general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Should we agree to language of this kind, we might give world and especially American public false impression that something practicable can be done in this period. Moreover, if US fails within this period to come forward with or agree to proposals regarding A or B or both, we may be placed at serious disadvantage not only in eyes of world but in those of American people. Acceptance of this language would also appear inconsistent with our contention that peace settlements must precede actual reduction of armaments.
- c.
- Placing concept of regulation and reduction before that of safeguards. This appears to suggest that commission should discuss “what” before dealing with “how”.
3. Following comments and suggestions may be of use to you in working out best procedures for further handling of this question:
- a.
- It is desirable not to press issue to a vote in Council at present. Even were it possible obtain support of seven members of SC for a resolution fully acceptable to us, and even though such a resolution were clearly procedural in technical sense, the matter is of such grave importance that adoption of a resolution over opposition of USSR, at least without further efforts to find basis for agreement, would be very unwise.
- b.
- Although Gromyko’s obstinacy regarding jurisdiction of AEC presents us with tactical advantage public relations-wise which it is desirable to make use of, it is important for future position vis-à-vis public that, in seizing the opportunity, we at same time, avoid being placed in position of appearing to support view that practical proposals regarding general regulation of armaments and effective safeguards can be worked out in few months.
- c.
- In present circumstances it may be worthwhile considering anew our proposals for a committee of the Council to formulate terms of reference for commission. You could point out that this would enable Council to get on with its other business, such as Corfu, while still endeavoring to work out agreement on whole arms question.