740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–945: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 10—1 a.m.]
3815. This evening I presented to Molotov verbally our position regarding the proposed Soviet amendments as set forth in Department’s number 2303, November 7, 8 p.m., and left with him my statement in writing.
Molotov received my statement with equanimity and said he would have to study it. He pointed out that in his proposed amendment to paragraph 3 of the proposals for the Council he had indicated that it referred specifically to matters of fundamental importance, such as changes in regime in Japan, etc., which should be reached by agreement between the Govts or in the FEC. I explained that I felt he had misunderstood the functions of the two bodies and, referring to my statement, pointed out that these were exactly the matters which would be considered fully in the FEC.
He then asked whether we would agree to his proposed voting procedure in FEC. I explained that if the fundamental principle of primary United States responsibility were accepted, the question of voting procedure was open for negotiation, but that I could not tell him whether or not his suggestion could be accepted. I explained that other countries were also making suggestions on this matter.
He asked whether I had an answer regarding his proposed change in title of the Council. I replied in the negative. He appears to have this much on his mind, perhaps because Stalin has made a point of it.
In a further brief discussion I emphasized that we had every intention of consulting fully with our Allies, that our proposal provided for this. Although the proposed machinery was not the same as in the Balkans it was, we believed, better adapted to the situation in regard to Japan. He replied that in the Balkans it was true there was nothing similar to the FEC.
I pointed out also the difference in Japan as compared with the Balkans since in the latter countries the populations [Page 844] and many of their leaders were basically friendly to the concept of the United Nations, whereas in Japan we are faced with a difficult and dangerous situation which makes it all the more important that the US, in the interests of the Allies, take primary responsibility. I assured him, on the other hand, that we recognize the Soviet Union’s great interest in future developments in Japan.
It is always dangerous to predict what the Soviet’s next move will be but I am inclined to believe that Molotov will come forward with some revised proposals accepting the principle of primary American responsibility on the condition that unanimity of the 4 principal Allies is agreed to in the voting procedures of the FEC and that he will attempt to change the title of the Allied Military Council and exclude India from participation in FEC.