740.00119 EW/11–645
Memorandum of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, November 6, 1945, 10:30 a.m.12
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[Page 833]Allied Participation in the Occupation of Japan
Mr. Patterson referred to a letter he had written Mr. Byrnes13 regarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which indicates approval and makes suggestions for the participation of Allied forces in the occupation of Japan. He had understood from Mr. Byrnes at the last meeting that the Russians were unwilling to send occupation forces unless some system of control similar to that of Germany were set up in Japan. Mr. Byrnes said that he understood that Marshal Stalin thought it would not be wise to send in any Allied occupation troops and that the entire occupation of Japan should be left to the Americans. Mr. Patterson inquired whether if the Russians did not wish to participate we could not go ahead with the others and said that he understood that the British and Chinese had already been invited; furthermore, that according to Mr. McCloy, General MacArthur wishes these troops to take part of the burden of occupation and to serve as a means of distributing responsibility among our other Allies. The one thing MacArthur is insistent upon is that he have command over them and Mr. Patterson does not think that the Russians would accept that. However, he did not think this made much difference. Mr. Byrnes said that unfortunately General MacArthur was not thinking of the effect on the rest of the world that he was naturally looking at the matter largely from the point of view of the problem of Japan. Mr. Byrnes felt that Stalin’s position was sound and that the presence of other Allied forces could not but be a source of considerable irritation. He believes that no one really wants to participate except the Australians. Mr. McCloy remarked that he thought the Chinese also wanted to participate. He said he felt that General MacArthur would not insist, however, on a composite force. Mr. Patterson pointed to the earlier views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and said that he favored bringing in British, Chinese and Australian troops and leaving the Russians out if they don’t want to come. Mr. Byrnes emphasized that the trouble is such a step is merely making for two worlds and preparing the course for another war. The Soviets believe that the rest of the world is ganging up on them and he considered it most important for the future peace of the world to try to work in cooperation with them. Mr. Forrestal said that to summarize Mr. Byrnes’ viewpoint it is that if we have the British and Chinese but no Russians, world opinion would oppose this arrangement and furthermore a certain school of our columnists would make a great to-do over our failure to include Russia. Mr. Byrnes emphasized that Stalin feels that he has been completely ignored on [Page 834] the question of Japan and said by way of illustration that in his conversation with Harriman14 it was the only question he wanted to discuss. The Far Eastern Commission, he said, was meeting today without Russia and he was very anxious to bring about their participation. Mr. McCloy said that the only choice, therefore, seemed to be for us to assume the full burden of occupation ourselves. Mr. Patterson pointed out that there is an aggregate difference of 100,000 if our Allies do not participate. Mr. Byrnes inquired whether the Chinese could be used. He said it seemed that it was only if the British were brought in that the difficulty arises. He wants the Joint Chiefs of Staff to know that they are not doing a favor to him by suggesting that Allied forces participate in Japanese occupation. There was some discussion of the unfortunate effects of our rapid demobilization and the pressing problem of how we will get our Army unless the universal service bill is passed. Mr. Patterson said that under the voluntary recruiting system the Army has obtained only 51,000 so far and most of these are old regular Army men. Of course, MacArthur would be happy to have a purely American force but the rate of demobilization presents a real question, Mr. Patterson said that to sum up the answer to his letter is that Mr. Byrnes wants the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the matter. It was suggested that this be arranged through SWNCC. Mr. Byrnes said that he would suggest to Mr. Harriman that he sound out Molotov further on this question.
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- Secretary of State Byrnes, Secretary of War Patterson, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal were present, together with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, Colonel McCarthy, Lieutenant Colonel Correa, and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews).↩
- November 5, p. 824.↩
- October 24 and 25; for memoranda of conversations, see pp. 782 and 787, respectively.↩