Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

741.92/9–1945

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

The Government of the United States has studied carefully the aide-mémoire from the British Embassy dated September 8, 1945 relating to Siam and the revised Text of Heads of Agreement with Military Annex presented to the Department of State on September 10.

The expression by the British Government of its desire to go as far as possible to meet the views of this Government is appreciated. This Government has approached its consideration of the proposed agreements in similar spirit and with a desire to avoid embarrassing the British Government or any of its allies which are at war with Siam. This has already been demonstrated by the withdrawal last month, at the urgent request of the British Government, of this Government’s resolution to extend the scope of UNRRA operations to include Siam.⁵⁷

Siamese Rice

This Government welcomes the acceptance in principle by the British Government of the principles of the tripartite agreement relating to Siamese rice which it proposed. It concurs in the change suggested by the British Government that export duties on Siamese rice should be limited, without the consent of the Rice Commission, to those in force on December 7, 1941 instead of August 15, 1945, as set forth in the American proposal. It agrees also that the prices to be paid for rice should be fixed by the Siamese Government in agreement with the Rice Commission having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas. The meaning of the suggestion that the operations of the Rice Commission be under British direction is not clear, but it is assumed that it is intended by this suggestion that at least the senior personnel engaged in the execution of operations approved by the Rice Commission be British. This Government has no objection to the suggestion as so understood, and, indeed, it would be agreeable to having the chairmanship of the Rice Commission British and most of the operational personnel British, it being understood, of course, that all decisions of the Rice Commission governing such operations would be by agreement between the British and American representation on the Commission.

With regard to the Rice Commission, this Government has recognized the need for combined Anglo-American dealing with Siamese rice because of the urgency of the problem. It does not wish to be understood as opposing future representation on the Commission of other major rice importing or exporting countries should circumstances arise indicating the desirability of adding such representation to the Commission.

The United States Government regrets the decision of the British Government to require a levy on Siamese rice unless the Siamese make a voluntary gift of rice to the United Nations. This Government also has been informed that the Siamese are considering such a gift, but it has no information as to the contemplated procedure by which such gift would be made. The most desirable procedure would appear to be a gift to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This Government believes that there would be serious administrative and political difficulties if the allocation of a free contribution of Siamese rice had to be made by the Combined Food Board, as every rice-importing nation might wish a share regardless of practical considerations.

If a free contribution is not made by the Siamese Government and if the British Government adheres to its decision to require a levy on Siamese rice, this Government believes that that is a matter for British-Siamese determination and should not be part of any agreement entered into on behalf of or for the benefit of the Allies. This Government is unable to concur in the suggestion that discharge of such a levy should precede the application of the principles proposed in the tripartite agreement and that such agreement should apply only to further production and exports of rice. It believes that the United States and other countries not at war with Siam should be able to purchase, from rice stocks presently available in Siam as well as those hereafter available, the amounts of rice allocated to them by the Combined Food Board at the same time that the British procure the amounts allocated to them by the Combined Food Board. If the British Government insists upon a levy on Siamese rice some British-Siamese arrangement might be made bilaterally whereby rice allocated from time to time by the Combined Food Board for British use could be procured by the British free of charge until the total agreed amount of the levy had been so allocated and procured. By this procedure, the interests of the nations not participating in such levy as well as the interests of the British Government would be fully protected.

With regard to the amounts of rice stocks now available in Siam, this Government has already communicated informally to the British Embassy an estimate which it has received, made on August 2, 1945 by the Siamese authorities in Bangkok, that the amount of rice available for export from the 1944 crop will be about 780,000 metric tons and that the coming crop will probably yield, because of early rains and a drastic reduction in tilled acreage, an export surplus of only 510,000 metric tons. This Government had received earlier an estimate from the Siamese Minister in Washington that stocks on hand totalled about 1,500,000 tons, but it was never able to secure verification of this estimate which it believes may have been based on prewar exports.

This Government welcomes the prompt action which the British Government is taking for the immediate collection, bagging, transport and shipment of Siamese rice as indicated in Paragraph 19 of the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 8. It is assumed that such shipments will be in accordance with Combined Food Board allocations and any questions of prices or of procurement without charge will be settled later in accordance with agreements made by the Siamese with the proposed Rice Commission and any British-Siamese agreement relating to free rice. This Government would appreciate receiving information on matters affecting Siamese rice obtained by any British rice personnel who may enter Siam before American rice personnel.

It would appear that the British and American Governments are in agreement on the principle that the control of Siamese rice and certain other exports should continue during the immediate emergency period that these commodities are in short supply. This Government, however, attaches much importance to the specifying of a date when an agreement of the nature contemplated would expire, with such provision as seems advisable for the renewal of the agreement for a specific period or for its prior termination upon a clearly determinable event. This Government assumes that the acceptance in principle by the British Government of the principles of the suggested tripartite agreement includes the provisions for its termination and renewal as set forth in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Annex to the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 1.

