740.00119 Control(Japan)/11–1245: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 12—11:10 p.m.]
3828. ReEmb’s 3815, November 9, 11 p.m. This evening Molotov handed me a statement in Russian which he said for convenience his interpreter had translated unofficially. Embassy’s translation is as follows:
“Consideration has been given by the Soviet Govt to the United States reply to the Soviet amendments to the United States’ proposals re control machinery for Japan and Far Eastern Commission which Ambassador Harriman handed Molotov on November 9.
1. As is evident from the United States reply, the latter does not wish to see the difference between the situation in Japan during the period of the disarmament of the Japanese Armed Forces (August–September) when the Supreme Commander operated without any control or an Allied control organ and the situation after the termination of their disarmament when there arose the necessity of creating an Allied control organ. Proceeding from this conception, the United States Govt apparently intends to maintain in general without change all the rights and privileges of the Supreme Commander [Page 846] which he enjoyed in the August-September period when he established and changed the regime in relation to Japan, formed and dismissed the Japanese Govt at his own discretion without knowledge of the Allied representatives in Japan. But such a conception excludes the necessity of creating a control organ worthy of being called a control organ. The Soviet Govt cannot agree to such a conception for it cannot help taking into consideration the fact that after the termination of the disarmament of the Japanese Armed Forces a new situation was created in Japan, new questions arose of a political, economic, cultural, administrative, financial character, whose correct solution would be impossible under a simplified, purely military approach to the matter and without the presence of a control organ.
2. The information of the United States Govt regarding the position of the Soviet Govt and Generalissimus I. V. Stalin contains elements of inaccuracy.
I. V. Stalin recognized and continues to recognize that the United States has more responsibility in Japanese affairs than the other Allies, but he never agreed that the United States alone should have this responsibility for he considers that those Allied Powers whose forces took an active part in the defeat of Japanese Armed Forces also bear this responsibility.
I. V. Stalin recognized and continues to recognize that in deciding the majority of questions the decisive voice rests with the Supreme Commander, as the permanent chairman of the control organ, but I. V. Stalin has never agreed that such a right rests with the Supreme Commander in all questions without exception for he considers that, in all cases of disagreement, the Supreme Commander enjoys the final voice except in those few cases when it is a question of matters of principle, such as questions of change in the regime of control of Japan, changes in the composition in the Japanese Govt, et cetera. That is why in conversation with Mr. Harriman, I. V. Stalin took exception to the example of the Advisory Commission in Italy and recommended that the example of the Control Commission in Hungary and Rumania be followed, he having in mind the position of the Control Commissions in these countries which was established after the surrender and disarmament of Germany.
In all of this, the Soviet Govt is solidly with I. V. Stalin.
The reference of the United States Govt to the effect that such questions of principle shall be discussed in the Far Eastern Commission and not in the Control Council, that the Control Council will deal only with the execution of the directives of the Far Eastern Commission cannot be considered convincing since, according to opinion of the Soviet Govt, control has an important significance not only in the formulation of directives but particularly in the execution of these directives on the spot, in Japan.
The Soviet Govt considers it expedient that the control organ should be called a Control Commission or Control Council since such a title correctly reflects the functions and the character of the work of this organ as a control organ. It is not a question of this organ being made up of military representatives but of the fact that it will execute control over Japan not only in military questions but also in all other questions of a political, economic, cultural, administrative and financial nature.
[Page 847]4. The Soviet Govt also considers it advisable that in the solution of questions in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission the principle of unanimity of the principal powers should be preserved. This principle has been successfully applied in the war. It is contained as the basis for the voting procedure in the Security Council. It would be correct also to preserve it in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.
5.19
From the aforementioned, it appears that the United States Govt has no reason to fear that if the Soviet amendments are accepted it “would be paralyzed in issuing any directives to the Supreme Commander”. The United States Govt may rest assured the Soviet Govt does not intend to diminish the pre-eminent rights of the USA in Japanese affairs. The Soviet amendments have only the following simple and elementary objectives:
- a.
- To see to it that the participation of the Soviet Union in the control over Japan would not appear to be decorative;
- b.
- To assure such conditions of cooperation in the control over Japan through which the Soviet Govt might also bear responsibility;
- c.
- To assist so as to provide for, in the control over Japan, an agreed upon system of undertakings free from chance events (sluchaiinykh pomentov) and one which complies with the general interest of the Allies.
Moscow, November 12, 1945.”
After reading the statement, I informed Molotov that the position of the Soviet Govt would not be acceptable to the United States Govt for the reasons I had given him in our last meeting. I referred specifically to the position of my Govt as stated in written document I had left with him. I said that Stalin, in his conversation with me, had clearly recognized that the last voice should rest with the United States, since we had the responsibility for occupation, whereas the position Molotov was now taking was in effect similar to the position in Germany where action could not be taken without unanimous agreement.
Molotov argued these points, repeating substantially the wording of the written statement but emphasized that the United States should have the primary responsibility on everything except a few matters of fundamental importance and referred continually to the question of changes of govt, mentioning no other type of case. He said that his proposal was in no way comparable to the German situation but resembled Hungary and Rumania. I said that I understood Marshal Voroshilov20 had been discussing with the Hungarians the composition of a new govt and inquired whether he had ever consulted his [Page 848] British and American colleagues on this matter. Molotov feigned ignorance, stating that the new govt had not been decided upon.
I went over the ground again, explaining that we had every intention of consulting the Soviet Govt and our other Allies on such matters and that the proposed procedure, specifically fundamental questions as changes in govt, and reiterated his phrase that the Soviet Govt representatives should not be “only decorative”. I explained that there could be no exception to the final voice of the United States as we had the responsibility for the occupation. If the Soviet Govt was completely dissatisfied with the decisions of the United States, it could withdraw from Japan, whereas it was impossible for the United States to divest itself of its responsibilities. My Govt could not accept responsibility for occupation without having a clearly agreed upon right to issue interim directives pending agreement or in the event of disagreement.
At Molotov’s request, I said that I would transmit his statement to my Govt although I saw little use in doing so as the position of my Govt had been made entirely clear in the document that I had previously left with him. Molotov gave me no clue as to what the Soviet Govt would do when faced with your official reply. He appeared unwilling, however, to accept my statement as the final position of my Govt.