856E.00/11–745: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6 p.m.]
11701. Increasing concern of Foreign Office over situation in Java was made evident this morning when Sterndale Bennett21 during informal talk with officer of Embassy appealed for US understanding and sympathy with difficult position in which British find themselves. He pointed out that British task has been complicated by fact that Java was only included in SEAC (Southeast Asia Command) on August 15 and that Britain did not have readily available sufficient troops and munition or adequate flow of intelligence from Java which would have prepared them for task they would face. British had hoped their action could be confined to releasing prisoners and internees and securing Jap surrender but they have been faced in addition with serious political crisis.
For some time British have been urging Dutch to make a public statement of what actions they are willing to take in order to implement [Page 1169] Queen Wilhelmina’s 1942 proclamation. This statement has now been released by Dr. Van Mook sooner than expected due to a leakage to the press. According to Sterndale Bennett, the statement, substantially as published, has been in hands of Indonesians for about a week. Britain believes statement to be helpful and a good basis for discussion providing Dutch officials in Java are allowed to act as they deem best on basis of their knowledge of local conditions. Dutch in Holland have been very stubborn and have made solution of the problem much more difficult by their disavowal of Van Mook’s talks with Soekarno.
While British believe Soekarno’s influence and position have been exaggerated and agree that negotiations should not be held with him alone, they do feel he should not be excluded from any talks and they have so informed the Dutch. British apparently feel that by singling out Soekarno as the one person with whom negotiations will not be held the Dutch would only give him more prestige than he would otherwise have and place him in position of false importance. In urging upon Dutch advisability of including Soekarno in any talks, British have pointed out that in Burma they did not refuse to negotiate with Aung San22 even though he had commanded armed Burmese forces against Britain.
British believe on basis of their latest information the extremist elements among Indonesians are comparatively small and that the more moderate elements are beginning to see difficulties which would be involved in immediate independence. Van Mook and other Dutch officials on the spot apparently believe moderate Indonesians are willing to talk and that equitable settlement can be achieved providing they are left alone and not interfered with from The Hague.
British position is complicated by fact that while they recognize Dutch sovereignty in the Netherlands Indies they also see the necessity for a gradual growth of local autonomy. British feel they have pressed Dutch in Holland about as far as they can and greatly fear that if The Hague persists in its refusal to talk with Soekarno there will be large scale outbreaks which will require British forces to quell. In such eventuality British apparently consider themselves committed to use required forces but are hoping against hope that it will be unnecessary. However should outbreaks eventuate and British troops be engaged in large scale activities, Foreign Office hopes US will understand that British are only carrying out an Allied task in an area which was suddenly placed under their responsibility without their asking.
Sent to Department repeated to The Hague as 37.