It is understood that the provisions of Clauses 15 and 16(b) of the Military Annex are not intended for inclusion in an agreement to be negotiated by the Supreme Allied Commander, but are intended to summarize in succinct form the basic principles to be included in the proposed tripartite agreement. To avoid possible confusion and ambiguity, it is hoped that Clauses 15 and 16(b) of the Military Annex will be amended so as to conform, in respect to duration and termination, to the provisions of Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the principles of the proposed tripartite agreement.

This Government considers that the references in Clauses 15 and 16(b): “an appropriate organization which may be set up by the United Nations”, “such similar authority as may replace these Boards”, and “other authority acting on behalf of the Allies”, are also not sufficiently definite. It would urge that any such references should be to “any successor body [to the Combined Board]⁵⁸ determined by the United States and Great Britain”.

It is noted that there has been added to Clause 15 the phrase “to regulate trade in and production of these commodities”, which phrase did not appear in Clause 22 of the Text of the Military Agreement originally communicated to the Department on August 20. This Government would have no objection to the phrase if amended by the insertion of the word “stimulate” before the word “production”. Any connotation of limitation on production implicit in the word “regulate” would thus be avoided, and the phrase would more accurately reflect the objectives sought.

If the foregoing suggestions are approved by the British Government, this Government will be glad to agree that the principle of combined instead of competitive action in the stimulation of production and export of rice from Siam during the period of the proposed tripartite agreement be accepted from the outset.

Military Annex

This Government understands that those clauses included in the Military Annex which are of Allied military or quasi-military concern will be included in a military agreement to be concluded by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, with the Siamese Military Mission acting on behalf of the Siamese Government; while those clauses not of such military or quasi-military concern will be covered by other agreements such as the proposed tripartite agreement relating to rice and Combined Board allocations.

It is assumed that it would be proposed to include Clauses 1 through 14 and Clause 17 in the military agreement. This Government welcomes the changes which have been made by the British Government in the revision of those clauses. There are still, however, a few points on which this Government hopes that a closer reconciliation of views can be achieved.

Clause 4. This Government has taken note of the British viewpoint that Siam must make compensation for all losses or damages sustained by British property, rights and interests regardless of whether the Siamese Government or the Japanese were responsible therefor. This Government has expressed its view that it would not be just to require Siam to pay compensation for Japanese looting or other damage, especially prior to the Siamese declaration of war, because the only Siamese responsibility for such loss or damage was their yielding after several hours of resistance to overwhelming Japanese armed aggression. It hopes that the British Government may yet accept that view.

It recognizes, however, that insofar as British interests are concerned the matter of compensation to be paid by Siam is a matter for British-Siamese determination. In the text of Heads of Agreement that point is fully covered on behalf of British interests. In Clause 4 of the Military Annex identical language is used applicable to all Allied property, rights and interests. By its terms the United States would thus be included. This Government believes that even though the British Government may desire to retain intact Clause 3 of the Text of Heads of Agreement, Clause 4 of the Military Annex should be amended by adding the words: “for which Siam might be deemed responsible.” This Government does not believe that the requirement that Siam pay compensation for all losses or damage sustained should be included in the military agreement. Clause 4, if amended as requested, would meet the minimum requirements on which all are agreed and permit the countries concerned to negotiate by separate agreement (as the British Government proposes to do in the Heads of Agreement) for additional compensation if they desire to do so.

Clause 11. This Government would prefer to see the provisions of Clause 11 limited in their application to matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan. It is understood, however, that the British Government attaches considerable importance to not expressly so limiting the application of that clause and it does not desire to embarrass the British Government by pressing for an amendment. This Government understands that when the state of war has been liquidated by the conclusion of an agreement based on the Heads of Agreement and its Military Annex as a whole, it would be the intention of the British Government to limit the application of Clause 11 to such matters. Under the circumstances, this Government does not request an amendment of Clause 11 but it expresses the hope that the Supreme Allied Commander will in actual practice limit its application to matters of military concern arising from the settlement of the war with Japan.

Clause 13. This Government would not be willing to have Clause 13 included in an Allied military agreement, and would prefer to see its omission from the Military Annex believing that the question of a military mission is a matter to be raised by the Siamese with the Government or Governments whose advice the Siamese desire.

