740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–646: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:29 p.m.]
1199. See my 1160 May 2. At Fifty-second Coordinating Committee meeting 3 May, further consideration was given controversial question of import-export program, but without reaching agreement.
French member said he had received advices his government had placed entire German problem on agenda Foreign Ministers’ Conference, Paris. His Government remained opposed to central organs until settlement Ruhr, Rhine and related questions. It agrees treatment Germany as economic entity now and therefore had accepted British proposal for handling external trade and establishment of Allied Control Bureau. Consequently his Government felt it was not impeding execution reparations program.
Soviet member considered Quadripartite Authorities could solve all difficulties connected with import-export program, and consequently he opposed reference matter to respective governments. Soviet delegation warmly advocated common import-export program for all Germany, based on paragraph 14, Potsdam Protocol. However, [Page 548] he said that there was little purpose discussing any such program until agreement reached on (1) all plants to be delivered as reparations; (2) which plants (and character their output) are to be left German economy; and (3) which plants shall be destroyed as war potential. Moreover, Soviet delegation felt following would promote success of such program: (1) Early decision on repair of plants to provide export articles; and (2) capability all remaining plants operate capacity by 1949, as foreseen in level-of-industry plan; thus that any import-export program could only be effectual if zone commanders placed all remaining plants in operation.
General Clay replied that he thought Soviets had cart before horse and that, excepting plants on first list, all physical labor on reparations had ceased in US zone; that formulation of reparations plan (as plan only) would continue but would not be implemented until all inter-related questions settled; and US delegation did not propose find self with neither plans nor agreement.
British member felt there was little likelihood members could reach agreement until Paris Conference had concluded deliberations, and that there was no certitude that even that Conference could reach agreement on principle. He then asked Soviet colleague explain “local” impediments which made Soviet delegation believe any import-export program ineffectual now.
As explanation Soviet member only iterated that any useful program must have concrete bases. He said colleague had made clear reparations program interrupted; however, Soviet delegation unable accept responsibility therefor. He emphasized only 25% such reparations allocated Soviet Union.
Thereupon British member asked if General Dratvin2 would agree that until matter settled and Germany becomes self-supporting no power may extract reparations from current production or stocks.
When Soviet member failed subscribe to that thesis, General Robertson said British delegation must take Soviet attitude into consideration in operation of British zone. He added that, although Britain had not yet followed General Clay’s example of interrupting reparations, he felt General Dratvin’s stand obliged him to request instructions to do so.
As Soviet member insisted that his colleagues had not convinced him his attitude was mistaken, Coordinating Committee agreed postpone further discussion sine die, and report to Control Council it had been thus far vainly discussing principles of import-export program but intended pursue endeavors reach agreement as soon as possible.
- Lt. Gen. Mikhail Ivanovich Dratvin, Soviet member, Coordinating Committee, Allied Control Council for Germany.↩