740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–946: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris3
u.s. urgent
2221. For Secretary from Acheson and Hilldring.4 Immediately following tel gives background and detailed exposition of plan for your consideration designed as attempt to resolve serious crisis in ACC Germany over relationship of implementation of reparation program to common economic policies and central German agencies. Plan has two features which may be dealt with simultaneously or in any order you consider feasible:
- 1.
- Four-Power agreement to negotiate settlement of Ruhr–Rhineland issue, including perhaps related security problems, on ground not only that French acceptance of full-fledged central German agencies hinges on such settlement, but above all that we cannot indefinitely carry out present drastic reparation removals program without definite knowledge whether or not important resources of Ruhr–Rhineland will be available to German economy.
- 2.
- Provisional continuation or resumption implementation of reparation program during period of 60–90 days on condition (a) that Soviets agree to join with other powers in immediate instructions to ACC to proceed during this period with negotiations on phased plan for adoption and application of common economic policies focussed on adoption of export-import program based on certain pre-agreed principles outlined in subsequent tel and with understanding implementation common policies would be entrusted, pending establishment full-fledged German central agencies, to quadripartite allied bureaus assisted by staffs of German technical experts, and (b) that further implementation of reparation would be immediately suspended if no substantial progress made in this period in negotiations on treatment of Germany as economic unit.
Whole plan is designed to avoid threatened breakup of ACC, to remove principal blocks to reparation program, and above all, to put Soviet protestations of loyalty to Potsdam to final test in order to gauge their willingness to live up to substance as well as letter of Potsdam and fix blame for breach of Potsdam on Soviets in case they fail to meet this test.
Sent to Paris, repeated to USPolAd, Berlin as Dept’s 1074. [Acheson and Hilldring.]