Clause 14. This Government would also be unwilling to have Clause 14 as now stated included in an Allied military agreement. It would not object to the inclusion of the first part of the clause (through the word “Allies”) if inserted as a subparagraph of Clause 11 and if subject to the same understanding which this Government has with reference to Clause 11. It could not be associated, however, with controls over the Siamese economy which were not related to matters of military concern to the Allies in the settlement of the war with Japan or not embodied in the principles of the proposed tripartite agreement relating to rice and Combined Board allocations as set forth in the Annex to the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 1 and as modified by this aide-mémoire.

Clauses 15, 16(a) and 16(b). As stated in the discussion on Siamese rice, this Government assumes that it is not intended to include the points covered by Clauses 15, 16(a) and 16(b) in any military agreement to be negotiated by the Supreme Allied Commander. It hopes, however, that those clauses will be changed as indicated in that discussion before their final inclusion in the Military Annex.

Heads of Political Agreement

This Government welcomes confirmation of its understanding as to the use of the term “Siamese Liberation Government” in the text of Heads of Agreement communicated to the Department on August 20.

It also welcomes the change of language which has been made to clarify the intent of Clause 5 of Section D with regard to tin and rubber.

Section E was not communicated to this Government until after the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 1 had been prepared and was therefore not considered in its comments in that aide-mémoire. That section has now been examined and this Government has no comments to offer thereon.

It regrets that its study of Section C relating to postwar strategic cooperation is not yet concluded but it hopes to communicate its views on that section within a very few days.

Its views with regard to the requirement that Siam pay compensation for all losses or damage sustained by British property, interests or rights have been set forth in the discussion of the Military Annex.

This Government has, therefore, only one matter in the Heads of Agreement on which it desires here to comment. It welcomes the assurance by the British Government that Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Paragraph D of the revised Heads of Agreement are not intended to preclude the granting of equally favorable treatment to nationals of any or all United Nations. This Government does not feel, however, that that assurance clarifies the intent of the British Government on the basic question raised in the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 1. The British Government has given repeated assurance that it desires Siam to resume her place in the community of nations on the basis of full equality with other sovereign and independent states. This Government would, of course, have no objection to the British Government seeking from Siam national and most favored nation treatment on a basis of mutuality; but the language of Clause 4 could be interpreted to prevent the Siamese Government without the consent of the British Government from establishing any monopolistic industrial, commercial or economic enterprise, whether publicly or privately owned; or from reserving ownership of certain industrial, commercial pr economic enterprises to Siamese nationals; or from reserving certain economic or professional pursuits to Siamese nationals. Any such unilateral limitation in the opinion of this Government would deprive Siam of full equality with other sovereign and independent states. This Government did not intend to imply in the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 1 that representations against unreasonable restraints on participation in Siamese economy and trade might be made by the British Government during a period when it did not have diplomatic relations with Siam. It did mean to object to such an infringement of Siamese sovereignty, as the language of Clause 4 might be construed to imply, and to offer to join with the British Government, after Siamese sovereignty and independence is reestablished and diplomatic relations resumed, in opposing any action which the Siamese might take along the lines suggested unreasonably restricting participation by United Nations nationals in Siamese economy and trade.

This Government again urges the British Government to give assurance that by Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D it does not intend to seek unilateral control, insofar as British interests are concerned, over the power of the Siamese Government in the exercise of a sovereign right to determine conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade.

Recognition of Siamese Government

In the Department’s aide-mémoire of June 25 there were set forth the conditions on which this Government proposed to recognize the Siamese Government. Under conditions as they now exist this Government would expect to resume diplomatic relations with the Siamese Government at Bangkok when that Government has abrogated the treaties and agreements entered into by the Pibul government with the Japanese. It believes that such abrogation will take place shortly.

It would like to have a diplomatic representative in Bangkok as soon thereafter as possible, but it would not wish to take action which might cause any embarrassment to the British Government. It would not feel justified in delaying resumption of diplomatic relations for any considerable period, but if the British Government contemplates that its negotiations will be completed and that it will resume diplomatic relations with Siam in the near future, it would be willing if desired by the British Government to defer action on its part for a reasonable period of time so that resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam can take place concurrently.

On resumption of diplomatic relations, this Government proposes to assign a Chargé d’affaires ad interim pending the arrival of a Minister, which might be deferred for several weeks. If concurrent recognition takes place as suggested, it is believed that it would be desirable that the first diplomatic representatives of the two Governments have equal status and this Government hopes that such suggestion would be agreeable to the British Government.

Washington , September 19, 1945.

57. Withdrawal was directed by the Department in telegram 6533, August 4, 2 p.m., to London, which read: “Reurtel 7860 of August 4. Dept favors alternative (B).” (840.50 UNRRA/8–445) For telegram 7860, August 4, 1 p.m., from London, see vol. ii, p. 1003.
58. Brackets appear in the original aide-mémoire.