[Enclosure]
The Secretary of
State to the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs (Bevin)
I have given much thought to your aide-mémoire of January 14 suggesting that our two
Governments examine the question of the entrances to the Baltic
with a view to reaching a policy which might be communicated to
the Soviet Government possibly in association with France and
the two limitrophe states, Sweden and Denmark.
As I see it, all trading and maritime nations have a general
interest in insuring free passage into and out of the Baltic for
their merchant
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ships
and war vessels, both in peace and war, and whether neutral or
belligerent. To my mind, however, there are really two problems
involved which would have to be considered separately: First,
that of the Sound and the Belts and, secondly, that of the Kiel
Canal.
The multi-lateral and bi-lateral arrangements concluded with
Denmark in 1857 establishing the Sound and the Belts as
international waterways would seem to cover, from the legal
standpoint, the question of free passage through those entrances
to the Baltic. In reality, however, as the experience of the
last war has shown, freedom of passage through these waterways
depends largely on the use of sea and air power by interested
belligerent states. You will recall, of course, that as part of
her neutrality-defensive measures Sweden mined a part of her
territorial waters lying along the Sound. Denmark, under German
pressure, did the same in World War I. Nevertheless, I agree
with you that at the appropriate time some advantages, both
political and otherwise, might be derived from a revision of the
1857 arrangements which would neutralize the Sound and the Belts
and would maintain and confirm the right of merchant ships and
war vessels of all states, whether neutral or belligerent, to
pass freely through them both in peace and war. Appropriate
provision would, of course, have to be made for contrary action
when directed by the Security Council.
The Kiel Canal, however, raises problems which to my mind are not
as readily susceptible of solution in the near future as are the
questions of the Sound and the Belts. For one thing, the status
to be given to the Kiel Canal is closely related to the regime
to be established for all of the European inland waterways.6 But even
if consideration of the status of the Kiel Canal should be
detached from consideration of the problem of the European
inland waterways, it is still, as a waterway lying entirely
within Germany, an integral part of the whole problem of
Germany’s future status.
We have studied possible solutions of the Kiel Canal problem but
have not yet reached a conclusion. We have given a considerable
amount of thought to the internationalization of the Kiel Canal
by placing it under an international administration, but leaving
the sovereignty of the Canal German. The Canal would be opened
to navigation by vessels of all states, in time of war as in
time of peace, upon the payment of tolls sufficient to cover the
administrative costs and upkeep. The affairs of the Canal would
be managed by a special international body, on which would be
represented all nations chiefly
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interested in transportation through the
Canal. This body, in turn, would be responsible to the Security
Council of the United Nations. Certain restricted areas adjacent
to the Canal might be usefully internationalized to facilitate
the operation of the international administration of the Canal,
but no “corridor” would be created. I repeat that we have not
reached any final conclusion in our own minds. I should be glad
to receive your views on a proposal along the above lines.
I am not so optimistic as is Mr. Lie that the Russians will leave
Bornholm when the question of the Kiel Canal and the other
entrances to the Baltic has been settled and would prefer,
therefore, to put off a definitive solution of both problems
involved until the final peace settlements.
