740.00119 Control(Japan)/11–645: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
2303. After careful consideration of your 3775 of November 5 and 3776 of November 6, it seems plain what the essence of the Soviet proposals is and that these proposals are unacceptable. Passing matters of language, to which we shall return, the heart of the Soviet proposals is contained in their amendments to paragraph 3 of the Military Council document and to paragraphs III and V of the Far Eastern Commission document. By these changes the Soviet Government proposes that all action by the United States Government in giving directives to the Supreme Commander must be in accordance with decisions of the Commission, and that these [Page 835] decisions must be reached by the unanimous agreement of the four principal powers. The power of this Government to issue interim directives is taken away. Thus the United States Government would be paralyzed in issuing any directive to the Supreme Commander unless it could obtain the unanimous consent of the four powers and a majority of the Commission. But this is not all. The Supreme Commander in turn is forbidden to issue any order upon his own initiative “on questions of principle”, should there be any disagreement on the part of any of the other members of the Council, until such question has been referred to the governments and there has been unanimous agreement among them. It thus appears that the United States Government, which has the responsibility for carrying out the surrender terms in Japan and the responsibility of enforcing those terms with its own military establishment, would be utterly unable either through the governmental machinery at Washington or through the decisions of the Supreme Commander in the field to fulfill this responsibility.
Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government seems to be a complete departure from Stalin’s statement to you and Molotov’s letter to the effect that that Government was willing to proceed along the general lines of the Rumanian model leaving to the Supreme Commander the “last word” and indicates a desire upon its part to impose in the control of Japan the same principles of unanimity which have produced such difficulty in the control of Germany. This Government has made clear from the outset that such a program is entirely unacceptable to it. In the case of the Balkan satellites, in view of the fact that the occupying forces were Soviet, the United States accepted the ultimate right of the commander-in-chief of those forces, acting on the instructions of his government, to have final decision in matters pertaining to the occupation of these countries. In Japan, the United States Government and the United States forces have on behalf of the United Nations occupied Japan and have the responsibility for carrying out the terms of surrender and the occupation of Japan. Neither this Government nor General MacArthur can be divested of nor share the responsibility for making and enforcing final decisions. It has been the desire of this Government to go to considerable lengths to bring about Allied participation in the making of basic decisions of policy through the Far Eastern Commission and to afford an opportunity to advise and consult upon the manner in which these policy decisions are carried into effect through the Allied Military Council. The practices and procedures which are proposed by this Government in the two documents under consideration are in our opinion a very considerable advance over the practices and procedures which have been followed in the Balkan [Page 836] commissions, particularly in regard to prior consultation. Thus in our opinion the counter suggestions which the Soviet Government has handed to you do not represent mere differences in wording or small matters about which adjustments could be reached, but represent a fundamental attack upon the whole principle of primary United States responsibility which we had understood had been accepted by both Stalin and Molotov.
Except for the suggestion contained in paragraph 2 of your tel 3776 providing that every member may be accompanied by an appropriate staff, which presents no difficulty, all of the other suggestions appear to be closely related to this fundamental issue bearing upon the nature and functions of both the Commission and the Council. If the Soviet Government is prepared to accept as we had hitherto believed it had done the prime responsibility of the United States Government and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, then many of the suggestions either fall away or present mere difficulties in language, otherwise they go to the heart of our position.
The foregoing is the official position of this Government for your guidance in your discussions with Soviet officials. You may also wish to mention the fact that hitherto we have proceeded according to the advice contained in the last sentence of your tel 3623 of October 22 by keeping this discussion as an informal bilateral one with the Soviet Government. This has involved considerable effort in preventing the matter from coming before the Far Eastern Commission and thus becoming a public discussion. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain this position. We therefore believe that it is of the utmost importance that the Soviet Government accept the fundamental considerations noted above. For your guidance and such use as you deem advisable, these views mean that we cannot make any substantive changes in the provisions relating to the Allied Military Council. So far as the Commission is concerned we cannot accept any impairment of the right contained in III (2) to issue interim directives pending action by the Commission. The other matters raised, particularly voting procedure, may furnish some latitude for negotiation. We cannot see how the Soviet Government can have any legitimate worry that fundamental changes in the regime for the control of Japan or in the Japanese constitution can or would be brought about without full consultation since these are exactly the matters which would be considered fully in the Far Eastern Commission.