741.92/9–1045
The British Minister (Sansom) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)52
The following is the substance of an oral communication which I made to you yesterday:—53
- (1)
- The Heads of Agreement and its Annex54 are linked together by Clause 6 of Section B of the Heads of Agreement and jointly represent the conditions on which H. M. Government are prepared to terminate the state of war with Siam and to recognise the Siamese Government.
- (2)
- The Siamese representatives will be told, when the Heads of Agreement and Annex are communicated to them, that our conditions do not at present cover the question of the territory acquired by Siam from Indo-China in 1941, because it is assumed that this question will be settled separately between Siam and France to the satisfaction of the latter in an Agreement to be negotiated at the same time as our own. But we do not recognise any territorial changes which have been made under duress since the outbreak of the World War, and in view of France’s position as our Ally we therefore reserve the right to cover the question of this territory, if necessary, in our own Agreement with Siam and to put forward provisions to that effect at any time during the negotiations.55
- (3)
- The comments of the Department of State in their Memorandum of September 1st and those of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in their Memorandum CCS 906/456 appear to be based on a suspicion that we are seeking to impose military and economic domination over Siam and to continue, for an indefinite period after the state of war with [Page 1323] her has been liquidated, such servitudes, restrictions or controls as may be immediately desirable. Such a suspicion would be entirely without foundation and we have sought to remove it in our revised texts by indicating, as far as it is practical to do so in present circumstances, the time limits which we have in mind for the duration of some of the obligations which in their original form the Department of State or the U. S. Chiefs of Staff desire to see limited.
For instance, the purely military facilities specified in the Annex are now requested “for so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of all matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war against Japan.” As we have already indicated, we cannot agree that, so long as our state of war remains unliquidated, the action of the Supreme Allied Commander and the rôle of our forces in Siam should be limited necessarily or solely to matters concerned with the surrender of Japanese forces. But, once the state of war with Siam has been liquidated (by the conclusion of an Agreement based on our Heads of Agreement and its Annex as an integral whole) the situation will be different. We should then see no objection to the question of facilities for Allied troops in Siam being linked to the conclusion of all matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war in Japan, including in particular the removal of all Japanese forces from Siam. This is of course without prejudice to any action which the United Nations organisation might see fit to take, either after the admission of Siam to membership in the United Nations or before such admission in virtue of Clause 2 of Section C of the Heads of Agreement.
- Addressed also to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.↩
- Covering memorandum of conversation of September 10 by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs not printed.↩
- Supra.↩
- In an aide-mémoire of August 31, the British Embassy stated that in the draft Heads of Agreement to be presented to the Thais, references to Franco-Thai territorial questions would be excluded as “It is now assumed that these questions will be dealt with in a separate instrument to be negotiated by the French Provisional Government with the Thai Government.” (740.00119 P.W./8–3145)↩
- Latter not found in Department files.↩