Department of State Disarmament Files

The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway has been the Chief of Staff’s Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee since the latter’s initial organization. He has had an excellent opportunity to observe closely the attitude of the U.S.S.R. on Atomic Energy Control, the allocation of forces to the United Nations Security Council and the general Regulation of Armaments.

General Ridgway has reached some interesting and significant conclusions on Russian objectives which are set forth in the attached memorandum. I believe you will find his memorandum of very considerable interest. I am furnishing a copy of this letter to the Secretary of the Navy.1

Sincerely yours,

Robert P. Patterson
[Page 402]
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Representative of the United States Army Chief of Staff on the United Nations Military Staff Committee (Ridgway) to the Army Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)2

top secret

1. Against the background of ten months continuous contact with Russian Representatives to the United Nations, I am impressed with what appears to me to be the emergence of a pattern of Russian objectives. The opinions stated herein are for your information. They derive from my evaluation of the facts of Russian action before the United Nations on the subjects of Atomic Energy Control, Disarmament and the establishment of United Nations armed forces under Article 43 of the Charter.

facts

2. a. Atomic Energy:

The USSR insists upon the conclusion of an international convention designed to prohibit the employment of atomic energy for military purposes and to accomplish the destruction of all existing atomic weapons within a period of three months after the ratification of such convention. Concurrently, the USSR has so far refused to accept the US proposals for effective safeguards and for the collective imposition of sanctions.

b. Disarmament:

The USSR introduced the disarmament resolution to the General Assembly and presses for United Nations action thereon.

c. Establishment of United Nations Armed Forces under Article 43 of the Charter:

The USSR Delegation in the Military Staff Committee has for ten months obstructed and so far has effectively prevented, any substantial progress towards the establishment of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council. Further, the Soviet Representatives have recently emphasized their insistence that the contributions from each of the Big Five shall be equal in overall strength and composition. In other words each of the Big Five shall furnish equal air, ground, and sea contingents.

evaluation

3. USSR Objectives:

At present, these facts indicate to me the existence of coordinated USSR objectives embracing: [Page 403]

a.
Public agreement by the US to:
(1)
Prohibit the use of atomic weapons for military purposes and destroy all existing atomic weapons.
(2)
Prohibit the use of all other weapons of mass destruction, in which classification, the USSR may seek to include such instruments of long range warfare as strategic air forces, guided missiles, and certain naval categories.
(3)
Ultimately reduce each Member’s armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available by that Member to the Security Council.
(4)
Establish United Nations armed forces, in which the contribution of each of the Big Five shall be equal in over-all strength and composition in their air, ground and sea contingents.
b.
Use of world public opinion and US national conscience to compel the US to comply with its agreements on the above subjects, while the USSR by equivocation and delay, evades the establishment and operation of effective safeguards on atomic energy and disarmament, and concurrently by intensive national effort, develops and produces atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

conclusions

4. a. Well known USSR moral codes and conduct indicate the following as capabilities with a high degree of probability:

(1)
An attempt to secure United Nations approval of an international convention outlawing the use of atomic energy for military purposes and requiring early destruction of all existing atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction; to keep this convention separate from any convention dealing with safeguards; to avoid pushing the question of safeguards; and ultimately, to refuse to accept, or if forced to accept, to fail to comply with them. If these attempts succeed, we shall have been deprived of atomic weapons at no cost to the USSR. In that event, we can not ignore the possibility that the USSR would continue its present great national effort to develop and produce such weapons clandestinely.
(2)
An attempt to bring about a convention reducing world armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available to the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter.
(3)
An endeavor to secure United Nations approval of the principle of equality in strength and composition of the air, sea and ground contingents of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each of the Big Five. This would compel us largely to renounce our modern complex armaments and would vastly increase the relative value of man-power as a determining factor in war.
(4)
A concurrent effort to infiltrate Soviet agents into our industrial structure in such manner as to increase their capability, at a time of Russia’s choosing, of paralyzing our national systems of transportation, fuel and telecommunications, for the purpose of preventing the timely restoration of our ability to exploit our superior industrial potential.

[Page 404]

5. The foregoing actually amounts to an integrated plan to bring about unilateral disarmament by the US under the guise of a plan for general regulation and reduction of armaments by all nations; to strip us of our present technological, managerial, and scientific superiority; and to elevate the USSR to the position of the dominant military power in the world.

6. No effort is made to fix a period of time within which attainment of these objectives by Russia might be reasonably expected. However, regardless of when attained, their attainment at any time under currently existing world power relationships, would represent a grave menace to US security and to the peace of the world.

M. B. Ridgway

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
  1. Secretary Patterson transmitted General Ridgway’s memorandum to the Secretaries of the State and Navy Departments at the suggestion of his Special Assistant, Dean Rusk. In his acknowledgment of February 18, Secretary Marshall declared that he was “in agreement with General Ridgway’s statement of the Soviet objectives” and likewise agreed “with his conclusions.” The Secretary of State further remarked that he was “taking steps to have Senator Austin and his principal assistants, as well as the officers of the Department of State who deal with these matters, informed of General Ridgway’s views and of my agreement with them.” Copies of this memorandum and the correspondence between the Secretaries were enclosed in instruction 1740 to the Embassy in the Soviet Union on February 27.
  2. A copy of this memorandum also exists in the Central Files of the Department of State, file 500.A/2–747.