740.00116 PW/11–1745

The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
No. 58

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram 136, November 15,3 and despatch No. 57, November 16, 1945, in regard to major Japanese war criminal suspects whom we have recommended be arrested at this time for trial, and especially to the case of Prince Fuimimaro Konoye.

There is enclosed a memorandum4 on the subject of Konoye’s war guilt prepared by Mr. E. H. Norman, a Canadian national, author of Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State who is in Tokyo as representative of the Canadian Department of External Affairs and who is temporarily acting as chief of the Research and Analysis Section of the Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer of General Headquarters. This memorandum comprises, in our opinion, a very able presentation of the political case against Konoye and is of special interest at this time because, we understand, there is considerable reluctance in some quarters to arrest Konoye along with the other (major suspects still at large. The memorandum was originally written by Mr. Norman for Allied General Headquarters.

In his “Conclusion” Mr. Norman states in part:

“The most valuable service which Konoye performed on behalf of Japanese aggression was one which he alone could have accomplished—namely the fusing of all the dominant sections of the ruling oligarchy, the Court, Army, Zaibatsu and bureaucracy. His prestige with the Army and his unassailable position at Court uniquely equipped him to reconcile personal differences among the various leaders, to remove the frictions between the Army cliques, to quiet the fears of the more timorous business leaders, to show the Army intransigeants the need for appeasing the Zaibatsu, to choose from the higher bureacracy those men most suitable to administer the war program.

In only the final event does Konoye escape full responsibility, namely, for the launching of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is a very considerable exception and one of which the Prince with his able coterie of henchmen including journalists, courtiers, and young brain trusters is making the most by direct and indirect propaganda. Yet he was the Prime Minister and continued to be Prime Minister through July 1941 until mid-October during which months the question of a war with the United States was fully canvassed and fairly faced both in the Cabinet and at least in the Imperial conference.

In other words, Konoye set in motion those policies and alliances which could only lead to a collision with the Western powers. Even though he stepped aside in favor of Tojo in October 1941, he still bears [Page 972] a heavy responsibility both moral and legal (if he had a serious change of heart in October 1941), since he made no move such as summoning an Imperial conference while still Premier to prevent the coming Japanese attack upon the United States and Britain”.

As is well known, Konoye was Prime Minister when Japan attacked China, entered the Tri-Partite Alliance with Germany and Italy, invaded French Indochina, adopted the National Mobilization Law5 which laid the foundation for the command economy for total war, and abolished the old political parties. He created the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and was its first president. While there is some question as to what effect his arrest might have upon the present Government, the widepread criticism of him and his past policies in the press suggest that the effect would not be adverse. The question of his nobility, i. e. his closeness to the Throne and whether his arrest would raise the question of the war guilt of the Emperor, is one for which there is even a Japanese solution in the thesis, which is being publicized in the Japanese press these days, that political responsibility rests in the Emperor’s advisers but never in the Emperor because the Emperor acts only in accordance with the recommendations of his advisers. It seems entirely inappropriate that a man with Konoye’s political history should escape formal investigation as a war criminal suspect and that he should continue to participate in important governmental activities.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
  1. Not printed.
  2. Dated November 5, not printed.
  3. It was promulgated on April 1, 1938.