740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–2945: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 29—12:40 p.m.]
3685. The following questions I believe may be raised by Stalin concerning proposal for control machinery for Japan contained in Dept’s 2234, October 27, 6 p.m.:
1. Stalin made a particular point in conversation with me of the use of word “commission” as distinguished from “council” in connection with name of control body for Japan. The word “council” in Russian is used to refer to an executive body whereas “commission” appears to signify more accurately the functions which are contemplated. Is there any objection to adopting Stalin’s proposal that [Page 805] the body should be known as a commission rather than a council? This may appear to be a small point but it evidently has significance to Stalin.
2. No reference is made in your cable to question of whether occupational forces are to be limited to those of US or whether Soviet, British and Chinese forces are to be invited to participate. This question will automatically come up at once. Stalin indicated to me that he would agree to control machinery along lines of your present proposal on assumption that only US troops were in occupation. He stated, however, that if these other forces were to participate in occupation MacArthur’s authority would of necessity be restricted.
I very much doubt whether Stalin would agree to place any Soviet forces under MacArthur’s command, which might involve their being ordered to carry out policies which he has not approved. In addition he no doubt recognizes that differences in customs, standards of discipline and general attitude would cause considerable difficulties. On the other hand if the British and Chinese agree to furnish forces under MacArthur’s command I am fearful that Stalin would insist upon having his troops in occupation as well and in an independent zone of their own, which I understand is completely opposed to our concept.
Leaving aside other considerations, agreement with Stalin would be much easier to work out if it is decided to use only US troops in occupation. I recognize that there are special reasons for including Chinese troops. Since the US has organized, train[ed] and commanded Chinese troops it might be possible to obtain Stalin’s agreement to inclusion of the Chinese only, leaving out both the British and Russians.
3. I believe that Stalin will ask for clarification of the line of demarcation between the responsibilities of the military body and the Far Eastern Commission. It would be helpful if I could be officially informed in more detail as to the manner in which it is contemplated the two bodies would function.
4. Turning to terms of reference of Far Eastern Commission (reDepts 2235, October 27, 6 p.m.) I believe Stalin will object to proposed voting procedure. He will consider that it is aimed against Soviet Union. He will not believe that we have in mind possibility that action could be taken without our approval since this would not seem realistic to him and he would not believe or understand our willingness to have MacArthur carry out directives which did not have approval of US Govt. I doubt therefore that he will ever agree to proposed voting procedure and am fearful that even suggesting it will arouse his indignation and suspicions and lead to his insistence on unanimity of the four principal powers. I believe, however, that Stalin would readily agree that US should have permanent chairmanship [Page 806] with decisive voice and would not object if we proposed majority rule providing chairman voted with majority.
Incidentally there is one aspect of proposed voting procedure which causes me concern and which perhaps may not have been given consideration, namely the position of China in regard to requirement that three of the four principal powers be in the majority. In the event that the Soviet representative opposed some action which the other principal powers wished to take, we would confront China with a difficult decision since she would have the responsibility of casting a decisive vote against Russia and of facing all the possible consequences. China is of course vulnerable to Soviet displeasure and it would appear desirable to provide voting procedure which would allow China to refrain from voting under certain circumstances.
5. I think it is also worth mentioning that, considering what Stalin told me about his strong attitude towards India, he may well object to inclusion of India on Commission, at least until such time as her political status is clarified.
6. Although I feel that it is important to begin promptly negotiations with the Soviet Govt on these matters I suggest that my comments be given consideration before our proposals are presented to Soviet Govt.