856E.00/11–845
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
Mr. Everson called to inform the Department of further developments in Java and stated in substance as follows:
On October 23 General Christison, British Commander, and Mr. Dening, political adviser, met with the Indonesian leaders, including Soekarno and Hatta. They explained the three-fold purpose of the British as being to evacuate prisoners and internees, disarm the Japanese, and maintain order where it was necessary for their troops to go for those purposes. Mr. Dening persuaded the Indonesians to be willing to listen to van Mook, Acting Governor General.
On October 31 van Mook handed the Indonesian leaders a statement of the Dutch intentions. The Embassy has not received the text of the statement but a telegraphic summary includes the following promises: (1) Internal self-government (though with some possible reservations); (2) Participation by Indonesians in affairs of the Kingdom as a whole (specific reference apparently made to admission of Indonesians to Dutch Foreign Service); (3) Abolition of race discrimination (abolition of separate courts for Indonesians and Europeans mentioned); (4) Economic opportunity for Indonesians; (5) Expansion of education; (6) Recognition of the Indonesian language as official (it is not known whether this applies to the entire Kingdom or to the NEI); (7) Adoption of a welfare policy for the Indonesian population.
It was intended that at eight P.M., Batavia time, November 8, van Mook would formally meet with the British, Dutch and Indonesians and present the plan as a basis of negotiating the future of the NEI. The plan was to be published on November 8 before the meeting. It is known, however, that there was a leak of two copies to Javanese reporters and the accounts which have appeared in the press may or may not have been based on the official text and it is probable that in view of the leak the text may have already been published.
Some weeks ago van Mook was authorized by the Dutch Government to talk with anyone. Van der Post, an Englishman purposely left behind by Wavell23 and interned in Java, on whom the British rely heavily, was sent to The Hague where recently he saw several of the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister. He thought that he had persuaded them that they must leave to van Mook the right to use his judgment regarding those with whom he should deal. The [Page 1171] British still hold to the view that negotiations would be fruitless unless Soekarno is present. The Dutch, however, insist that van Mook has no authority to negotiate with Soekarno. A leading Dutch official has informed the British Ambassador at The Hague that Dutch opinion against recognizing Soekarno as one of the nationalist leaders is so strong that if the Dutch Cabinet authorized negotiations with him the Cabinet might fall.
Meanwhile, the British are continuing to build up their forces to two divisions and are again permitting Dutch troops to be moved into the NEI. The number of these, however, is small and Mr. Everson understands that the present target figure is to build up the Dutch unit in Java to between 3500 and 5000 men.
While recognizing that Soekarno, Hatta and Soebardjo intend to be cooperative with the British, it is felt that they do not control the armed bands that are shooting and looting. Following the killing of General Mallaby24 at Soerabaya General Christison issued a proclamation that the band responsible for Mallaby’s death must lay down their arms and Mallaby’s body must be returned by November 8 or he would take stern action against that band. Such action would be taken deliberately to show to the Indonesians before the proposed meeting of November 8 that the British mean to stamp out lawlessness which affects the British or prisoners and internees. It is felt that the lawlessness is directly the result of local anarchy arising from the lack of any strong governmental control and that any strong organization could put a stop to it.
With regard to the proposed meeting, the Embassy does not know whether in fact it will be held in view of the difference between the British and Dutch over the admission of Soekarno. A compromise has been suggested that Soekarno be officially present but not officially participate.
With regard to the British position relative to restoration of Dutch control of the Netherlands East Indies, there is no British commitment to restore the Dutch if the situation “flares up into a big thing” nor, on the other hand, is there a decision or commitment that they will withdraw should the situation so develop. The British continue to pin their hopes to successful Dutch-Indonesian negotiations.
Mr. Everson then delicately inquired whether there was a possibility that the United States might be planning to take some position or action (beyond Mr. Vincent’s statement and the removal of the “U.S.A.” initials from trucks). I gathered the impression that he hoped we would take a position supporting the British in seeking a peaceful settlement.
[Page 1172]Mr. Everson telephoned a short while later to say that word had just been received that the meeting scheduled for the eighth had been postponed until the fifteenth because Soekarno felt that he must go upcountry to attend a youth conference and a labor conference because his absence might result in disorder.